Pseudonym: Brent, Thomas
Dec 1961-July 1962: "...ninety percent of all Cubans supported Castro, while McCone added that of 27 or 28 CIA agents presently in Cuba, only 12 presently were in communication. Contact even with these was infrequent, and an additional team of seven, infiltrated in December (1961) had been captured (with two featured on a television 'confession' show)." Page 9: "(By July 1962) McCone reported nine intelligence collection teams (about half the originally-planned number) had been infiltrated into Cuba and maintained in place, thousands of Cuban refugees had been systematically interrogated in Florida, and a number of third-party agents recruited inside Cuba." Pages 1314: On 8/22/62, McCone spoke with JFK about the arms & possible missile build-up in Cuba, mentioned his meeting with Phillipe de Vosjoli and his report re Soviet and Oriental personnel. Page 30 - McCone met with de Vosjoli on 12/15/61. Page 16: MONGOOSE was in disarray; on 10/26/62 intelligence collection teams had to be recalled. Lansdale complained he was not kept abreast of JCS planning. Pages 25-26: On 11/24/63, LBJ made it clear to McCone he wanted to "get on with winning the war" in Vietnam. Page 34, 7/12/62, McCone discusses "consultant status" with Allen Dulles.
02/09/62: Dispatch from COS, Mexico City to Chief, WH Division: Subject: Examples of Marxist Textbooks used in Mexican Schools: ..."3. It will be recalled that on the evening of 11 January 1962 Thomas A. Brent requested copies of the two (2) textbooks listed in paragraph 1. above from COS. He wished to consider using them in presentations (unintelligible) and (b) possibly to certain Senators and Congressmen."
05/07/62: Memorandum for the record No. 292: "1. At my meeting with Dr. Miro Monday morning, 7 May, he informed me of his meeting with Mr. McCone on 1 May. While Dr. Miro was meeting with Mr. Hurwitch in the Department of States on 30 April, Mr. Hurwitch informed Miro that the Director of CIA wished to meet him at the Director's home at 8:00 May 1: that Dr. Miro would be met at his hotel and taken to the Director's home; that Ernesto Aragon, Miro's assistant and interpreter was not to go. 2. Dr. Miro told me that a Mr. 'Al Rodriguez' called for him 1 May and took him to see Mr. McCone and noted as interpreter. Also present was Mr. Richard Goodwin, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs, who had just returned from Puerto Rico the proceeding day. Coffee was served and Dr. Miro told me that the meeting, which lasted an hour and ten minutes, was most gratifying. He was asked to express his views relative to the Cuban situation, the attitude of the people, and weaknesses and strength of the regime. Dr. Miro said that Mr. Goodwin did not enter into the conversation except to refer once to the remarks made during Miro's conversation with President Kennedy about the strength needed to overthrow the Castro-Communist regime..."
05/09/62: Memorandum for the record No. 293: "Following should be added to my memo ref Miro's meeting with Director. Mr. McCone said, 'We think alike on the Cuban problem and the solutions.' Miro told the Director that he didn't want to know the details of plans, but merely to be kept generally informed; that he only sought cooperation, collaboration and coordination...Miro said he felt that this was an exploratory meeting; that Mr. McCone wished to know him and get his views and ideas: that Mr. McCone had spoken very little, said nothing of plans or policies; but that his attitude was most friendly and gave Miro the impression of being with him in spirit..."
05/11/62: Dispatch from COS, JMWAVE to Chief, Task Force W: "Forwarded under separate cover are two PASSAVOY Reports, Nos. 292 and 293 covering the 1 May meeting of AMBUD-1 with Thomas A. Brent. According to AMBUD-1 no policy was discussed and it appeared that the purpose of the meeting was to provide an opportunity for Brent to meet and become acquainted with AMBUD-1. It will be noted that Richard Goodwin also attended this meeting along with a CIA interpreter."
05/31/62: Dispatch from COS, JMWAVE to Chief, Task Force, W: ..."2. Attachment A is based on Baro's conversation with AMBUD-1's and briefly states the following of interest: (a) that AMBUD-1 siad he had 'finsihed' Manolo Ray, Felipe Pazos, etc. with the statements he made against them in Washington, D.C.; (b) that AMBUD-1 had a meeting with Thomas A. Brent and that AMBUD-1 was happier with this conversation than with his meeting with GPIDEAL because 'now' he (AMBUD-1) finally knew the general aspects of the final plan: (c) AMBUD-1 wants from Baro a briefing on the Cuban underground as well as details on the operations that are being carried out. They also discussed the reorganization of AMBUD and AMBUD-1's belief that the AMBUD Washington D.C. representative was responsible for the resignation of two members of AMBUD..."
05/31/62: Dispatch from COS, JMWAVE to Chief, Task Force W: "1. The following excerpts from two contact reports written by Stephen R. Manganello following two meetings held in Miami with Subject on 9 and 13 May 1962. Meeting of 9 May 1962: 2. In response to a cable (Reference A) stating that Subject's wife had written to Thomas A. Brent that her husband had 'important information to deliver to CIA' when he arrived in Miami..."
07/11/62: Cable from Mexico City to Director: ATTN BRENT AND KNIGHT: "1. COS has learned from reliable source (LIELEGANT) that LITENSOR planning visit Sukarno in Djakarta in late October or early November. 2. Ambassador Mann mentioned to COS that he personally believes this visit not good. 3. COS has tentative appointment talk over LIENVOY operational with LITENSOR on 13 July. Can, if HQs approves, tell LITENSOR that 'My chiefs think visit to Sukarno this year a bad idea.' 4. Please advise. Suggest consult with Dainold."
10/31/62: Cable from Mexico City to Director: ATTN: BRENT, KNIGHT, GALBOND: "1. Info reported in ref confirmed by personal conversations between COS and LITENSOR, LIELEGANT, LIERGO, LITEMPO/2 and Humberto Romero Perez. Also, LITEMPO/2 position by LIENVOY report of his telephone conversation with Galindo Ochoa as cited in reference. LITEMPO/2 statements to Galindo Ochoa amount to Mexican press guidance theme. 2. All assured COS Mexico 100 percent with U.S.A. However, Romero pointed out his 'chief' must be careful what he says and to whom he speaks. C/S Comment: *Reference attached."
05/22/63: Memorandum for the record from COS, JMWAVE, Andrew K. Reuteman: Pages 3-4: ...."4. After obtaining Mr. Sourwine’s permission to cooperate with KUBARK, QDDALE asked how he should proceed with the implementation of the operation. Reuteman suggested that the best way of handling the operation would be for Reuteman to outline the information currently at hand to his Headquarters. Once this was done QDDALE would probably be well advised to personally contact Brent or TODHUNTER in order to obtain firm commitments relative to the period of time which would elapse between the Soviets’ entry into the U. S. and their referral to the Internal Security Committee. QDDALE thought this over for several minutes and then stated that he would prefer to contact TODHUNTER directly and not have any record of this transaction in normal KUBARK cable channels. Reuteman could not dissuade QDDALE from this decision. As a result QDDALE placed a long distance telephone call to TODHUNTER. This telephone call did not produce a direct contact with TODHUNTER as he was out of his office. QDDALE then made arrangements to talk to TODHUNTER at a later time on 18 April 1963...."
11/02/63: Cable from Mexico City to Director: Slugline LISIREN KUJUMP: "1. FYI: LISIREN-3 (IDEN) now at Oschner Clinic New Orleans for unexpected operation. Diagnosis not known MEXI. 2. Suggest HQs thru KUJUMP may wish send flowers or note from 'Washington D.C. friends' or perhaps from Thomas J. Brent." C/S Comment: *Attached."
11/27/63: Cable from Director to Mexico City: Slugline TO CURTIS FROM BRENT AND KNIGHT: "1. After consideration by Brent and Knight, we feel that investigation and analysis of Alvarado's story should be pursued further before more executive action is taken. In lieu of arresting Duran, suggest she be put under close surveillance by CIA or by Mexican authorities. 2. Note Alvarado's claim he is still working for the Nicaraguan service and Managua's belief that he was dropped in August 1963. 3. If further consideration of this problem by Sec Rusk and Mr. Hoover results in other recommendations, we will advise you. C/S Comments: *IN 68406-Cable from the Ambassador for Secretary Rusk, Mr. McCone and Mr. Hoover regarding the Oswald case. **Suggested MEXI contact Alvarado's Nic case officer in Mexico City and ask him whether Alvarado had ever told him this story or anything like it. Also requested MEXI not take any action to re-arrest Duran or arrest others without approval from Hqs."