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Pseudonym: Bracket, Alvin

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Alvin Bracket was an alias for Leon C. Fluteo. In turn, Fluteo was a pseudonym used by CIA officer Bruce MacMaster.
Bruce MacMaster's name was handwritten in the margin of a cable from JMWAVE on November 20, 1963, with a arrow pointing to Fluteo's name. The cable stated that "A-27 turned over to Leon C. Fluteo 20 Nov although Station dubious that this solution durable, it now puts monkey on A-27's (Dr. Nestor Moreno) back and should ease any possible future termination."

A dispatch in July 1963 noted that Leon C. Fluteo was a JMWAVE officer, and also that he was AMCORE-2's (Luis Conte Aguero) new case officer.

It was AMCORE-2 who used the name Alvin Bracket (with Leon C. Fluteo in brackets), in a letter to David Phillips in October 1967.

In an 1982 article by journalist Seymour Hersh, titled The Price of Power, there was mention of a feud between Bruce MacMaster and Henry J. Sloman (probably Tony Sforza). Both worked in Miami in operations against Cuba, in Mexico City, and the Chile operation against President Allende.


07/17/63: Dispatch from COS, JMWAVE to Chief, Special Affairs Staff: "1. AMCORE-2 (Luis Conte Aguero) was turned over to Leon C. Fluteo on 9 July 1963. Henceforth contact will be direct with the JMWAVE case officer rather than indirect through Wibalda (Robert Wall). AMCORE-2 was highly cooperative, understood that Melvin T. Welinsky 'has left the area', and appeared happy to deal with his new case officer only. He inquired about 'Dick' in 'Juan's office.' He was told that, as people move about, new personnel come to offices, although functions and attentions remain the same. He was assured that all his suggestions would receive proper attention by the people concerned. 2. AMCORE-2 requested 'more frequent and clear orientation' to guide his propaganda efforts. As a result he and Fluteo agreed to meet twice weekly, more when needed..."


11/20/63: Cable from JMWAVE to Director: Slugline RYBAT TYPIC AMTRUNK: "1. In 19 Nov meeting between Andrew K. Reuteman (Theodore Shackley), Peggins and AMICE-27 (Dr. Nestor Moreno), latter agreed devote his efforts to assisting in Station's Rebel Army radio program, with understanding that AMICE-14 (Miguel A. Diaz Isalgue) to continue with clandestine ops and the two activities to be largely compartmented. 2. At end of meeting A-27 said that he had written letters to AMTRUNK-1 (George Volsky aka Jorge Volsky) and AMCAPE-1 (Tad Szulc) saying that Op Leonardo had terminated. Reuteman told A-27 from future security viewpoint this advantageous, and not to say anything further to these individuals. 3. A-27 turned over to Leon C. Fluteo (handwritten in margin on right hand side with arrow pointing: Bruce MacMaster) 20 Nov although Station dubious that this solution durable, it now puts monkey on A-27's back and should ease any possible future termination."


10/31/67: Translated letter from Luis Conte Aguero to Michael C. Choaden (David A. Phillips): "Douglas (Michael C. Choaden), my friend, In August 1965, under circumstances which you should recall very well, you made certain general promises to assist me, and, specifically to finance a magazine which we would distribute throughout the hemisphere. Later, Alvin Bracket (Leon C. Fluteo) told me that the project would be implemented and that he had been instructed to ask me for a budget, though along somewhat more modest lines that those upon which we had agreed at that early morning meeting on the island (Hispaniola)..." - - - Page 2: "To avoid wrong interpretations, I wish to emphasize that my relations with Joe Crespi (Edward D. Knapman) are fine. He is pleasant to deal with and knows his job..."


12/00/82: The Price of Power: Kissinger, Nixon and Chile by Seymour M. Hersh in Atlantic Monthly magazine: Pages 20-21: ..."Some of the CIA agents inside Chile knew better. In the months following, at least one of those men who saw the most-the false-flaggers-feared that his action against Schneider would come to haunt him. The worried operative was Bruce MacMaster, a career CIA officer who had served throughout Latin America in the 1950s and 1960s under cover as a Foreign Service officer. MacMaster had a series of complaints about what he had seen and done in Chile and about the activities of Henry J. Sloman (probably Tony Sforza). On February 16, 1971, he walked into the office of John Charles Murray, the branch chief for Mexico, at Agency headquarters, in Washington. Murray was a career operations officer with a reputation for integrity-a straight shooter. MacMaster proceeded to unravel the story of his involvement in Chile, acknowledging that he, Sloman, and others were ordered into Santiago in an effort to mobilize a coup. As Murray reported in a 'Secret-Eyes Only' memorandum to his superior two days later, MacMaster 'stated that [while in Chile] he ostensibly was representing American business interests such as the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation and other unidentified business groups'...MacMaster, who was born of American parents in Colombia, told Murray that he had traveled on a falsified Colombian passport to Chile to meet with coup plotters, and had reassured them that, as Murray reported, 'as a representative of American business interests he was most anxious to see the continuance of democratic institutions in Chile.' MacMaster said that he and Sloman had also met with Viaux, and were involved in the plotting against Schneider. They learned that Viaux was also working closely with a group of right-wing students." (CONTINUED BELOW)


"They learned that Viaux was also working closely with a group of right-wing students. It was the student group, MacMaster told Murray, that 'was responsible for the machine-gun attack on General Schneider.' The main goal of Murray's memorandum, which was sent to Broe, the chief of Latin American clandestine operations, was to warn of MacMaster's fear that some members of the Viaux group, many of whom were jailed following the Schneider assassination, 'will possibly implicate CIA in the action taken against Schneider.' MacMaster told Murray that he had privately met-outside of Chile- with one of Viaux's associates and had been informed, as Murray wrote, that the men jailed were 'seeking a large amount of money-somewhere in the neighborhood of $250,000-for the purpose of providing support for the families of the members of the group jailed...Mr. MacMaster said that we could probably get away with paying around $10,000 for the support of each family.' MacMaster had another complaint-about Sloman's black-market activities while in Santiago. He accused his colleague of smuggling clothing and jewelry out of Santiago for his personal profit, and reported that Sloman had been using diplomatic pouches to bring pornography into Mexico from the United States. The two men had been friends, but when MacMaster lost a bitter fistfight with him weeks before at a New Year's Eve party in Mexico City, he retaliated by informing Mexican internal-security officials of Sloman's status as a long-standing CIA operative. All these seamy doings, as reported by Murray, were hushed up by the Agency over the next few months and later kept from the Senate Intelligence Committee. Sloman, in a later interview, casually acknowledged that he was involved in smuggling while in Santiago, but described it as part of his CIA cover. 'I've always been an outside man,' he said. 'I lived my cover in every place I've ever been. I was also known as a professional gambler-or as Mafia...'" (CONTINUED BELOW).


"Sloman confirmed that he had been reported to the police in Mexico City after a fistfight with MacMaster, but called his action justified. 'He made a pass at my oldest daughter, and so I hit him in the mouth and knocked his teeth out.' Senior officials of the CIA were kept aware of the Mac- Master-Sloman dispute in a series of highly classified official reports and communiques in early 1971. Somehow, the Mexican authorities were soothed, and Sloman was routinely promoted-despite the serious questions raised about his activities, and the fact that his feud with MacMaster led to the blowing of his cover in Mexico and, more important, compromised the security of the Agency's plotting against Allende. In deciding not to reprimand or dismiss the two men, the CIA perhaps concluded that the character defects that got MacMaster and Sloman into hot water in Mexico City also made them good agents. The official memoranda detailing the incident reveal much, inadvertently, about the kind of men recruited to serve as undercover operatives. MacMaster was reported in official documents to be a heavy drinker; Sloman had been admonished for having violated Agency rules about the purchase of duty-free liquor from American Embassy commissaries and the use of diplomatic pouches for the shipment of personal-and obviously contraband-goods. Sloman also told a senior Agency official in Mexico City who queried him about some of the MacMaster charges that-as a subsequent internal report noted-'he knew a great deal about the people in the Station and threatened to blow the Station out of the water.' Yet the only one to suffer was John Murray, who had forwarded official reports to his superiors. Murray, who died in 1979, began to investigate on his own, and was told by one senior CIA operative that there were at least a few members of the CIA station in Santiago who realized that Schneider would never escape from the kidnapping attempt with his life..."

Gavin McDonald • Seymour Hersh

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