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Pseudonym: Harper, David

Definition:
Captain David L. Harper was an alias for Richard Kinsman.
Category:
alias
Status:
Documented
Discussion:
A cable on August 21, 1962, from Frankfurt, and with the slugs KEYWAY (CIA Europe Division), PBRUMEN (Cuba), and AMLASH (Rolando Cubela Secades), stated that alias Captain David L. Harper (IDEN) was planning to get a flight to Paris. The IDEN was Roger Kinsman.
Sources:

104-10295-10011: CABLES(2): ALIAS CAPT DAVID L. HARPER (IDEN) SW TECH UNDER MILITARY

08/21/62: Cable from Frankfurt to Paris: Slugline KEYWAY PBRUMEN AMLASH: REF PARI 2659 (IN 48313)* Alias Capt David L. Harper (IDEN) SW-tech under military leave orders plans ETA 21 August AF No. 747 provided can get reservations. If not will take next available flight. No need meet. Will contact Mr. Higgins at office. C/S Comment: *FRAN requested developer for system 15136 by noon Aug 21." - - - Page 3: "Alias is Mr. Richard Kinsman. C/S Comment: FRAN requested develop for system 15136 by noon Aug 21."

https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/453/280.html

U.S. Supreme Court: HAIG v. AGEE (1981): No. 80-83: Argued: January 14, 1981. Decided: June 29, 1981: ..."Footnotes...[Footnote 7] In December 1975, Richard Welch was murdered in Greece after the publication of an article in an English-language newspaper in Athens naming Welch as CIA Chief of Station. CA App. 92. In July 1980, two days after a Jamaica press conference at which Agee's principal collaborator identified Richard Kinsman as CIA Chief of Station in Jamaica, Kinsman's house was strafed with automatic gunfire. Four days after the same press conference, three men approached the Jamaica home of another man similarly identified as an Agency officer. Police challenged the men and gunfire was exchanged. Affidavit of United States Ambassador to Jamaica, App. to Pet. for Cert. 125a-127a. In January 1981, two American officials of the American Institute for Free Labor Development, previously identified as a CIA front by Agee and discussed extensively in Agee's book Inside the Company: CIA Diary, were assassinated in El Salvador. N. Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1981, p. A10, cols. 4-5; id., Jan. 5, 1981, p. Al, col. 6, p. A10, cols. 3-6. The Secretary does not assert that Agee has specifically incited anyone to commit murder. However, affidavits of the CIA's Deputy Director for Operations set out and support his judgment that Agee's purported identifications are 'thinly-veiled invitations to violence,' that 'Agee's actions could, in today's circumstances, result in someone's death,' and that Agee's conduct has 'markedly increased the likelihood of individuals so identified being the victims of violence.' App. to Pet. for Cert. 111a, 116a-118a. One of those affidavits also shows that the ultimate effectiveness of Agee's program depends on activities of hostile foreign [453 U.S. 280, 286] groups, and that such groups can be expected to engage in physical surveillance, harassment, kidnaping, and, in extreme cases, murder of United States officials abroad..."

https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=1042#relPageId=213&search=

Brian Freemantle (1983) CIA: Page 195: Chapter 13: The Defenders (Mary Ferrell search entry): "Aided by a former CIA operative, Philip Agee, whose book Inside the Company: CIA Diary earned him hatred within the Agency, the Covert Action Richard Kinsman was identified by the Bulletin as the CIA station chief in Kingston, Jamaica, his house was attacked by machine-guns though fortunately Kinsman was unhurt."

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus-history/chapter-12

U.S State Department document: TOWARD “THOROUGH, ACCURATE, AND RELIABLE”: A HISTORY OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SERIES: Chapter 12: Implementing the FRUS Statute, 1992–20021: Joshua Botts: ..."In early 2001, Richard Kinsman, a CIA declassification reviewer and former DO officer, published an article in the Agency’s in-house scholarly journal, Studies in Intelligence, warning that FRUS “confronted [the CIA] with increasingly frequent and deadly serious assaults on DCI authorities and responsibilities.” Although he accepted that “approved covert actions in and of themselves constitute foreign policy decisions when on the scale of the Bay of Pigs, Afghanistan, Iran, and so forth,” Kinsman argued that “providing details of operational implementation is quite another” matter. HO “aggravated” these fears by its “efforts to provide ‘historically accurate’ documents, citing [the] CIA by name,” which “constituted de facto admission of a CIA presence abroad, a direct contradiction of current policy.” FRUS methodology endangered “official CIA nonpresence abroad,” which Kinsman judged “crucially important to CIA’s ability to conduct its clandestine missions of collection, liaison, and covert action.” With HO and the HAC rejecting CIA claims that “historical accuracy can be satisfied by describing the ‘fact of’ a given covert action . . . without specifics that threaten clandestine operational relationships and methodology,” Kinsman feared that “CIA is in danger of losing control of its own declassification process . . . to the nongovernmental academic community.” (37) Kinsman’s fears of the risks posed by including intelligence documents in FRUS echoed four decades of CIA efforts to limit coverage of its overseas presence in the series..."

https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a524042.pdf

2001: Report by N. Richard Kinsman on Studies of Intelligence Journal: Titled: Protecting CIA's Interests: Openness and the Future of the Clandestine Service: "Editor's Note: The subject of openness in dealing with intelligence information, sources, and methods has long been controversial. This article and the one that follows provide a point-counterpoint discussion of some of the prominent issues involved."..."N. Richard Kinsman served in the Directorate of Operations, and from 1997 to the present has assisted in declassification programs..." - - - Pages 5-6: ..."To add relevance to the unfortunate popular perception of CIA as a sometime rogue element, one need only consider who the general public refers to or blames for such well-known covert operations as the Bay of Pigs, Guatemala 1954, the Iran coup, the U-2 incident in 1960, and so forth. The reader of official US history should not be left with the impression that the results of such activities were other than the result of an official US Government initiative or policy decision. For example, the Bay of Pigs is commonly perceived as a CIA debacle. In fact, it is frequently argued that the failure was due to influence by then-Secretary of State Rusk, UN Ambassador Stevenson, and, ultimately, President Kennedy in denying air operations and other support. FRUS would not be likely to include this level of controversy in its broad treatment of the history of US foreign policy..." ..."The search criteria or goal is generally described broadly, and, given the highly subjective nature of the inquiries, produces large volumes of documents. Each new special search requires reinvention of the wheel in terms of declassification criteria. In the JFK case, the search was mandated by legislation, then implemented by an external (to CIA) panel that had few discernible concerns with regard to CIA long-term equities..."

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Gavin McDonald • Brian Freemantle

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