Home/ Resources / Projects / CIA Pseudonyms / pseudonym: MAGOFFIN_FRANCIS

Pseudonym: Magoffin, Francis

Definition:
Unknown identity. Francis D. Magoffin appeared to be the author of a dispatch in 1952 which was included in one of Ross Crozier's files. Magoffin was also involved in PBSUCCESS in Guatemala.
Category:
pseudonym
Status:
Unknown
Sources:

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Guatemala: Current Section: Persons and Pseudonyms

Page XX: ..."Magoffin, Francis D. (pseudonym, identity not released)..."

104-10215-10246: COLLECTED DOCUMENTS:CROZIER, ROSS L.

07/09/52: Dispatch (via Air Pouch) from Chief, Withheld to Chief, Withheld: Subject: General - Operational Matters: Specific (REDACTION): Ref: TRS-A-1239: "At the present moment there are no projects under development requiring (REDACTION). In the event a use for subject develops within the next two weeks, the (REDACTION) station will be advised. Francis D. Magoffin."

https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000136042.pdf

03/27/54: Cable from Lincoln to Director: Slugline RYBAT PBSUCCESS: "1. LINC now requires field representative for SKIMMER viz as follow-up Gillray. All other PBPRIME (U.S.) personnel are alleged employees SKIMMER in KMFLUSH (SCRANTON, SARANAC, SHERWOOD). 2. SKIMMER rep should be capable keeping (REDACTION) briefed and handling overall policy matters. 3. LINC acknowledges (REDACTION) cognizance ODYOKE (U.S. Government) unofficial support of SCOMBER and fact Maggoffin is engaged in intelligence matters. This situation precludes airtight security and leaves only confidence in (REDACTION) to preserve cover which is highly to his advantage. 4. View requirement para 1 situation para 2 affords opportunity exploit our advantage by requesting Maggoffin assume cover role SKIMMER rep. 5. Maggofin could inform (REDACTION) privately he unofficially acting as Gillray's rep for SKIMMER without knowledge ODACID (U.S. State Department) and could provide communication channels securely to SKIMMER/SCOMBER. Thereafter serve as local negotiator. 6. LINC has several pressing ops matters for early handling through above channel. Only alternate to above would be to place new person in KMFLUSH (Nicaragua) this purpose and none available. Existing local cutouts undesirable due local ties etc. 7. Advise your reaction above soonest. And await HDQS concurrance before implementing."

https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000916474.pdf

04/12/54: Dispatch (via Air Pouch) from Withheld to Lincoln: Subject: General - Operational/KUGOWN: Specific: Attempted Assassination of Anastacio Somoza: "1. Enclosed herewith as attachment A is one sealed manila envelope in which are eight exposed rolls of film containing photographs of arms and documents the subject of reference. All of these photographs were taken with an Argus C-3 belonging to one of the personnel of (REDACTION). Since the (REDACTION) Kodak-35 could not be used effectively for document work, the (REDACTION) Kodak-35 porta-lens was adopted to the C-3 with celephane tape and placed upon a borrowed unstable tripod. These photographs were taken expediciously in a combination of natural light and the light supplied by two 'Goose-necked' lamps while the documents were placed on the floor of the office of (REDACTION). It is possible that they are overexposed and will require reducing. 2. There is also enclosed herewith as attachment B, one sealed white envelope containing lists of arms taken from the plotters. 3. (REDACTION) promised to supply (REDACTION) three photographic copies of each document photographed. It is urgently requested that these copies be supplied soonest (REDACTION) in order to insure future cooperation from (REDACTION). 4. It is requested that (REDACTION) be furnished with three copies of all of the above-mentioned photographs. (REDACTION) Francis D. Magoffin."

https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000916215.pdf

04/21/54: Cable from Withheld to Director: Slugline RYBAT PBSUCCESS: WASHTUB: "1. (REDACTION) just requested Magoffin to visit him at (REDACTION). On arrival Magoffin (REDACTION) exhibited cache and stated he did not wish to proceed with WASHTUB on basis of material furnished, since quantity so small not even most credulous farmhand would believe submarine would be risked for burial this material and he, (REDACTION) would be laughing-stock of Latin America. Magoffin examined cache without unwrapping and agrees with (REDACTION), as not more than 10 rifles could be in cache and little if any ammunition. 2. Magoffin recommends WASHTUB (Phony arms cache planted by CIA in Nicaragua during 1954) be delayed and minimum of 50 rifles plus some automatic weapons, hand grenades etc be furnished for burial, plus several thousand rounds ammo. These can be recovered from (REDACTION) for later use if necessary. After WASHTUB furor dies down if unable to furnish above material or enough of it to provide credibles recommend WASHTUB be abandoned. 3. Magoffin promised to advise (REDACTION) 22 April whether to proceed on basis of larger cache. Advise."

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Guatemala: Current Section: 140. 5/1/54-Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida

05/01/54: Telegram to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida: "48933. Ref: A. LINC 230, (2) B. LINC 2294. (3) 1. In discussion ODACID (U.S. State Department) tentative thinking pending meeting following ODACID’s review of LCPANGS (Costa Rica) situation with Ambassador is: A. No approach whatever should be made Somoza either by Magoffin or local ODACID chief as outlined ref A paras 3 and 4. ODACID reaffirms ruling against such representations on matters related to PBSUCCESS by its representatives to any foreign government. B. ODACID concurs re in ref B action which might interpreted to be for info intell purposes only. C. FYI: ODACID plans instruct local chiefs KMFLUSH (Nicaragua) and LCPANGS to renew efforts pacific settlement present tension in line with ODACID parallel action in OAS but such efforts will in no way be related to PBSUCCESS nor will any reference be made to revelations described in ref B. 2. Complexities of LCPANGS situation and best course to follow in observing PBSUCCESS needs will be discussed Tuesday. Request at that time LINC appreciation of possibility [name not declassified] may be using PBSUCCESS also as cloak for move against LCPANGS. If we conclude that such possibility exists we shall have to decide what position to take vis-à-vis (REDACTION)."

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Guatemala: Current Section: 144. 5/7/54-Telegram From the CIA Station in [place not declassified] to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida:

05/07/54: Telegram from Withheld Station to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida: "984. 1. WASHTUB (Phony arms cache planted by CIA in Nicaragua during 1954) at this moment appears to be complete success. (REDACTION) called press conference of entire press and diplomatic corps. All were completely sold including PBPRIME (U.S.) Ambassador, First Secretary and military attaché. Latter identified country of origin of weapons, as he has spent some time in Far East. French Minister who has served in Greece pointed out how cache completely fits pattern used in Greece, explaining that men for whom arms intended could arrive at cache either by land or sea and if apprehended have no arms, but once fully loaded weapons are dug up, men are ready to go into action immediately. British Ambassador (REDACTION) read markings on rifles and dates of manufacture; (REDACTION) he is sending cable to his govt advising of gravity of situation. WSHOOFS (Honduras) Ambassador wanted to telephoto markings to PBPRIME for destroyer and search planes to locate submarine. New reports of sub sightings coming in from coastal residents who believe their own stories. 2. (REDACTION) again asked Magoffin for negative requested in [telegram indicator not declassified] 950. (2) Believe it absolutely imperative he be furnished this. He can stall for a period of time by saying he has turned it over to PBPRIME for amplification in hope of identifying sub, but sooner or later may have to produce it if credibility of story to be maintained."

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Guatemala: Current Section: 147. 5/14/54-Telegram From the CIA Station in [place not declassified] to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida:

05/14/54: Telegram from Withheld Station to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida: "997. Re: LINC 2622. (2) (REDACTION) advised Dubois that negative turned over to ODACID (U.S. State Department). ODACID chief confirmed to Dubois that negative has been forwarded to PBPRIME (U.S.). Dubois satisfied and asked no further questions. To offset considerable opinion that there was no submarine and story was a plant by (REDACTION) Magoffin leaking to known gossips fact that he has seen negative and that it appears to be genuine. Whispering campaign underway only 3 days but having moderate success."

https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000923318.pdf

05/24/54: Memorandum for Deputy Director (Plans): Subject: Questions Arising from Study of LINC 3057 re Purchase of Aircraft: "1. Why is Brodfrost, a member of the Lincoln headquarters, acting as a SYNCARP representative dealing with (REDACTION) and attempting to recruit American pilots in the United States? It is Headquarters' desire that a legitimate member of the SYNCARP organization make all arrangements re procurement of aircraft and pilots. 2. Paragraph 6 of DIR 01912 stated no further action was required on the part of Lincoln re the procurement of F-47 aircraft by (REDACTION). Why then is Brodfrost going to discuss this subject with (REDACTION) as indicated in paragraph 5 of LINC 3057? 3. It is Lincoln's impression that approval has been granted for use of the FJHOPEFUL C-47 for overflights-Guatemala? If so, what is Lincoln's reasoning? 4. In view of Department of State's desire that Department officers (REDACTION) refrain from direct contact with heads of Central American states in the interests of SYNCARP, why was Magoffin ordered to make a direct approach to (REDACTION). Our understanding here is that such a move on Magoffin's part is a direct contravention of Department policy. 5. Can Brodfrost even plausibly live the cover of a SYNCARP representative and deal with representatives of foreign governments? 6. It appears to Headquarters that LINC 3057 is a play on words and an attempt to circumvent the limitations placed by the DD/P when he returned (REDACTION) to Lincoln to continue discussion of aircraft. 7. Why is Brodfrost (an American) going to Managua to talk to (REDACTION) about obtaining the use of an A-20 aircraft? Is it not high time that Calligeris stand on his own two feet and handle his own deals, particularly if he hopes to emerge in the eyes of Central America as a man capable of organizing a successful movement against the encumbent government ..."

https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000922665.pdf

06/07/54: Cable from Director to SR. REP. Lincoln (Orig: R. M. Bissell): Slugline RYBAT PBSUCCESS: ..."5. Important that Brodfrost and Magoffin reveal no repeat no knowledge of ODACID (U.S. State Department) position unless and until becomes generally known in KMFLUSH (Nicaragua). They could however press (REDACTION) to learn of ODACID reply to him."

Contributors:
Gavin McDonald

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