12/30/53: Cable from LINCOLN to Director: Slugline PBSUCCESS RYBAT: RE: DIR 32389 (OUT 60013): "Items A and B obtained by Merton (probably Jack Stewart) from Pivall (probably David Morales) in Nov 53 and placed in his files. Merton turned files over to Carla Latchford and Irving Cadick prior departing for LINCOLN (CIA's Guatemalan covert operations headquarters, a forward base in Florida)."
03/31/54: Memorandum from C/SEC, Withheld to C/P: Subject: Director's Visit: "1. For your information, the meeting and departure of the Director were effected without incident. 2. You may be interested in the Director's reactions to the briefing he received. He indicated he was very much impressed by the organization and the apparent competence of all personnel. He went over the names of the key personnel including (REDACTION), Mr. Robertson and (REDACTION). It was mentioned that (REDACTION), Chief of FI, was presently on business outside the country. Just prior to departure, the Director requested me to inform you and all the staff that he 'meant exactly what he said when he referred to this project as the most vitally important one in the Agency - to continue the good work and to give 'em hell.' 3. He asked that (REDACTION) stop in to see him the next time (REDACTION) is in headquarters."
04/15/54: Cable from Withheld to SLINCOLN (Info: Director): Slugline RYBAT PBSUCCESS: FROM LUGTON: "1. (REDACTION) met with (REDACTION) evening 14 April in order establish new channel contact and preserve continuity previous negotiations. Meeting set up by letter to (REDACTION) prepared by Lugton, apparently signed by 'Ramsey' (Cadick). Letter explained Cadick's inability to make contact 13 April and introduced (REDACTION) as individual solely responsible for future contacts. (REDACTION) as individual solely responsible for future contacts. (Princep note: SKILLET (Whiting Willauer, U.S. Ambassador to Honduras) has discreetly retired from operational contact and (REDACTION) understands not to consult SKILLET further this matter)..."
06/16/54: Cable from SHERWOOD to Director: Slugline RYBAT PBSUCCESS: "1. A. C7. B. 0610. C. 0840. D. CG 4559. E. Pilots again returned with cargo. No reception team, panels or lights at DZ. When plane arrived area was partially covered with ground fog. This dissipated rapidly. Pilots buzzed farmhouses in area in hope waking up reception team. Farmers observed working in fields. All waved but none approached DZ. As this was one shot DZ pilots stayed in area 45 minutes. No luck. DZ definitely spotted. Maps sent by Cadick were excellent..."
06/20/54: Cable from LINCOLN to Director: Slugline RYBAT PBSUCCESS: COMMAND MSG FOR CADICK: "1. General ultimatum all enemy military garrisons considered premature and counter-productive at this time. Specific ultimatum to HANK (Zacapa - Guatemalan base) on 20 June accompanied with ground and air assault as originally requested (REDACTION) is approved and urged as test case and example of SYNCARP (the "Junta", Castillo Armas' political organization headed by Cordova Cerna) military capabilities. Upon successful completion this specific mission and analysis of impact on army, consideration will be given to general ultimatum. Imperative SYNCARP lead from strength and victory in initial engagement. Coordination and timing this assault is subject to your direction. 2. Ultimatum to HANK should provide every opportunity for garrison to honorably join friendly cause. Therefore, if necessary prepare special leaflets and radio script, since your (REDACTION) considered psychologically incorrect and would only induce an Alamo reaction. Accordingly, phrase ultimatum in most honorable and Christian manner calling on anti-Communists within garrison to incapacitate all Communists or those blindly serving Communist stooge dictator Arbenz...4. You are specifically authorized to direct foregoing operation utilizing fighter air support as indicated against this specific target only. You are not authorized; nor is Brodfrost permitted to conduct any air to ground fire except as indicated herein. This is specific authority only for specific mission described. 5. Although LINC recognizes your position viz Calligeris (Carlos Castillo Armas) you are urged to present above operation in strongest terms as success at HANK is believed vital at this moment and procedure outlined has many important considerations of later value."
06/29/54: Cable from LINCOLN to Director: Slugline RYBAT PBSUCCESS: "1. Pursuant Galbond/Dunbar telephone conversation 28 June regarding possible responsibility for bombing attack on merchant vessels off WSBURNT (Guatemala) 27 June, queries to the field now clearly establishes fact such vessels had been hit by a SYNCARP pilot. 2. Briefly the circumstances appear to be a matter of the pilot knowing from discussions with Cadick that (REDACTION) had reported a vessel at San Jose unloading fuel and possibly arms and urged it be bombed. A bomb had been laid on to destroy fuel storage tanks at San Jose and apparently the pilot had not been told specifically to avoid hitting any shipping. It is also possible the pilot considered (REDACTION) request as sufficient approval and proceeded to strike the vessels while in the area. 3. Cadick had requested authority in advance to bomb above mentioned vessel at San Jose. LINCOLN reviewed the request and requested HQs authority to bomb. Reason being the available info requested rapidly worsening economic situation in WSBURNT and critical gas shortage which was being kept from serious stage by shipping from Pacific ports, PTO Barrios being cut off. One incident of bombing could well have had the effect of scaring off other shippers thereby materially contributing to economic warfare objectives of WSBURNT. Although Goodbourne had discussed this request with Dunbar and latter stated it was not a pressing matter and in view of uncertainty involved the request was withdrawn. Later SHERWOOD was told no bombing of shipping was authorized for present...4. It is highly regretted that above incident occurred and it is hoped no serious embarrassment will result to KUBARK (CIA). Every effort is being made to control all bombing targets and LINC has carefully endeavored to keep within HQs policies on the subject however in this instance it appears that a contract pilot was over eager in his effort to help achieve our objectives."
07/07/54: Memorandum from Withheld to Chief of Project: Subject: Paramilitary Activities, PBSUCCESS, June, 1954: Page 4: ..."10. Upon the arrival of Cadick the final touches were put on the plans and very shortly after he came the campaign was initiated. It should be noted here that the entire Calligeris organization had complete confidence in Cadick and in his leadership. So far as I could tell, none of his decisions were ever questioned and for that matter neither were any of mine, before he came. Calligeris made the same plea for strong air attacks to Cadick that he had made to me previously and of course he was not given any assurance whatever that air support would be forthcoming..."
07/29/54: Memorandum from C. Tracy Barnes to Director: Subject: List of those participating in briefing White House, 29 July 54, 4 - 5:30 PM: "1. Mr. Dulles. 2. Mr. Barnes (Handwritten - lawyer + OSS. (Tracy Barnes). 3. (REDACTION) - Military Intelligence General Staff, U. S. Army, WWII; Chief of Mission Korea during Korean War. 4. (REDACTION - Note: William Robertson) - 3rd Marine Division, WW II; CIA Mission in Korea; Chief PM in PBSUCCESS and Field Commander. Will talk on PM and Air operations. 5. (REDACTION) - Army Signal Corps, WW II, OSS, CIA. Has been with CIA without break since OSS days. In project Chief Commo in field. Will talk on Commo training and field operations. 6. Staff Sergeant Dave Phillips - bombardier, U. S. 15th Air Force, WW II shot down Wiener Nustadt. Newspaperman and lecturer. Will talk on Radio Liberation. 7. (REDACTION) - U. S. Army World War II, U. S. Army detailed CIA in Korea during Korean War. Will talk re living with Castillo Armas including negotiations in Salvador. 8. (REDACTION - Note: Probably Henry Hecksher) - Military Intelligence 3rd Army, WW II, OSS, CIA. 8 years in Germany for CIA. (REDACTION) will talk on high level Guatemalan Army defection essentially with (REDACTION). 9. (REDACTION) - Military Intelligence WW II, (REDACTION) Editor Neve Zeitung, American sponsored newspaper, Berlin, TIME correspondent (REDACTION). Will talk on last 24 to 48 hours, essentially the period of the Diaz Junta. 10. Frank Wisner - will talk on future plans."
Circa 1960: "In his transmittal of Robertson's first reports, REDACTED reported as follows: 'CADICK (Robertson) is now operating completely outside of REDACTED, because REDACTED wants to know nothing more than what is absolutely required that he know regarding these activities, he has given CADICK the essential cryptonyms..."
John Prados (1996), President's Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations from World War II Through the Persian Gulf
Pages 100-101: ..."On the paramilitary side, Haney also brought in William A. Robertson, Jr., a CIA trainer on Saipan, who had been Haney's deputy in Korea and enjoyed going along on the behind-the-lines missions with the CIA guerrillas, in violation of standing orders from Washington..." - - - Page 103: ..."The 'Alfhem affair' led to the first military action of Operation Success. CIA paramilitary man William 'Rip' Robertson wanted to go into Puerto Barrios with frogmen and sink the Swedish ship with explosives but Washington turned him down. Instead, he was told to send a party from Castillo Armas's 'liberation army' to blow up the railroad tracks outside the port. Robertson led the team himself and laid explosive charges on the track, but they fizzled when the detonators got drenched in a downpour. The CIA team then opened fire on one of the trains, but did not stop the ten-train convoy leaving Puerto Barrios. One anti-Arbenz solider died in the ambush.." - - - Pages 105-106: ..."Then the CIA bombed and sank a British merchant vessel. The ship was the Springfiord, which had sailed from the Pacific port of San Jose. Tacho Somoza feared the vessel carried gasoline, with which the Guatemalans might fuel their trucks and airplanes to attack Nicaragua and exact retribution for the assistance Somoza was giving the CIA. The Nicaraguan dictator turned to Rip Robertson, the top CIA officer at the airfield, and demanded that the ship be stopped. Robertson asked Opa Locka for orders but his cable arrived at two in the morning of Sunday, June 27. Al Haney and Tracy Barnes refused permission and told Robertson to use some other method - frogmen or a commando raid. This reply infuriated Somoza...Robertson, who had also been disappointed by the orders to desist, gave in and ordered up one of the fighter-bombers...the plane found Springfiord and hit her with a five-hundred-pound bomb on the second pass." (CONTINUED BELOW)
John Prados (1996), President's Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations from World War II Through the Persian Gulf
"Fortunately, no one was killed or wounded by the bomb and the ship sank slowly enough for everyone to abandon shop. Springfiord, it was later learned had carried only coffee and cotton. When news of the sinking reached Washington later that day, it destroyed the cordial atmosphere Eisenhower had been seeking to create at the summit...The British leaders allowed themselves to be mollified and the CIA later quietly reimbursed Lloyd's of London, insurers of the Springfiord, the $1.5 million they had paid out on the ship. However, Springfiord's sinking did achieve a significant psychological impact on the Guatemalan crisis. The Guatemalans finally felt pushed to the point where the army began to considered ousting Arbenz. The president was given an ultimatum and he resigned before the day was out, taking refuge in the Mexican embassy where he asked for political asylum. So Operation Success had achieved its aim after all. Despite the success of this unintended strike, the Springfiord incident had a rather different effect at CIA. It convinced Eisenhower of the necessity for more rigorous control over covert action, soon leading to establishment of a senior review group similar to Truman's 10/2 Panel. Rip Robertson was branded as a 'cowboy', and Allen Dulles fired him. In a 1966 interview with New York Times reporters, Richard Bissell conceded that the action 'went beyond the established limits of policy...'"