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Pseudonym: Page, Graham

Unknown identity. Graham L. Page was involved in the K Program in Guatemala during PBSUCCESS. A memo in March, 1954, stated that Page would be assigned to Guatemala for around ninety days and "be charged with the execution of a defection program."
The memo also mentioned that Page would be operating independently of the CIA Guatemala Station. In addition, a dispatch on June 2, 1954, mentioned that Page had visited JMBLUG (John S Peurifoy), the U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala, and briefed the latter on the K-Program. Graham L. Page appeared to have departed Guatemala sometime in June of 1954. Furthermore, Page sent Allen Dulles a telegram on June 19, 1954, with a fairly bleak assessment of the overall situation in Guatemala.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Guatemala Current Section: Persons and Pseudonyms

Page XX: ..."Page, Graham L. (pseudonym, identity not released)..."

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Guatemala Current Section: 118. 3/26/54-Memorandum From [name not declassified] to the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, Central Intelligence Agency (King)

03/26/54: Memorandum from Withheld to Chief, WHD: Subject: K-Program Plan: "1. Background: Within the purview of PBSUCCESS and designed to further the attainment of its immediate ends, it is planned to assign Page for a period of approximately 90 days to Guatemala, where he will be charged with the execution of a defection program, targeted to bring important segments of the Guatemalan executive apparatus under American control...4. Personnel:[name not declassified] will be assigned to Guatemala as Page’s field assistant. He will serve as communications clerk, interpreter, bodyguard, and discharge all housekeeping chores incidental to K-Program. 5. Schedule: Page and [name not declassified] will proceed to Guatemala on or about 15 April 1954. The labor assistant should become available not later than 20 April. 6. Official Position: For the duration of the program, Page will be stationed in Guatemala as a senior official of the Central Intell. Agency serving as the personal representative of [name not declassified] in his capacity as Chief of the Project. Although Page will operate independently of the Guatemala station, it is understood that the station’s overt and covert assets will be committed to the support of K-Program. This arrangement is not meant to derogate from [name not declassified]’s status as Chief of Station. It is anticipated that he and Page will work in closest harmony toward the implementation of the program. 7. Accreditation: Ambassador Peurifoy will be apprised of Page’s mission in broad outline and be requested to render him the necessary support within bounds of diplomatic propriety. It will be intimated to Peurifoy that Page is a ranking and responsible official of the C.I.A. and that he is operating independently of the local station. Mr. Frank Wisner has offered to write Amb. Peurifoy a personal letter along those lines...8. Personal Cover: Page will represent himself and live the cover of an American of independent means..."

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Guatemala Current Section: 168. 6/2/54-Dispatch From the CIA Chief of Station in Guatemala to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida

06/02/54: Dispatch from COS, Guatemala to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida: Subkect: General -K-Program: Specific: JMBLUG: "1. This is to advise you that Page paid JMBLUG a personal call on the evening of 1 June 1954. The meeting took place in JMBLUG’s private residence. 2. In view of certain anticipated ramifications of the SWALLOW operation, it was deemed necessary to apprise JMBLUG of what had transpired and what we are trying to accomplish. Page gave JMBLUG a general briefing on the scope and purpose of K-Program and explained that he is operating independently of the Station so as to preclude any conceivable compromise to our diplomatic representation should the Guatemalan authorities uncover his true status. 3. JMBLUG fully approved of our endeavor to enlist the support of SWALLOW in the defection of members of the Army High Command and promised to continue backstopping to the extent of vouching for his bona fides. Page advised JMBLUG that Whiting had decided against formally introducing Page to him to so as to rule out any possibility of embarrassment should there be an unpleasantness. 4. Page disavowed detailed knowledge of the progress of PBSUCCESS and of the nature of Calligeris’ operations in Guatemala, stressing the limited and strictly compartmentalized nature of the program in which he is engaged. 5. It should be pointed out that the call on JMBLUG was a move decided upon by Page acting on his own responsibility. The Station introduced Page and crowded the necessary security safeguards. Further meetings, if required, will be held in a secure, neutral place. Graham L. Page..."

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Guatemala Current Section: 173. 6/8/54-Telegram From the CIA Station in Guatemala to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida

06/08/54: Telegram from Guatemala Station to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida: "Following from Page. 1. K-Program likely remain stalemated until further pattern of PBSUCCESS clearly emerging. 2. Not a ghost of a chance to sway army high command as long as Arbenz regime going through impressive phase of consolidation with oppositional elements fragmentized and subdued. (2) Government firmly convinced U.S. has abandoned all thought of going it alone and effective collective intervention discounted (Toriello to SWALLOW). 3. Recommend K-Program be brought under Station control soonest and Page be authorized return to ZI. [name not declassified] complex can be handled through ESQUIRE. Contact with SWALLOW will be maintained by Burnett. 4. If at any future time, high command members should indicate desire talk terms with U.S. representative and if situation of manifest strength then favoring our cause, dispatch of PBSUCCESS representative would pose no problem security or otherwise. 5. Request approval for Page return to HQ not later than 10 June. ESQUIRE leaving for U.S. o/a 9 June on short visit and most appropriate effect turn over at that time. 6. Report on Page/SWALLOW meeting in 8 June pouch. (3)..."

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Guatemala Current Section: 179. 6/10/54-Telegram From the CIA Station in Guatemala to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida

06/10/54: Telegram from Guatemala Station to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida: "799. Re: GUAT 791. (2) 1. Though clearly understood that this Station has no responsibility for the K-Program and in fact is limited to being a commo channel and backstopper for Page nevertheless information obtained by us and made available to Page plus that obtained by Page from [name not declassified] (see GUAT 785 (IN 15812)) (3) leads us to believe that Page’s departure at this time is unfortunate since indications army discontent mounting and may result in conditions favorable to defection efforts either through [name not declassified] or others. 2. Since information contained LINC 3631 (IN 15716) (4) and obtained from [name not declassified] as reported GUAT 790 (IN 16092) (5) indicates SEMANTIC compromise is an inconvenience rather than disaster, we perturbed by fact no one will be on scene to handle defection possibilities which may shortly arise as friendly pressure and govt tension mount. 3. We wish point out we have no contact with any Page people and that K-Program automatically suspended with Page departure..."

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Guatemala Current Section: 188. 6/16/54-Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the CIA Station in Guatemala

06/16/54: Telegram from Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to Guatemala Station: "3895. RE: GUAT 848. (2) 1. Appreciate fully your apprehensions behalf Page however he is fully briefed by LINC on how to proceed upon his arrival. 2. With exception change in residence status all points were recognized and anticipated in above briefing. Page despite healthy desire to be cautious is fully prepared for expulsion, denial of entry and at worst apprehension by local authorities. Important point is to permit him opportunity to materialize K Program in manner originally contemplated. FYI LINC 3838 (IN 17978) (3) was prepared with his assistance and Hqs general concurrence in principle. Moreover LINC convinced that more than 'issuing marching orders' left to do. 3. Accordingly however tenuous Page’s position may be he should attempt finalization his program with fullest support your Station: In event situation denies him opportunity then Station should be prepared to pick up and follow through with [name not declassified]. 4. Therefore arrange to meet and brief Page on developments since his departure setting up usual emergency and alternate procedures in event of his forced withdrawal from operation. Resolve his residence situation soonest. Inform him of DIR 04858 (OUT 53908). (4) 5. Imperative your Station provide LINC fullest details these developments by OPIM cable as many other factors hinge upon your progress. Page has been requested to do same..."

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Guatemala Current Section: 210. 6/19/54-Telegram From the CIA Chief Station in Guatemala to the Central Intelligence Agency

06/19/54: Telegram from COS, Guatemala: ..."For Ascham from Page. 1. Effective 12 June K Program taken over by Guat Station. Page no longer in touch with either [name not declassified] or ESQUIRE. Bannister in direct contact [name not declassified] as of 15 June. Page not familiar contents GUAT 886. (3) 2. My estimate of situation, no longer based on controlled sources or access to official reports, is following: PBSUCCESS capabilities inside WSBURNT exceedingly limited and no match for combined strength law enforcement agencies, army and armed campesinos. Validity assumption underlying PBSUCCESS that local civilian insurrections will sweep garrisons into open revolt questionable, even if you take Calligeris claims regarding controlled inside assets at face value. Other intangible factors that may determine developments in provinces simply defy assessment. 3. I have on repeated occasions reported that this resolution will be won or lost in WSBURNT city and that the one determinant factor is the attitude of the Army High Command. If the Army High Command can be won over to our side ultimate success is a foregone conclusion. If it decides to back Arbenz, PBSUCCESS will not prevail. This is the principal consideration underlying K Program. 4. Our sole key to the Army High Command is [name not declassified]. I have the very greatest respect for him as a human being, an officer and a patriotic servant of his country. It is on his authority mainly that I originally proposed an air strike against military targets in the WSBURNT city area. I refuse to believe that [name not declassified] would be so swayed by self-seeking motives as to ignore counter productive effects with respect to the attitude of people WSBURNT. Although I specifically and repeatedly questioned him on that score he could not conceive of 'adequate other forms of exhibiting strengths.' Nor could SWALLOW with whom I raised that point..."

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Guatemala Current Section: 234. 6/24/54-Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida

06/24/54: Telegram to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida: "1. We have been working with ODACID (U.S. State Department) on plans for consolidation phase to determine circumstances under which PBPRIME (U.S.) would recognize a rebel government or would offer military or economic aid to a new regime. No authoritative conclusions yet reached and none likely to be until there is firmer indication revolt sufficiently successful at least produce situation in which rebels control considerable territory and sufficient forces to give them at least an even chance of overthrowing regime...2. As to immediate decisions, generally concur your instructions ref A on question desirability establishment new regime and announcement names of government members, believe must weigh two opposing considerations: A. Early action desirable in order increase air of legitimacy of rebellion and make semi-official support possible sooner if movement successful. B. Main danger this action that it will alienate army officers who either dislike Calligeris or simply prefer themselves control new regime. 3. On balance we conclude unwise announce provisional government now for reason given ref A par 1A and because effect of such action on army unevaluated. Meanwhile if traffic can stand it suggest message to Bannister, Page, and JMBLUG inquiring if they believe establishment provisional government now would reduce chances of action against Arbenz by army officers. 4. Regardless action by Calligeris believe desirable if contact re–established [name not declassified] by Page or Bannister to point out that if army moves decisively against Arbenz it rather than Calligeris will rule the country and to state that SKIMMER would support regime established by army even if it excluded Calligeris entirely..."

Gavin McDonald

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