Pseudonym: Urquhart, Thomas
104-10413-10038: CABLE: SUGGEST CURTIS RAISE QUESTION OF VERBATIM TRANSCRIPTIONS
7/24/63 cable "Suggest Curtis raise question of verbatim transcriptions of LIENVOY PBRUMEN take with DAINOLD (Des FitzGerald) while latter MEXI...URQUHART...is principal end user of such take..."
104-10178-10240: QJWIN'S SALARY RECEIPTS FOR AUG AND SEPT '63
10/11/63 memo: This is the last document sent to FI-D with Presland/Harvey's name on it. It is about QJWIN. This undated note from a secretary says Presland is no longer the proper addressee on these Luxembourg notes about QJWIN.
104-10414-10124: MEXICO CITY STATION HISTORY, EXCERPTS
Sept.-Oct. 1963: Goodpasture writes during the 70s in her Mexico City History that during 1963, the deputy chief at FI, Ronald MacMillan sent Walter Jessel to see the finest technical ops of the Agency.
Bill Simpich, State Secret, Chapter 4: Mexico City Intrigue – The World of Surveillance - https://www.maryferrell.org/pages/State_Secret_Chapter4.html
Sept-Oct. 1963: As Mexico City was the wiretap capital of the Western Hemisphere, it meant that Bill Harvey was still in the game in his last days at Staff D. Anita Potocki continued to reign as the queen of the Staff D files. Years later, after inquiries about a Staff D/NSA file on Oswald had been made and a Staff D Oswald biographic file had been spotted, she reported that Staff D had no file on Oswald. Staff D’s material went directly to the National Security Agency. What was the role of Staff D at the Mexico City station? I think that they were one and the same. Goodpasture was a Staff D officer. This memo indicates Chief Win Scott was also Staff D. Available personnel fitness reports indicate that all the main officers stationed in Mexico City may have been working with Staff D. LIFEAT chief Tom Keenan was Staff D. So was David Phillips, head of the Western Hemisphere covert action and the Cuba section, as well as his deputy Robert Shaw. Also intercept station chief Charles Flick. Also the station photographer Robert Zambernardi. Charlotte Bustos, WH/3/Mexico, stationed at Headquarters, also answered to Staff D. Some of the story recounted here is based on a report done by Paul Levister, a Staff D officer who was a wiretap expert. After his visit between September 22 and October 1, he wrote up a fifty page report on LIENVOY and LIFEAT.[ 100 ] Levister’s boss was a Headquarters officer whose pseudonym was Thomas Urquhart, described as the “principal end user” of LIENVOY.[ 101 ] Urquhart was a Staff D officer, and was probably Staff D chief Alex MacMillan, who had served as Harvey’s deputy chief of Staff D before Harvey’s dethroning by the Kennedys. MacMillan was close to Harvey and one of the two CIA men who attended his funeral.[ 102 ] On at least one occasion, Urquhart came to the LIENVOY intercept center and monitored Cuban calls himself.
104-10528-10133: CABLE RE TRAVEL PLANS
Urquhart came himself to Mexico City a few days later, on Oct. 6, to stay at the Hotel Francis. He was coming in regards to Joaquin Ordoqui, 201-24081, the focus of the AMROD operation.
104-10150-10001: TWO INDICATIONS ON CHART SENT REF, WOULD APPEAR TRANSMISSIONS RESUMED.
10/11/63: This Special Center Classified Message sent from FI/D/OB Vincent Thill in Washington to "SCMEXI" (Special Center, Mexico City) is dated October 11, 1963, involving FI/D/Ops slugline BYTIKO BYMOJO ZRERASE Refers to HMMA 22207 - can't find it at MFF. "Note with interest two indications on chart sent ref. Would appear burst transmissions resumed. Recommend any subsequent charts on hand in order see if there are any further indications of activity. Advise. 2. Leave aperiodic and recorders in LIMESA. Cable date and time any reactions observed. KUCLUB techs to return HQS per SCMEXI 407. At early date will send Messrs. ___ and ___ to install and leave other equipment for further search burst transmissions." (Note that Philip Agee wrote that NSA monitored burst transmissions such as these from USSR to Mexico.http://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=10008&relPageId=66&search="burst_transmissions".) Releasing officer: RA MacMillan - authenticating officer Charles W. Arnold
104-10150-10003: RECEIVER RESULTS NEGATIVE, CONSIDERED ADEQUATE.
10/25/63: Thill sends a second message on October 25, 1963. This involves AEMIQUELET, and is the same day as a mysterious ZRTAFFY letter sent from Win Scott to Richard Helms. Page 1 is 104-10150-10002 and Page 2 is 104-10150-10003. The "Special Center" may be one and the same as this Special Security Center listed in this Office of Security flowchart. It states handle through COMINT channels only. The coordinating officers were "OC/SPS" and "SR/CI/I". The releasing officer was Ronald MacMillan, the new head of Staff D. The authenticating officer was Charles W. Arnold.
104-10529-10197: CABLE: ETA 11 NOVEMBER. PLEASE RESERVE ROOM HOTEL FRANCIS
11/11/63 cable DIR 81873 from Charles Anderson to Mexico City: Urquhart came out a second time to working on AMROD in Mexico City on November 11. See 104-10062-10001 Urquhart remained until at least November 13, clearly working on the AMROD operation. See 104-10188-10052: Note that In late 1966, Urquhart is identified as the AMROD Headquarters case officer).
104-10219-10231: DISCUSSION WITH DR. TORDELLA ON WILLIAM MARTIN
1/22/64: Memorandum for the Record: Ronald A. MacMillan signs as "Chief, FI, Division D".
104-10188-10052: (ASSET) DEVELOPMENT AND PLANS.
December 1966: "The (CIA) targets have been limited mainly to CI/CE requirements...(note: at the Cuban embassies, the six lines covered by LIENVOY are basically the same lines covered during the autumn of 1963)...the Commercial Office coverage provides information on Cuban Commercial activities in Mexico and identification of firms doing business in Cuba. The Elena Vasquez Gomez target was connected to support the sensitive AMROD operation. The AMROD Headquarters Case Officer, Thomas G. Urquhart, visits Mexico on temporary duty in connection with this operation. His comments on this project are: "The take from LIENVOY continues to be of prime tactical value to the conduct of such operations as AMROD and JMROD. It enables us to know how to time our various moves, gives us the opportunity to know where the opposition figures are and gives us the general background we need to manage these operations properly."