Pseudonym: Mylkes, Francis

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Guatemala: Current Section: 85. 1/25/54-Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to Director of Central Intelligence Dulles

01/25/54: Telegram from Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to Director: "225. Ref: LINC 159; GUAT 015; DIR 222.2 From Mylkes. (REDACTION) advised report (REDACTION) arrested on charges illegal possession arms. (REDACTION) extremely worried since (REDACTION) is principal link between Calligeris and WSBURNT (Guatemala) Army officers who support his group. (REDACTION) according (REDACTION) has considerable information re personalities, plans, and organization Call–(REDACTION) Group, and from personal experience considers (REDACTION) will be tortured and confession his knowledge entirely possible."

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Guatemala: Current Section: 88. 1/29/54-Contact Report

01/31/54: Contact Report by Francis T. Mylkes: PLACE: Safe House B, Lincoln. PERSONS PRESENT: RUFUS, Withheld, Mylkes: "Discussion: 1. Following concerns only matters taken up after Galbond’s departure. Mylkes began discussion of PP organization as it pertained to LINC and to various organizations in the field. A general picture was developed as to how the PP program fitted into the overall picture and how important it was. At Galbond’s advice, particular stress was laid on how the military could be defected or neutralized...2. Before any further items of PP, or any of FI and/or PM matters could be discussed, the White Paper hit the press. (2) After Mylkes was furnished with known facts (Guat 046), (3) he was directed to check with RUFUS as to whom the possible source of this info was. LINC 3214 gave briefly that info which was gathered from RUFUS. His attitude toward Mylkes’ insistence for facts to back up statements which indicated info leak would be Somozas or Pablo or acceptance of fact that it could be his men Delgado or Capt. Sierra was one of indignation. 3. This conversation...brought up subject of security. Mylkes indicated that he was personally certain that the group would want to study all of the security considerations before continuing as scheduled. He advised that on two previous efforts the RUFUS-(REDACTION) group had been compromised at last moment, causing long delay and costly re-financing. For this reason Mylkes stated that it was his Personal opinion that RUFUS be prepared to either explain the fact with the info that his group had been penetrated on a high level from the beginning and/or current method of security and FI practices were not adequate. RUFUS defended his position strongly by saying that his men should not be judged too severely and that he, personally, was responsible since he could not establish such a system of checks and investigations with his sensitive Latin assistants." (CONTINUED BELOW)

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Guatemala: Current Section: 88. 1/29/54-Contact Report

01/31/54: Contact Report by Francis T. Mylkes: PLACE: Safe House B, Lincoln. PERSONS PRESENT: RUFUS, Withheld, Mylkes: "4. Later the same day (30 Jan.), Mylkes returned to the house and the matter of security was again brought up. At this point RUFUS, without any prompting, advised that he had learned now that Delgado had betrayed him and that he was willing to accept the ideas of the group re: security and FI Ops. Mylkes pointed out that although RUFUS would lose some authority and responsibility he would receive the benefits of better intelligence and security. He agreed and said that immediately upon his return he would issue a general order which would necessitate compliance with all measures deemed necessary by our FI officer. He said that all of those sensitive people would have to accept a general law which arose as a result of this Delgado betrayal or be removed to less sensitive jobs out of his general Headquarters. RUFUS agreed that all elements of his organization would be advised to adhere strictly to all new security regulations as suggested by our FI rep and issued by RUFUS’ command. Comment: Let’s get our fee while the tears are hot. Remains to be seen to what degree RUFUS will comply with these promises once he is in the field and is in full possession of our aid and equipment. Mylkes."

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Guatemala: Current Section: 92. 1/31/54-Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Central Intelligence Agency

01/31/54: Telegram from Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida: "311. Re: DIR 36511. (2) 1. In full discussion with Mylkes re possible sources White Paper info, Calligeris named in order: Somoza, Somoza’s son, Delgado, Captain Raul Sierra, and Seekford. He devoted considerable time to speculation that Somozas could be witting or unwitting sources, but could give no motives for such action on their part. When directly questioned why he had named Seekford, C replied Somoza Jr. had once told him Seekford security risk. C then added he himself had fullest confidence in Seekford. C extremely reluctant to consider Delgado or Sierra as sources, despite his own admission that both knew virtually all his plans, including most sensitive items of White Paper. 2. Calligeris obliquely declined to divulge Sierra’s true name to Mylkes. (Note Sierra action re KUCLUB TNG site reported SCRANTON 002 (IN 14032). Note also Seekford request POC on Sierra in alias per [telegram indicator not declassified] 0858. 3. Calligeris indicated to Mylkes his dislike of Lugton’s requests for bio data on personnel in his intelligence nets. 4. When Mylkes pointed out that Delgado and Sierra were also on staff for two previous attempts which were compromised at crucial junctures, Calligeris failed to respond directly. He replied that group must also consider both Somozas and Seekford as definitely possible sources of White Paper. 5. Above would perhaps not ordinarily raise doubts Calligeris loyalty or motivation and might be interpreted as pride or reticence. However, in present situation, fullest objectivity, candor and straight talk are required of all concerned. Above Calligeris replies either fail to meet such standards or suggest inability of Calligeris to face situation realistically...10. If LCFLUTTER approved, Mylkes will attempt obtain acquiescence (REDACTION) and Calligeris."

https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000913702.pdf

02/05/54: Cable from Lincoln to Director: Slugline PBSUCCESS RYBAT: "1. (REDACTION) and Calligeris 2 Feb accepted following terms of future coop with group: A. Security. Group provides men (Handwritten: ?) and techniques, junta cooperates fully. B. Funding. Group supplies all funds needed. (REDACTION) on 20 each month provides group junta budget forecast for following month. Funds flow to field through group channels (Handwritten: vague) where available. Estimates flow in from field through group channels to (REDACTION). C. Commo. Secure electrical and courier commo to be established throughout. Junta to use such commo and eliminate its own insecure channels. D. Responsibility. Group provides direction technical assistance and logistics. Junta provides leadership, inspiration, mobilization, execution. Joint planning coordination to be effected between (REDACTION) and group representative (Mylkes). C has military responsibility: (REDACTION), political, propaganda, intelligence. E. Outside aid. Group agrees to have junta accept other offers provided group and junta review them first. F. Time. Mission to be accomplished as soon as practicable. 2. Above, with inspirational preamble and finale, set down in formal agreement by Lincoln and presented to (REDACTION) and C 2 Feb. (REDACTION) and C appeared impressed by solemnity and seriousness of proceeding. They signed single document together with Ford. Document then burned and toast drunk. 3. Pouching details and copy of agreement, HUL-A-33. 4. Detailed KUHOOK (CIA Paramilitary Operations Staff), KUFIRE (Intelligence) and KUGOWN (Psychological and Paramilitary Staff) discussions with (REDACTION) and C proceeding."

https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000916120.pdf

04/28/54: Air dispatch from Lincoln to COS, Withheld: Subject: Operational Verbatim Message for Calligeris: "1. During the visit of Francis T. Mylkes, Calligeris raised the question as to what the attitude of SKIMMER would be in the event that an anti-Communist group seized power in Guatemala before he (Calligeris) was ready to move and to seize power himself. 2. Attached is the SKIMMER reply to this question of Calligeris'. Please give the reply to Stephen R. Lugton and have him translate it as accurately as possible (orally) to Calligeris. It is hoped that this reply will once and for all set Calligeris' mind at rest. Jerome C. Dunbar." - - - Page 2: "In February, 1954, a Gentlemen's Agreement was signed whereby the Group pledged itself to see the Junta and the personnel of the Junta through to ultimate victory. Nothing has happened to change the opinions or undermine the pledges of the Group in that regard. Now, as ever, the Group stands firmly committed, not to the success of just any anti-Communist, but to your (Pancho's) success."

https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000915596.pdf

05/07/54: Memorandum for the record from C. Tracy Barnes: Subject: Trip to Washington, D.C. on May 4-5: "1. During the two days I attended two long meetings, one each day in Frank Wisner's office. In addition to Wisner and myself, there were present for all or part of the meeting the first day, Messrs. Bissell, Helms, Roosevelt, (REDACTION), Esterline and Ray Leddy: the second day, Messrs. Bissell, Helms, Roosevelt, (REDACTION). 2. At these meetings I delivered with very brief explanations (a) a paper with attachments and a chart plus explanatory material covering the Calligeris internal organization; (b) a paper with chart covering the Calligeris internal intelligence organization; (c) a document prepared by Major Robertson on paramilitary planning. 3. I reported briefly on the following subjects: a. What had been done on the suggestions set forth in a memo written by Mr. Wisner giving deception ideas. I pointed out the instructions which Ontrich (Nestor Sanchez) was given plus mentioning the possible use of (REDACTION) the use of (REDACTION) trip to B.A. as a possible ground for implicating Peron and the use of letters from either Calligeris or (REDACTION) as a basis for making it appear that help is being sought from a group in Texas. It was felt that (REDACTION) might be useful if his activities were limited to Texas. Nutting will work on this on his trip. As far as (REDACTION) was concerned, it was felt that it might be unfortunate to have his activities in connection with SUMMIT mixed up with raising funds for Calligeris since this might tend to make SUMMIT look like a controlled operation...c. The return of (REDACTION) to the fold including a statement of the recent visit to (REDACTION) by Mylkes and Ontrich and of functions which (REDACTION) plans to perform when he returns..."

https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000915160.pdf

05/17/54: Memorandum from Jeremy T. Nutting to C/P and DC/P: Subject: (REDACTION) Future Position: "1. The premise of this paper is that (REDACTION) if he consents, should be made to emerge, either shortly before D-day or on D-day as the Chief of whatever Junta then exists and as the head of the new interim Guatemalan government. 2. Needless to say, (REDACTION) actual power position has long been a matter of doubt. This doubt has been created, first and foremost, by (REDACTION) himself: he has vacillated between statements to the effect that he wished to be 'only a private citizen' and indications of frustrated ambition. Francis T. Mylkes speculated, probably with some justification, that (REDACTION) 'resignation' may have been promoted by long-range ambition rather than disgust. In view of the conflicting evidences of (REDACTION) real desires, it will be important to flush him out at the earliest possible opportunity. If the general concept of this paper is agreed upon, (REDACTION) can be approached by Reelfoot with a concrete proposition, whereas in the past the Group has had to be guided more by what appeared to be (REDACTION) own wishes in the matter of his position. 3. There is now available sufficient evidence to indicate that the revolutionary Junta, no matter how composed, will be fraught with considerable internal rivalry. The distaste of (REDACTION) SMILAX and other leading Guatemalan army officers who could presumably be won to the anti-Communist cause, if they are not already passively dedicated to it, for Calligeris is established. There is every reason to believe that Calligeris reciprocates such feelings. To be on the same side, it must be assumed that there are other factions besides those of (REDACTION) and Calligeris who will be wanting to share post-revolutionary power..."

https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000920193.pdf

Undated: CIA document: "PBHISTORY Teams: 1. Preliminary Teams: CIA: (REDACTION) ST/C. STATE: Myron Bergin, Alberto Vazquez, OIR. 2. Teams for August- September: CIA: (REDACTION) Chairman - Mylkes, (REDACTION) Administrative clerk typist, (REDACTION) FI reports officer (bilingual), (REDACTION) Micro-photographer from RI, (REDACTION) Clerk-typist (bilingual), (REDACTION) Intelligence analyst, (REDACTION) Writer, author, propagandist - Paul D. Langeuine (David Phillips) (Owner of a newspaper in Santiago de Chile). (REDACTION) Intelligence reports officer. STATE: Myron Bergin, Deputy Chief (Note Bergin will probably return to Washington during the latter part of August). John Sturgis - biographic duties, Alberto Vazquez - Economics and research, Joseph Barager - Historian and Political Scientist. USIA: Kay Keeny (or Meeny?). (REDACTION)/WH (REDACTION). Handwritten note: Myron Bergin, Frank Ordim (?) USIA."