Home/ Resources / Projects / CIA Pseudonyms / pseudonym: ZAMKA_STANLEY

Pseudonym: Zamka, Stanley R.

Definition:
David Morales.
Category:
pseudonym
Status:
Documented
Discussion:
Besides the CIA memo of 3/5/63 described below, author Larry Hancock (Someone Would Have Talked, Second Edition (2010)) includes references to Stanley R. Zamka as David S. Morales on pages 110, 113, and 424.
Sources:

104-10121-10339: OFFICE MEMORANDUM: SUBJECT IS AN ENLISTED MAN IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY

1/18/50 memo: David Morales, US Army since 1946, is identified as having security office number 39418. See 104-10121-10326: In 1949, he was assigned to the CIA in a military capacity.

104-10193-10367: MEMORANDUM:COMPROMISE OF BENDER REPRESENTATIVE AND KUBARK STAFFER TO THE AMYUM/AMRUNG COMPLEX

11/1/60 comment from WH/4/PM to C/WH/4/PA: For the MRR/AMYUM, David Morales/Stanley Zamka was running AMYUM/AMRUNG in 1960 inside Cuba, while Droller/Bender ran them outside Cuba.

104-10260-10210: DISPATCH: SUBJECT - MEETING OF CUBANS IN BAYFRONT PARK, MIAMI

This 5/15/61 memo shows Zamka as signing for the Chief of Base, JMWAVE - see 104-10171-10319, p. 2 for Paul Manson's signature - the 5/15/61 memo is actually signed by Chief of Base Paul Manson - this memo describes AMOT-2/Jose Samjenis' description of a 5/6/61 meeting in Bayfront Park, Miami, attacking any North Americans who had anything to do with the Bay of Pigs affair. The organizers includes Manolo Alonso, Carlos Garcia, Pedro Luis Diaz Lanz, and Jose A. Rodriguez Navarro. Also see 104-10193-10026 - 7/20/61 cable initialed by SRZ (Stanley R. Zamka) with the added mariginalia "for" Chief of Base.

104-10310-10020: FILE:DDCI DOCUMENTS

6/2/61 memo: Morales was described as the head of CI for JMWAVE up till after the Bay of Pigs. Morales trained the anti-Castro Cubans designated as "the future intelligence service" known as the AMOTs; the future CI officials and civil government officials" known as the AMFASTs; and "the AMCHEERs, a group of approximately 100 older, nonpolitical individuals, who received training from Morales as a reserve in intelligence personnel".

104-10121-10249: REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION - EXCEPTED APPOINTMENT FOR STANLEY R. ZAMKA

8/11/61 request for personnel action identifies Zamka to be appointed as "operations officer - DCOS".

104-10245-10085: DISPATCH: CRC PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED BY CHILE DELEGATION

1/1/62 cable from Chief of Station, JMWAVE (originated by Stanley Zamka) to Chief, TFW: "Attached herewith to addressees is a letter sent from Max Asigri-Levy to AMTIKI-1. The information is self-explanatory." Although Morales allegedly continued as JMWAVE's chief of operations until 1964, this the last known document specifically showing Zamka as Chief of Operations, C/Ops or COPS. Also see 104-10233-10131 of 11/27/61, which is the first known identification of Zamka/Morales as C/Ops in a request for approval for Operation Grieta.

104-10511-10045: 5 DISPATCH: SUBJECT - PASSAVOY REPORT NO. 327: CONFIDENTIAL REPORT OF PROVINCIAL COORDINATOR OF THE MDC IN PINAR DEL RIO TO AMBUD-1

6/15/62 cable from Chief of Station, JMWAVE to Chief, TFW: Stanley Zamka listed as "C/PM", designating him as chief of JMWAVE paramilitary operations. Also see 104-10235-10259, 6/3/62: Very articulate letter by Zamka, signing off again as C/PM

104-10171-10041: AMSPELL PROGRESS REPORT FOR AUGUST 1962

9/14/62 dispatch from Chief of Station, JMWAVE to Chief, TFW: Zamka as 'Dr. Meza' appears to be the case officer for the AMHINTS (military wing) of DRE during August 1962. His counterparts within DRE were Noemayr/Crozier (later Joannides/Newby) for AMSPELL (political wing) and Robert Q. Nelander with the AMBARBS (students).

Fabian Escalante, The Secret War (Ocean Press, 1995) https://archive.org/stream/FabianEscalanteSecretWarCubaCIA/Fabian%20Escalante%20Secret%20War%20Cuba%20CIA_djvu.txt

Nov. 1962: pp. 114: "(By) the final months of 1961...a study of the Cuban scene led (CIA) to the false belief that the most favorable territories for the uprising (included) intricate mountain ranges which could harbor a strong and well-supplied guerrilla nucleus, distant from urban centers, scarce means of communication, and a rural population sufficiently backward culturally and politically to be easily susceptible to indoctrination by agents...one of the CIA's priorities was the reorganization of the internal front. The counterrevolutionary groups and bands were structures that already existed and should be used...William Harvey met with several of these agents during the early days of 1962, to personally instruct them in the tasks they were to carry out. These included Manuel Guillot Castellanos (AMBRONC-5), Julio Hernandez Rojo (AMOT-99), Esteban Marquez Novo (probably AMBANTY-1, head of what was called AMCOBRA in 1962, Felix Rodriguez (present for Che's death), Eugenio Martinez (the Watergate burglar), Clemente Inclan Werner, Luis Hernandez Rocha (AMHINT-53), Miguel and Ramon Orozco, Alberto del Busto, Pedro Cameron and Manuel del Valle...Guillot, Marquez Novo, Fernandez Rocha, Cameron and Del Valle would be infiltrated into Cuba to organize the counterrevolution, while the rest would take charge of marine supply. Of all of them, the greatest hope was placed in Guillot Castellanos." (pp. 145-146); ...agents Miguel Orozco Crespo and Pedro Vera Ortiz were arrested in the Malas Aguas Farm in the municipality of Vinales in Pinar del Rio province. After his capture, Orozco Crespo said he had conducted 25 similar special missions against Cuba in 1962 , and that his chiefs in Florida were CIA officers, "Rip" Robertson and Robert Wall. (William "Rip" Robertson was one of the Americans who landed with the mercenary brigade of Playa Girón, on April 17, 1961 ). He also said that he had recruited people for Alpha-66 and participated in the training of these forces.

104-10506-10028: MEMO: LATIN AMERICA DIVISION TASK FORCE REPORT OF POSSIBLE CUBAN COMPLICITY IN THE JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION

3/5/63 CIA memo discusses "meeting between ZAMKA (Dave Morales) CIA and Manuel Artime for purpose of re-recruiting Artime, briefing him on brigade activities, and to provide guidance. Ruiz-Williams apparently told Artime that Robert Kennedy instructed Ruiz, Oliva and Jose Perez not to accept any money from the CRC or CIA; that Kennedy was setting aside $25,000 from families committee funds for brigade leadership use for trips, expenses, etc."

Ted Shackley, Spymaster (2005), p. 72.

Summer of 1963: Shackley and Morales would plan the Comando Mambises raids on Cuba while hanging out at Shackley’s pool in the evenings.

See Also:
Contributors:
Bill Simpich • Larry Hancock

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