Pseudonym: Merton, Andrew
2/11/52: Memo from OSO/OPC to WHD: "Air attache sought list of and info concerning leading Communists from Andrew F. Merton 7 Feb to be given to person who could not be named but who high up (REDACTED) and air attache HQS...in strictest confidence IDENTITY 1 advised Merton info to be used allegedly in proposed conversation by REDACTED with William B. Starke re proposed plan overthrow government WSBURNT/Guatemala. IDENTITY 1 states IDENTITY 2 has discussed with REDACTED proposed setting up intelligence organization within IDENTITY 3..." See https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54Guat/d90 - memo 1/30/54 re request for "details of current cover situation Seekford, Lugton, Merton, and Middlecott."
6/4/54: CIA document: SCRANTON Final Report: Page 4 (Page 7 of PDF): Mention of Seekford, Merton and John F. Middlecott as pseudonyms. - - - Pages 18-19 (Pages 21-22 of PDF): "VI. Staff Personnel: A. Staff instructors included John F. Middlecott, (REDACTION) and Andrew F. Merton. The bulk of the instruction was carried by the former two and too much credit cannot be given them. Middlecott spoke no Spanish although training was not delayed on this account. (REDACTION) Spanish was more than adequate for the job, while Merton's Spanish may be classified as adequate. Difficulty was experienced in getting (REDACTION) into KMFLUSH (Nicaragua), which may have contributed to overall problems in meeting deadlines. B. Merton and Middlecott activated the first SCRANTON site at Tamarindo on 29 January 1954. Following the expose of this site, Merton returned to Lincoln since his service in WSBURNT (Guatemala) would have exposed PBPRIME (U.S.) interests, should he have been blown. Middlecott carried on with the aid of Vincent Pivall (ps), Spanish speaking SARANAC instructor, and began training on 6 March. (REDACTION) arrived on 3 April to share the instruction load. Middlecott was recalled to Lincoln over 23 April - 3 May for consultation and briefing. After Middlecott's return to SCRANTON, he was stricken by appendicitis on 21 May, and, following a successful operation, remained thereafter at SHERWOOD where he assisted the training net to SCRANTON. It should be remarked that Middlecott's service following his operation was on a volunteer basis, a tribute to his professionalism. He was unable to serve further at SCRANTON since road communications were too rough for his safe convalescence. Following 21 May, (REDACTION) was aided by Merton who returned from Lincoln to SCRANTON for the short time remaining. (REDACTION) departed for Headquarters on 5 June, leaving Merton to finish training alone and close SCRANTON on 9 June..."
John Newman, Countdown to Darkness, pp. 427-430 - "Appendix Three: Jack Stewart, aka Andrew F. Merton, and Earl J. Williamson
According to the State Department Foreign Service register, "Stewart was transferred to Havana in December 1955, where he worked under State Department cover as a political officer until November 1959. He was then transferred to the embassy in Mexico City, and worked undercover as a consular officer...During the four years Stewart worked at the Havana station, he worked closely with Earl Willlamson...the two remained close up until the time of Williamson's death in March 2001...Stewart attempted, unsuccessfully, to recruit Rolando Cubela (AMLASH-1) in March 1961, in a meeting that included Carlos Tepedino (AMWHIP-1),,,"
Re 1959-1969: Pages 1 and 2: ..."4. Mr. Govea then brought in to the conversation one Francisco Wilfredo 'Pancho' Varona (Alonso), who was born on 11 October 1922 in the Pinar del Rio province of Cuba and who does not speak English. He resides at 2551 SW 17th Street, Miami, Florida, telephone #445-3620. Varona advised that he was first in contact with CIA about 1959 in Cuba where he dealt with one Jack Stewart (phonetic). He stated that he worked for CIA in the Miami, Florida area (including travel abroad) from 1962 until about five months ago when he was terminated and given three months pay..."06/11/69, Memorandum from Charles W. Kane, Special Agent in Charge, Miami Field Office to COS, WH/Miami:
07/19/59, Cable from Havana to Director: ACTION: C/WH 2 (Mr. Macauley, WH DIV, notified 0620, 19 Jul): "1. Contact made by Zamka with Byers and Williams. They plan call on Virgilio and George Villata. They returning Miami evening 19 July. 2. Station recommends following action: A. Merton fly Tampa 20 June (as RCVD) lay on exfiltration with AMCOO as in previous cases with target date 25 July. B. Either AMCONCERT or AMCLATTER take delivery of body without knowledge true identity and transport body to ship. C. HQs take whatever action necessary prevent subsequent publicity in U.S. as this would seriously prejudice U.S. Government interests this area. D. HQs provide pseudonym for body use. E. Fiorini (also RCVD) not be made witting under any circumstances as Station considers him untrustworthy. 3. Request immediate reply." - - - Also see 104-10183-10085:11/24/59, Cable from Havana to Director: "1. SUBJ Carlos Tepedino Gonzalez, who furnished Station with draft contract of Ref is accompanying delegation and is willing cooperate with 'any friend of Andrew F. Merton in Mexico.' SUBJ HQs concurrence, request MEXI contact SUBJ for daily debriefing...."
01/15/60, Cable from Havana to Director: "1. Station plan, subject to concurrence of ODUNIT (U.S. Air Force) attache upon return from mobile end of week, is as follows:...C. On morning 18 Jan Merton will drive AMCLATTER-1 to home of ODUNIT attaché. AMCLATTER-1 is staying at safehouse in Merton's apartment building. AMCLATTER-1 will then chauffeur ODUNIT attaché, his copilot and Merton to plane at Campo Libertad. Upon arrival at plane side AMCLATTER-1 will go aboard and remain out of sight either in cockpit area or toilet of plane...2. Chances of stopping and interrogation slight...Alibi would be that AMCLATTER-1 had only a few days before applied to embassy for job as chauffeur and was being tried out on probationary period. ODUNIT attaché who has been away for week could claim never to have seen him before and Merton would give the alibi which AMCLATTER-1 would support..."
03/22/61, Dispatch from COS, Mexico City to Chief, WH Division: "Attached as of possible interest to Headquarters is a report of a conversation between a Station Case Officer and Subject. Willard C. Curtis" Pages 3 and 4: 17 March 1961: Memorandum for the record by Andrew F. Merton: Subject: Interview with Rolando Cubela...
06/18/62, Cable from Mexico City to Director: Slugline RYBAT GYROSE: REFS A. DIR 14710.* (Handwritten: 'Should be 17410'). B. WAVE 4672 (IN 11724)* "1. MEXI traces SUBJ Ref A: MEXI 6662***, HAVA 6806, MEXI 7686***, HMMA 16751, MEXI 8673, MEXI 8673***, HMMA 16714, DIR 10034***, PARI 6376***, which include previous attempt defect SUBJ Ref B. SUBJ Ref A contact of Andrew F. Merton in HAVA via AMPACK-1 and directly in MEXI. Basis previous relationship, Merton certain SUBJ Ref A will cooperate any way desired. As obvious above traces, he has access and bona fides. Danger provocation by SUBJ Ref B mentioned DIR 10034 may be less likely since no repercussion contact HMMA 16702. 2. No objection AMCONCERT-1 mentioning Merton's true name to SUBJ Ref A if necessary establish AMCONCERT-1's ais bona fides. C/S Comment: *Apparently wrong reference. **Requested traces Tepedino Gonzalez. ***Cables pre-date CS files. Copy may be seen in signal center archives."
06/21/62, Cable from Director to JMWAVE (Orig: J. Caswell, Unit: DC/TFW/FI): REF: WAVE 4746 (IN 13313) "1. MEXI and further HQs traces confirm AMCONCERT-1's assessment of Tepedino's bona fides and probable willingness cooperate. He worked closely with CIA rep Andrew F. Merton in unsuccessful attempt defect SUBJ ref Mar 1961 in MEXI. 2. Expecting POA request and will probably use him for direct approach Europe. Propose have staffer contact and brief Tepedino re trip but will probably wish have AMCONCERT-1 help in setting up contact. Will advise."
07/29/63, Dispatch from Chief of Base, Merida to Chief, Western Hemisphere Division and Chief, KURIOT (Info: COS, Mexico City): "It is requested that Headquarters forward Base Merida sufficient sabotage material suitable for introducing into the oil or gasoline filler ducts of the 3 local Cuban official vehicles with the purpose of damaging the vehicles to the point where extensive and expensive repairs would be necessary. It would be preferable if the resultant damage were apparently caused by some natural agent such as bad gas or oil. Base coverage of the Cuban establishment has shown that the Cubans depend heavily on their transportation to accomplish their mission in Yucatan; that such harassment would cause a heavy drain on their limited financial resources; and that even temporary stoppage of transportation would significantly affect the Cuban efforts in the area. Andrew F. Merton."
12/16/63, Cable from Mexico City to Director: "1. Following is Station recommendation, after talks between Merton Choaden in MRID 10 and 11 Dec. 2. Because of developmental nature some MRID ops and especially considering potential LIHALT project MEXI suggests that final decision this matter not be taken for six months. Also suggest that Merton's tour be extended six months from present March 1964 date. If decision is to close base Merton will be on hand to accomplish. If decided maintain base this schedule would give HQs three months to send Merton replacement. This agreeable to Merton. 3. Station agrees that closing of base should be considered. Routine ops including LIHACK are helpful but not indispensable. But base can be genuinely useful in flap situations (such as AMGLOSSY) and LIHALT, while slow in development, could become vital operation. It also true that in event any significant increase in TYPIC material maritime ops a refueling and emergency reception area could be established by MRID. 4. In summary, while Station agrees closing base may become desirable, current program of expanding Cuban ops in Mexico justifies six month delay in facing that decision."
06/28/65, Contact Report: Page 2: ..."C. Connection with the Agency: 4....Stewart requested that Carlos and Rivon maintain contact with the Czech who was believed to be connected with intelligence activities. 5...He did attend the exhibition, became a member of the Cuban commission which arranged for the transfer of the Soviet exhibition to Cuba, and was able to obtain detailed information which Stewart appeared to consider valuable..."