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Cryptonym: UPHILL

West German Foreign Intelligence Service (BND), which formed out of what was previously known as the Gehlen Org.


The UPHILL cryptonym is mentioned on page 57 of this document: West German Foreign Intelligence Service (BND).

Carl Oglesby, The Secret Treaty of Fort Hunt, Part 1 - https://aarclibrary.org/cold-war-context/

Organizing the physical removal of the Nazis’ material assets and the escape of SS personnel were the tasks of the hulking Otto Skorzeny, simultaneously an officer of the SS, the Gestapo and the Waffen SS as well as Hitler’s “favorite commando. “13 Skorzeny worked closely with Bormann and Schacht in transporting the Nazi assets to safety outside Europe and in creating a network of SS escape routes (“rat lines”) that led from all over Germany to the Bavarian city of Memmingen, then to Rome, then by sea to a number of Nazi retreat colonies set up in the global south. The international organization created to accommodate Bormann’s plans is most often called “The Odessa,” a German acronym for “Organization of Veterans of the SS.” It has remained active as a shadowy presence since the war and may indeed constitute Nazism’s most notable organizational achievement. But we must understand that none of Bormann’s, Skorzeny’s, and Schacht’s well-laid plans would have stood the least chance of success had it not been for a final component of their organization, one not usually associated with the Odessa at all but very possibly the linchpin of the entire project. Enter Gehlen. This final element of the Odessa was the so-called Gehlen Organization (the Org), the Nazi intelligence system that sold itself to the U.S. at the end of the war. It was by far the most audacious, most critical, and most essential part of the entire Odessa undertaking. The literature on the Odessa and that on the Gehlen Organization, however, are two different things. No writer in the field Of Nazi studies has yet explicitly associated the two, despite the fact that General Reinhard Gehlen was tied politically as well as personally with Skorzeny and Schacht. Moreover, Gehlen’s fabled post-war organization was in large part staffed by SS Nazis who are positively identified with the Odessa, men such as the infamous Franz Alfred Six and Emil Augsburg of the Wannsee Institute. (continued)

Carl Oglesby, The Secret Treaty of Fort Hunt, Part 2 - https://aarclibrary.org/cold-war-context/

An even more compelling reason for associating Gehlen with the Odessa is that, without his organization as a screen, the various Odessa projects would have been directly exposed to American intelligence. If the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) had not been neutralized by the Gehlen ploy, the Odessa’s great escape scheme would have been discovered and broken up. At 43, Brigadier General Reinhard Gehlen was a stiff, unprepossessing man of pounds when he presented himself for surrender at the U.S. command center in Fischhausen. But there was nothing small about his ego. “I am head of the section Foreign Armies East in German Army Headquarters,” he announced to the Gl at the desk. “I have information to give of the highest importance to your government.” The Gl was not impressed, however, and Gehien spent weeks stewing in a POW compound before an evident Soviet eagerness to find him finally aroused the Americans’ attention. Gehlen became chief of the Third Reich’s Foreign Armies East (FHO), on April 1, 1942. He was thus responsible for Germany’s military intelligence operations throughout Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. His FHO was connected in this role with a number of secret fascist organizations in the countries to Germany’s east. These included Stepan Bandera’s “B Faction” of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN/B), Romania’s Iron Guard, the Ustachis of Yugoslavia, the Vanagis of Latvia, and, after the summer of 1942, “Vlasov’s Army", the band of defectors from Soviet Communism marching behind former Red hero General Andrey Vlasov. Later on in the war, Gehlen placed one of his top men in control of Foreign Armies West, which broadened his power; and then after Admiral Wilhelm Canaris was purged and his Abwehr intelligence service cannibalized by the SS, Gehlen became in effect Nazi Germany’s over-all top intelligence chief.

Carl Oglesby, The Secret Treaty of Fort Hunt, Part 3 - https://aarclibrary.org/cold-war-context/

The Great Escape In December 1943, at the latest, Gehlen reached the same conclusion about the war that had come upon Bormann, Schacht, Skorzeny, and Himmler. Germany was losing and could do nothing about it. Several months later, Gehlen says, he began quietly discussing the impending loss with a few close associates. As he writes in his memoir: “Early in October 1944 I told my more intimate colleagues that I considered the war was lost and we must begin thinking of the future. We had to think ahead and plan for the approaching catastrophe. Gehien pursued the following strategic rationale: When the alliance between the United States and the USSR collapsed, as it was bound to do upon Germany’s defeat, the United States would discover a piercing need for a top-quality intelligence service in Eastern Europe and inside the Soviet Union. It did not have such a service of its own, and the pressures of erupting East-West conflict would not give it time to develop one from scratch. Let the United States therefore leave the assets assembled by Gehien and the FHO intact. Let the United States not break up Gehlen’s relationship with East European fascist groups. Let the United States pick up Gehlen’s organization and put it to work for the West, the better to prevail in its coming struggle against a Soviet Union soon to become its ex-ally..despite Gehlen and despite the military, the United States did after all finally wind up with a civilian intelligence service. The National Security Act of 1947 did embody Donovan’s central point in creating a CIA outside the military. But in fact the Gehlen Org substantially pre-empted the CIA’s civilian character before it was ever born. The CIA was born to be rocked in Gehlen’s cradle. It remained dependent on the Org even when the Org turned into the BND. Thus, whatever the CIA was from the standpoint of the law, it remained from the standpoint of practical intelligence collection a front for a house of Nazi spies.


06/24/60: Dispatch from Withheld to Chief, WE (Attention: Chief, SR): Subject: REDWOOD REDSKIN AEDOGMA/1: Pages 2-6: AEDOGMA-1 PRQ Part II: "Subject was first contacted in 1946 in Salzburg, Austria, by an alleged ODOPAL (U.S. Army Counterintelligence Corps) agent, an American of Hungarian descent, called 'Uncle Tom.' (Uncle Tom was probably a CARRYALL (Zsolt Aradi) unit staff member). Several months later, Subject was turned over to a Dr. Novak, ostensibly in ODOPAL, Salzburg. In 1947, Dr. Novak turned Subject over to (REDACTION), who arranged for his transfer to (REDACTION) in Munich, on 21 January 1948. Since August 1950, (REDACTION) has handled Subject...Subject's basic motivation is probably his desire for Ukrainian independence, since he was active in this cause long before being connected with KUBARK (CIA). As a priest and being from a good middle class family, he is completely opposed to the Communist ideology. In addition, he makes a relatively good income from his connection with KUBARK...Subject knows he is working for an ODYOKE (U.S. Government) IS and has probably concluded that it is KUBARK. Subject has previously been involved with the AECAVATINA (either Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists - OUN - or Foreign Section of Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists - Zch/OUN) security section and with UPHILL (BND)...AECAPELIN/2 (Volodymyr Bohdan Slymakovsky) probably knows definitely Subject is connected with KUBARK, while various Ukrainians and members of UPSWING (BND) may suspect it...Subject was trained by the Abwehr, and it is obvious that Subject has exceptional qualifications based on years of practical experience...Subject has been in contact with the Munich Operating Base since 1946 continuously and has produced mainly CE/CI information...No derogatory information other than the fact that he was an agent leader in Prague, organizing customs officials into agent groups..." Pages 7-8: Summary of AEDOGMA-1's dealings with German IS.


08/25/60: Cable from MUNI (Neale) to FRAN (Alverson): "1. UPHILL asking whether any basis DDR reports arrests 147 agents and whether Sloboda case involved. 2. We assume East German statements merely continuation intel propaganda and either false or based old arrests over long period time. We have not yet passed Sloboda info (FRAN) 01/24. Incidentally 513th reps told me Sloboda was aware Loring presence Camp King. 3. Have you any further info on arrests."


09/03/60: Cable from Frankfurt to Director: Slugline CART PBRAMPART CABEZONE: REF DIR 48082 (OUT 64181)*: "1. Unable thus far find any evidence (Vladimir) Sloboda had any contact KUBARKers (CIA). 2. Capt Jack Manning ODIBEX (U.S. Army) rep SES informed Lyack 2 September he knew Sloboda well as member his section 525 MI Group Fort Meade in 1958. Says S. had access then to considerable personality info ODIBEX intel. S. Visited Manning SES offices late last winter to borrow fifty dollars which later repaid. Visit lasted 20 minutes during which safes locked and no classified material exposed. Manning says S. knows generally purpose of CABEZONE and SES but not Manning's functions. According CABEZONE records this only visit S. to CABEZONE. 3. No KUBARKers in CABEZONE had dealings any nature with S. One KUBARKer thought he had heard member ODIBEX detachment CABEZONE say just after defection that S. had occasionally assisted them in some way but unable now identify speaker or otherwise verify this statement. Assume such impression could have been gained from S. visit to Manning para 2 above. 4. Alias Loring says he known to S. in capacity of UPHILL liaison Camp King but not as UPHILL liaison CABEZONE. 5. MKTOPAZ (CIA Technical Services Division) liaison to Camp King had no dealings with S. 6. Will report any additional items but tentatively conclude S. had no intimate knowledge KUBARK. 7. Request identity army type and full report all his statements to assist investigation here. C/S Comment: *HQs requested estimate SUBJ's knowledge KUBARK activities and personnel." Another version can be found at 104-10181-10073.

104-10182-10052: CIA FILE ON WIROGUE.

04/02/61: Cable from Leopoldville to Director: "1. In answer Ref A para 2 we prefer WIROGUE remain LEOP but he working for CAF and ordered Europe now given second task to contact German officers Col (FNU) Stahl (L) (see MUNI 5132) (IN 28066), Col (FNU) Stein and unidentified German general Munich. He to discuss arms for CAF including types and quantity available price, method and time of delivery though he not to actually make deal. To prevent leaving this matter UPHILL (BND), does HQs wish provide names other arms dealers. May be difficult keep WIROGUE LEOP if Kazadi and Pierrot determined he go Germany. 2. Request clarification Ref B. If Swanson not witting KUBARK (CIA) relationship this case what has he been told and what is story for original connection per previous traffic. One lever used by WIROGUE to become Pierrot adviser was story he had contacts to provide instructors. If Swanson establishes direct contact Pierrot this could easily undercut WIROGUE influence. 3. Wish urge if possible recruit at least one each mechanic and flying instructor prior to arrival LEOP. Fully appreciate time factor and desire pre-empt any effort on part Pierrot to procure instructors by other channels. If WIROGUE and Swanson settle on names there is possible time for HQs to check out prospective instructors and make recruitment pitch. Although Congolese have big ideas and hope need more instructors, this may not be case. If we rush in all non KUBARK assets we may find ourselves with expensive op over which we have little control and which might produce little for KUBARK..." The UPHILL cryptonym is mentioned on page 57 of this document: https://www.archives.gov/files/iwg/declassified-records/rg-263-cia-records/second-release-lexicon.pdf


05/17/62: Dispatch from Chief, EE to Chief, Munich Liaison Base: Subject: UPHILL Dr. Herbert Kraus and Hans Rechenberg: "1. Headquarters is in possession of a voluminous file dating back to 1948 on Dr. Herbert Kraus, the subject of (REDACTION). A brief summary of this file for your information follows: Dr. Herbert Kraus, born Nov 18, 1911 in Zagreb, Croatia, Austrian rightist political figure, was for years head of the League of Independents (VdU) and editor and publisher of its newspaper the 'Neue Front.'...He has been described as pro-Western and anti-Russian...ODOPAL established contact with Kraus in 1945. Kraus was described as being 'responsible for most of ODOPAL Salzburg's positive intelligence networks.' The most important one of these, which purported to run into the USSR through Finland, was finally proved to be a complete fabrication. The ODOPAL officer in contact with Kraus later joined KUBARK (CIA) and much of the KUBARK information concerning Kraus stems from him. KUBARK considered recruiting Kraus in 1954-55 but decided against so doing because of the fact that he still maintained some sort of casual contact with ODOPAL at that time and because his record indicated some doubt of his trustworthiness..."


9/26/62 dispatch from Acting Chief, Munich Liaison Base to Chief, Eastern Europe, slugline RYBAT UPHILL AELADLE - UPHILL QUERY RE AELADLE RELIABILITY: "On 25 September Alias Fleming raised the question of AELADLE's (Soviet defector Anatoly Golitysn) reliability and bona fides. Fleming did so apologetically and in a low key manner...he said in the course of going over the information AELADLE had provide on the FedRep/West Germany, the UPHILLERS involved had become increasingly aware of the consistent vagueness of AELADLE's info...(AELADLE/Golitsyn suggested) that in order to refresh his memory it would help if the German debriefers brought along detailed reviews of RIS/Russian intelligence service cases, background data on suspect West German intel and government employees etc...Fleming said that UPHILL's concern naturally was unfounded if it turned out that AELADLE had provided important and detailed info on KGB operations and penetrations in other areas, information which had been determined to be accurate. If this is the case, UPHILL would be happy to take our word for it. Otherwise, on the basis of UPHILL's limited ability to judge AELADLE's bona fides, UPHILL would be uneasy and unwilling to provide too much info to AELADLE when they do their debriefing.

Gavin McDonald • Bill Simpich

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