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Pseudonym: Germosen, George

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Lt. Col. George Gaines, Chief of JMCLEAR and Project Officer for JMATE.

Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Volume I: Air Operations, March 1960 - April 1961 Current Section: D. Initial Planning for Air Operations

Pages 76-77: ..."D. Initial Planning for Air Operations: It has already been noted that when DPD officially came into the JMATE program in July 1960 various aspects of air operations had been considered in the planning - infiltration and exfiltration, propaganda drops, supply drops, and the possibility of tactical targets for combat aircraft. Even before being assigned to support JMATE, DPD had anticipated some requirements which would be necessary to the success of WH/4's air operations. As early as 6 April 1960, for example, Casimiro 'Chick' Barquin participated in a meeting with representatives of the Photo Intelligence Center 'to gather all known sources of coverage of Cuba...It is my opinion that complete coverage of the island will be required if any PM efforts are envisioned which will be supported by air.' 94/ That Barquin's instincts were excellent was verified by a memorandum from George Gaines, Jr., the Chief, JMCLEAR to the Acting Chief, DPD on 2 August 1960 when Gaines wrote: It was determined in the meeting of the JMARC Task Force on 2 August 1960 that photo coverage of the target country was necessary in order to adequately affect the JMARC Project. This photo coverage should be done so as to provide JMARC intelligence with a finished product not later than 19 September 1960. The specific requirement is to determine, with the latest equipment available, the (start of italics) location and type of aircraft in the target country (end of italics). 95/* From the outset of DPD's involvement, it was clear to Gaines that the first step in a successful operation would have to be the elimination of Castro's Air Force..."

Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Volume II: Participation in the Conduct of Foreign Policy Current Section: Appendices

11/14/60: Cable from Eglin Air Force Base to Director: Slugline OPIM EGLI: "1. Per telecon Vartanian/Hayes FOLL being delivered your ST via C-124 for transhipment to JMADD. Request shipment be forwarded on priority basis cited. A. 50 EA 220 lbs frag bombs 13,151 lbs 1st priority. B. 16,800 rds 50 cal ammo 6,531 lbs 2nd priority. C. 200 EA .45 cal SMG 4,821 lbs 3rd priority. D. 60,000 rds .45 cal ammo 3,530 lbs 4th priority. 2. Partials of item para 1 A and B above should be shipped on each ACFT for space utilization and for each aircraft not to exceed 10,000 lbs of cargo. 3. Balance of C-124 shipment to be held for future flights. 4. Request HQs be advised what facilities avail EGLI for storage of above type materiel for 7-14 day periods." Releasing Officer: George Gaines C/JMCLEAR. - - - Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Volume I: Air Operations, March 1960 - April 1961: Current Section: A. Organization and Management: Page 7: ..."To administer the planned air operations, Lt. Col. George Gaines (USAF) was relieved as Chief, Air Section, DPD to become the Project Officer for JMATE; and Garfield M. Thorsrud was assigned to be Acting Chief, Air Section. 5/" https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=146516&search=#relPageId=34&tab=page

Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Volume IV: The Taylor Committee Investigation of the Bay of Pigs Current Section: 3. Testimony of the Witnesses

Page 35: ..."Unfortunately, the CSG seems to have been more impressed by (REDACTION) than by either Gar Teegen (pseudo) who was in charge of over-all air operations at the time of the invasion or Col. George Germosen (pseudo) of DPD who was assigned to work directly with the WH/4 task force in Washington..." - - - Page 62: "The evidence necessary to demonstrate that Clark's version of the CAP was self-convicting became available before the Taylor Committee closed its investigation, and it was unfortunate that the Agency's USAF representatives - particularly Colonels Beerli and Germosen or Gar Teegen - had no opportunity to challenge Admiral Clark's testimony..." https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=146519&relPageId=68&search=germosen

Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Volume I: Air Operations, March 1960 - April 1961 Current Section: A. D minus 2 (15 April 1961)

Page 195: ..."In a much publicized cable of 13 April 1961 Hawkins stated among other things the following: Germosen (Lt. Col. George Gaines, USAF) informed me today that he considers the B-26 squadron equal to the best US Air Force squadron. 21/. The 'best US Air Force squadron' is not necessarily the same as 'any comparable selection USAF pilots.'"...

Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Volume I: Air Operations, March 1960 - April 1961 Current Section: B. Post-Strike Contretemps

Pages 214-215: ..."Even though convinced that the D-2 air strike had done more extensive damage than was apparent on the U-2 photography, air operations personnel at JMTIDE - and Col. George Gaines who had returned to Headquarters - wanted a second strike at the aircraft. Gaines was convinced that because of the 48 hours concentrated briefings they had received that the B-26 pilots could easily manage the re-attack. Gaines was concerned that any potential combat aircraft had been left untouched; and in an Oral History interview he stressed that the air and ground force leaders and Chief, JMATE agreed that no troops would be landed as long as there was any combat capability available in Castro aircraft. Gaines stated: We knew we had to get every single gun that could be put in the air before we put our soldiers ashore. Jack Hawkins and I agreed to that over and over. We said, 'we don't land anybody,' and Esterline agreed to that...that we don't land anybody until we can stop a goat if it goes down the highway. Our air cover will be constant, and if a Castro tank moves, we knock him out. 48/..."

Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Volume IV: The Taylor Committee Investigation of the Bay of Pigs Current Section: 6. Assessment of the Taylor Committee Investigation

Page 240: ..."4. The failure to resolve the confusion over matters related to air operations such as the appreciation of the capabilities of Castro's T-33s, whether Castro's B-26s were of more concern to the Brigade that the T-33s, whether the T-33s were armed, and whether Castro's FAR had MiG aircraft. The individuals directly responsible for WH/4's air training and air operations - Billy Carpenter, George Germosen, Gar Teegen, and all of the pilots (Cuban and American) - knew exactly what they were up against. That Beerli, Bissell, Hawkins, and even General White confused the situation without contradiction or questions from the committee was inexcusable considering the criticality of air operations to the success or failure of the operation..." - - - Page 280: ..."Before 3:00 p.m., Washington time, on 19 April, a message went from Headquarters to Puerto Cabezas telling them to stand down all air activity pending further advice.*...*There had been a meeting in DCI Dulles's office about 8:30 a.m. on 19 April attended by McGeorge Bundy and the key personnel involved in the project - DDCI Cabell, Mr. Bissell, Jake Esterline, Dick Drain, Colonel Hawkins, Beerli, and Germosen, and Captain Scapa. Bundy called President to request that Navy air be authorized to attack both ground and air targets. The President refused to authorize any extension beyond the hour granted for the morning." https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=146519&search=#relPageId=286&tab=page

Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Volume IV: The Taylor Committee Investigation of the Bay of Pigs Current Section: 6. Assessment of the Taylor Committee Investigation

Pages 124-125: ..."Prior to the appearance of General Decker, Chief of Staff of the US Army, the Cuban Study Group had a brief session with Colonel Germosen*, USAF (* Pseudonym), who was assigned to the Development Projects Division of CIA and who became the air operations officer for the WH/4 task force at Headquarters. The primary concern of the committee with reference to Colonel Germosen was whether the T-33's were considered to be a threat, and if they were a threat, whether they had been selected specifically as air targets during the D-2 or planned D-Day air strikes. Colonel Germosen's testimony was quite direct; he apparently was quite self-composed in stating that there were no instructions for the pilots to go after T-33's in particular. The instructions for D-2 were to knock out all offensive aircraft photographed in the parking areas of the three selected airfields. Colonel Germosen also refuted the testimony of (REDACTION) who had told the committee that the B-26's in Castro's inventory were of far more concern than the T-33's. Colonel Germosen pointed out that Castro's T-33 inventory was located at the three airfields selected for attack on D-2; and he told the committee that of Castro's five T-33's, three were knocked out by the D-2 strikes, but one of these was back in the action by D+1 (18 April 1961). When queried about the origin of the D-2 strike, the officer had to plead ignorance. After he indicated some reservations about the wisdom of the D-2 strike, one committee member took a cheap shot at Colonel Germosen by saying 'I have real doubt in my mind as to whether you did well by accepting those other D-2 strikes.' 118/* *The record does read...other D-2 strikes, but there was only one D-2 strike at three airfields. It was not Germosen's responsibility 'to accept' or not accept the D-2 strike plan."

Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Volume I: Air Operations, March 1960 - April 1961 Current Section: C. The Stevenson Story and the Second Strike

Page 282: ..."While Bissell wondered whether he acted properly at the time that the second strike was being called off, both Jake Esterline, Chief, JMATE and George Gaines, who ran the JMATE operation for DPD, had different retrospective views concerning not only Bissell, but particularly General Cabell..." - - - Pages 285-287: ..."In his recollections of the situation at the time of the cancellation of the D-Day air strike, George Gaines reported that he had just returned from the Puerto Cabezas briefings, and walked into the office in time to be told that the President had cancelled the D-Day strike. Gaines stated: At that time I told Stan Beerli, and later on, Bissell, that 'this thing is doomed. It cannot go if we don't get those airplanes.' 130/ When asked if he himself recommended that the whole operation be called off at that stage, Gaines said: No,...the President - when he cancelled it - did not arbitrarily override everybody. He said unless there are 'operational reasons' dictating otherwise, we'll cancel tomorrow morning's strike. Well nobody had told him that there were 'operational reasons.' At the moment he made that decision, he thought that there was a chance - a good chance - of success without that air strike. He should have been informed, right at that moment, that operational reasons do dictate that we continue...that we go ahead ...because if we don't, we can't land those troops, Mr. President. 131/" (CONTINUED BELOW)

Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Volume I: Air Operations, March 1960 - April 1961 Current Section: C. The Stevenson Story and the Second Strike

Page 286-287: "Concerning Cabell's responsibility and degree of familiarity with the operational implications of the cancellation, Gaines pointed out that Cabell was not too well aware of the air plan: He had been briefed. We had our regular briefings to keep him up to date, but he had been apart from the military community for such a period of time that his operational expertise had been eroded by time. This was my whole argument...that the President deserves some operational information because he has killed the entire project if we cannot make that strike. 132/ Making this point to both Beerli and later to Bissell, Gaines stated further: I got the impression that there were so many political considerations involved that they did not want to go back and beard the President in his office, or ask for a special audience, when it would have been much better had we done so...I really believe that Beerli should have been more forceful in this - and I don't mean to be critical of Stan, because Stan was trying to do the right thing. But, Stan was military, and I was telling Stan - military to military - this cannot succeed; and I believe if he had been forceful in his presentation to Bissell, Bissell might have done it. Bissell was the type who would do something if he believed in it. But, Cabell is the one on whom the ultimate responsibility must lie, he was the man that Bissell - and Dulles and the President - was looking to for professional operational advise; and he didn't get it. That's my personal opinion. 133/..."

Jack B. Pfeiffer • Peter Kornbluh • Maxwell D. Taylor • Gavin McDonald

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