Cryptonym: UNSNAFU-14
A memo on May 16, 1963, mentioned that "Juan David Posada is currently employed as cultural counselor with the Cuban Embassy in France. Subject (note: Jose Antonio Casas Rodriguez) describes Posada as an 'arty type' who is an excellent caricaturist."
A cable in March, 1965, stated that the CIA planned to use UNSNAFU-9 (Luis Enrique Trasancos) as a possible recruiter directed against those such as UNSNAFU-14, with whom he was friendly.
104-10073-10374: JUAN DAVID POSADA
01/31/63: Cable from Mexico City to Director (handwritten note: "Prew. De Santi. Anita. Tracy") (Ousler Acting): Slugline GYROSE LITAMIL-9: "1. On 28 Jan 63 Carlos Maristany, Cuban Amb Netherlands, told LITAMIL-9 (Luis Alberu Souto) that Juan David Posada, former cultural attaché Uruguay, was probably going PARI as cultural attaché. 2. LITAMIL-9 reported previously that David scheduled come MEXI but Teresa Proenza against assignment. Proenza told L-9 that almost all David relatives in exile and if we assigned MEXI likely he too would take asylum."
05/16/63: Memorandum of Contact from Withheld, SAS/CI: Subject: Jose Antonio Casas Rodriguez (201-327702): Page 9: ..."g. Juan David Posada is currently employed as cultural counselor with the Cuban Embassy in France. Subject describes Posada as an 'arty type' who is an excellent caricaturist..."
04/27/64: Cable from Paris to Director: Slugline KEYWAY PBRUMEN QJFINK UNSNAFU (handwritten at top of cable: "Sanchez - for El Mago file"): "1. QJFINK contacted 21 April, briefed, and able see UNSNAFU/14 (handwritten above: Juan David Posada) several times 22 and 23 April. Returning LUXE 25 April. Also met old friend 'El Mago' Robreno whose case familiar HQs. 2. QJFINK assesses UNSNAFU/14 as not recruitable at this time. States UNSNAFU/14 not commie but has great faith Fidel and believes regime will endure short of direct intervention by U.S. UNSNAFU/14 not overly happy present assignment under UNSNAFU/19 (Antonio Maria Carrillo Carreras) but not significantly disaffected. PI from meetings being dissemed separately. 3. DIR: QJFINK somewhat sidetracked by meeting Robreno and offered introduce case officer to him, stating Robreno knows 'everyone.' Offer declined on basis Robreno has too many personnel problems at this time. QJFINK claims also knows AMLASH/1 (Rolando Cubela Secades) well. 4. QJFINK cooperative and believe he honestly attempted fulfil requirements levied. However, believe UNSNAFU/14 did not open up to QJFINK but followed current regime line on economic picture, internal political situation and Cuban/U.S. rapprochement...C/S Comment: *QJFINK requested meet with UNSNAFU-14." - - - For the handwritten name of Juan David Posada and the note at the top of the cable see: https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2021/docid-32381762.pdf
104-10247-10030: CABLE RE: REFERENCE ARRIVED AT OPPORTUNE MOMENT FOR COMMENT
03/23/65: Cable from Paris to Director: Slugline RYBAT KEYWAY PBRUMEN UNSNAFU: Page 3: ..."7. Pending further developments, plan use UNSNAFU-9 (Luis Enrique Trasancos) as possible recruiter directed against such types as UNSNAFU-14 with who he friendly and selected visitors..."
104-10216-10435: DISPATCH: CABLE TO CUBAN FOREIGN MINISTRY
04/15/65: Dispatch from COS, Paris to Chief, WE (Info: Deputy Chief, WH-SA): "1. Transmitted under separate cover is a copy of the cable mentioned in paragraph 3 of Reference C. As will be seen, the text of this cable differs a great deal from that suggested in Reference A. We discussed the Reference A suggestion within the Station, and, in essence, with UNSNAFU/9 (Luis Enrique Trasancos). We came to the conclusion that such a strong personal attack on UNSNAFU/19 (Antonio Maria Carrillo Carreras) would probably accomplish little since UNSNAFU/19 had already sent in his version to Havana and could be expected to have the backing of most or all of the Paris Embassy personnel - despite noble claims to the contrary made privately to UNSNAFU/9 by UNSNAFU/14 and AMBALD/2 (Juan Arcocha Barcelo, worked for the CIA Paris station during 1965). Also considered, especially by UNSNAFU/9, was the possible effect such action might have on AMLASH/1 (Rolando Cubela Secades). UNSNAFU/9 was, and still is, very reluctant to take any action which might adversely effect AMLASH/1 or force AMLASH/1 into a position not of his own choosing, i.e., to have to take up the defense of UNSNAFU/9 without being able to choose his own time and place. 2. We are trying to get the story into the press here, as stated in Reference C, and will advise you of any results obtained. A dispatch on the subject of planning for UNSNAFU/9 will be forthcoming shortly."