Pseudonym: Short, Stannard K.
Stannard K. Short was the chief of the Covert Action division in Mexico City from 12/56 to 9/61. He was succeeded by David A. Phillips, who assumed this role from 9/61 to 3/64.
1/5/62, Margaret Forsythe, on behalf of C/WH/4/PA-Prop Stannard Short, wrote that Vidal was considered a security risk, an opportunist associating with people with whom CIA wanted no contact. "(Back in July 1960, Vidal) with two aides (traveled to US) to assume the post of Navy chief in FRD directorate...one of these individuals is described as needing only the slightest excuse to make public statements embarrassing and harmful to (CIA) interests..."
2/1/62 memo by C/WH/4/PA-PROP Stannard K. Short about his call from Sam Halpern on 1/23/62 asking about the backers of Radio Free Cuba.
4/9/62 dispatch, slugline "Operational/GYROSE/KUCAGE Julio Hernandez" from Chief, Task Force W to Chief, JMWAVE. The above "April Progresss Report" is described in this document: "a report of interview with Subject (Julio Hernandez) by a representative of KUJUMP in Washington, DC. Since subject is associated with the DRE and is associated with a "Mr. Rodgers", this will be of particular interest to NOEMAYR." The originating officer is TFW/PA-PROP Gabe Lowe, the Coordinating officer is C/TFW/PA-PROP S.K. Short, the Releasing officer is William Harvey.
6/5/62 memo from C.W. Matt to WAVE: "(Michael Malone) put AMDENIM-1 on the line to discuss UR joining CRC." Both sides wanted to try to work it out. C/TFW/PA-PROP identified as Bolten.
6/30/62, C/TFW/PA-PROP Seymour Bolten Memorandum for the Record: "At PASSAVOY's request, Mr. (William) Harvey arranged through Mr. Tom Parrott for PASSAVOY to call upon General Maxwell Taylor for a discussion of the former's views on AMBUD and the Cuban exile community in general...(PASSAVOY) did advise General Taylor that he had been asked by Mr. Harvey to sound out AMBUD-1 on certain individuals such as Manuel RAY, BETANCOURT, and others and the MRP in general."
8/18/62 cable sent by C/TFW/PA-PROP Seymour Bolten to JMWAVE, in response to WAVE report that "AMBUD-1 preparing declaration for press and radio on significance of Soviet troop landings to be broadcast 19 August. WAVE asks if there are any objections to this action." Bolten responded: "FYI only, (matter) referred to (State Dept) which interposed no objection but wishes (to) make it clear that this does not constitute 'concurrence'..."
1/15/63 dispatch by Gabe Lowe to Chief of Station, JMWAVE, asking if the DRE had proven there are African military forces in Cuba, with C/TFW/PA-Prop Bolten listed as a coordinating officer and William Harvey listed as releasing officer.
5/13/63: Routing slip from Seymour Bolten to C/SAS Desmond FitzGerald stating: "Attached is long-awaited memo on Castro death contingency." The actual 5/10/63 memo from the Office of National Estimates can be read at 104-10307-10022 - a related 5/7/64 memo is at 104-10307-10021. Bolten emphasized the summary of 104-10307-10022, p. 2, quoting it at the first page of the Annex in his 2/24/64 memo below: "...we believe that the odds are that upon Castro's death his brother Raul or some other figure in the regime would...take control. However, there is a good chance that a power struggle would ensue...(and) the loyalties of the military commanders, now committed to Fidel but probably divided after his death, would significantly influence the outcome. Anti-Moscow Cuban nationalists would require extensive US help in order to win, and probably US military intervention."
11/12/63 memo "dictated by Messrs. Bolten and (Alfonso) Rodriguez". Alfonso Rodriguez was the pseudonym for Earl Williamson: "At the meeting with the President, the program will be reaffirmed emphatically and we will be authorized to continue external mounted ops including sabotage against the mainland. The president will emphasize the importance of increasing internal resistance, especially those leading to a coup. He will not approve air ops." The next page has the marginalia "Seymour", stating: "Program to foment resistance and simple sabotage through propaganda: ...we do have hard evidence from intelligence reports, refugee interviews, and personal letters from Cuba that minor sabotage, passive resistance and harassment of the Castro regime has taken place...a well qualified Cuban propagandist considers the expose of the GLOSSY team (note: AMGLOSSY/Comando Mambises) as a propaganda victory for the US which impressed the Cuban people on how much had been done by Cuban exile cooperation with CIA...to move backward in our program and take a softer approach would have a demoralizing effect on the Cubans and make a psychological program to increase resistance pretty futile."
4/24/64 draft memo by SAS/SO/SB Seymour Bolten, what appears to be a successor to his earlier draft of May 1963, as seen above: "This paper deals with the probable consequences in Cuba in the event of a sudden death of Castro by accident, natural causes or assassination (NOTE: For the purposes of this paper, assassination would be limited to a single isolated act, not intended as part of a coup which calls for a completely different contingency plan.). In this context, the paper discusses the opportunities and options open to the US in the event of Castro's sudden death as well as the likely situation that would evolve should the US choose to refrain from exercising those options...During the past year, various memoranda and estimates have been drafted on the consequences of Castro's death, pertinent extracts of which are attached as Annex 1 (note: the May 1963 draft, above)...my guess is, barring a carefully devised counter-campaign by the US instituted immediately after Castro's death, the Soviet/Cuban drive for acceptance...will meet with success...Higher authority should...emphasize to the Soviets that a non-Fidel Communist Cuba is as abhorrent to US interests as one with Fidel...we must first decide whether the US can or cannot live with a Communist and Soviet-dominated Cuba 'sin Fidel'."