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Cryptonym: SUMAC-2

Definition:
Lt. Col. Jose Angel Sanchez Barillas.
Status:
Documented
Sources:

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Guatemala Current Section: Index

Page 460: Index..."SUMAC-2, See Sanchez Barillas, Lt. Col. Jose Angel..."

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Guatemala Current Section: 4. 1/25/52-Telegram From the CIA Station in [place not declassified] to the Central Intelligence Agency

01/25/52: Telegram from Withheld Station: "1. An army captain came Guatemala City 24 Jan from Jutiapa and stated Castillo Armas succeeded in delaying revolt, one of his reasons being few more days would make fall of Zacapa easier; also that Castillo Armas is on [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] farm located both sides Guatemalan-Salvadoran border near Jutiapa. 2. Present indications governing triumvirate will be (1) Castillo Armas (2) Juan Cordova Cerna, see TGG 1359 (3) Oscar Mendoza, Guatemalan Military Attaché in Costa Rica, presently in Guatemala for appendectomy, or Colonel Elfego Monzon, minister without portfolio, or Colonel Marciano Casado who was forced leave country 29 Nov 51 at Tapachula Mexico. 3. Major Carlos Paz Tejada, recently removed as Minister of Communications and assigned Atlantic Highway Works, and Colonel Carlos Enrique Diaz considered by students as pro-government. Latter but not former is liked by some army officers who support movement. 4. Colonel Monzon, although possible choice for triumvirate may be aware generally of planned revolt but not known to be taking part. Colonel Francisco Oliva, ex-chief of Coban (also RCVD, Toban) military establishment and ex-chief of staff for deceased Colonel Arana supporting movement. 5. Military Air Attaché report dated 22 Jan 52 and evaluated C 3 reports Carlos Enrique Diaz has created junta of self, Lt. Col. Jose Angel Sanchez Barillas and Col. Carlos Aldana Sandoval to take over government if president becomes too ill, or for other reason, to prevent occupation president’s office by Alvarado Fuentes. Comment: This appears logical move of pro-government officers and could be used to dissipate support to Castillo Armas if his revolt shows indication of success. Source: Same as source 1 of ref cable. Distr: chargé d’affairs only..."

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Guatemala Current Section: 133. 4/24/54-Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner) to Director of Central Intelligence Dulles

04/24/54: Memo from Deputy Director for Plans to the Director: Subject: Position Paper on PBSUCCESS: Pages 2-3: ..."c. Military and Paramilitary: As stated above the Board of National Estimates concludes that a revolutionary potential exists in the Guatemalan Army. Specific data may be adduced to confirm this estimate. Disaffection and dissatisfaction are evident throughout all echelons. The high command is particularly vulnerable to defection and in some instances defection in place is practically assured. The Minister of National Defense, Jose Angel Sanchez, is opposed to Communist control over Arbenz and is considered inclined towards supporting any well-organized opposition movement. The Chief of the Armed Forces Colonel Carlos Enrique Diaz, is probably discredited and considered no longer loyal to Arbenz. The Chief of Staff, Colonel Enrique Parinello de Leon, has repeatedly indicated his desire to see the end of the Communist-controlled regime. The Chief of the Air Force, Colonel Luis A. Giron, is believed disaffected. The Minister without Portfolio, Colonel Elfego Monzon, is actively, covertly organizing within the Army for a coup [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Plans are under way to incorporate his assets with those of the Junta and a meeting is being planned to effect this union. Thus, within the high command a definite capability exists to defect in place sufficient numbers of influential military leaders to ensure control over the Armed Forces before any overt action is undertaken..."

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Guatemala Current Section: 175. 6/8/54-Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the CIA Chief of Station in Guatemala

06/08/54: Telegram from Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to COS, Guatemala: "1. Despite compromise PBSUCCESS moving forward apace. Compromise cost only top echelon and plans that events have invalidated anyway. But mass of organization remains intact and in state of near-readiness. 2. RO’s, organizers, sab leaders presently being launched. They will contact unburned second, third echelon and proceed as planned. 3. Numerous 5-man harassment teams being readied for launching, with mission attack Commies and Commie property, but not attack army. 4. Capacity to air supply friendly internal forces should exist soon. 5. Shock troops moving to WSHOOFS (Honduras) staging sites. High degrees of readiness, both in proficiency and spirit. 6. More leaflet drops, intensified SHERWOOD programs contemplated. 7. It would therefore be regrettable if, by your departure, you would tend confirm apparent impression of setback to PBSUCCESS. On contrary, your mission now to counteract [name not declassified] depression and destroy whatever smugness/fatalism has arisen among army through Semantic compromise. 8. If SWALLOW your sole channel after ESQUIRE departure, make maximum use to convey 'You ain’t seen nothing yet' theme to SMILAX, SUMAC–2, etc. This might begin soonest. Events in next week may make you appear as prophet and man worth doing business with. 9. Would be unfortunate you leave on eve of authentication you have been requesting. 10. Request you weigh foregoing in light security and operational factors and advise your considered conclusions for LINC decision. 11. Also request you attempt retain ESQUIRE in place during forthcoming period..."

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Guatemala Current Section: 193. 6/17/54-Telegram From the CIA Station in Guatemala to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida

06/17/54: Telegram from Guatemala Station to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida: "In view critical situation, ripe psychological moment and in compliance requests made reference, and since did not know when ESQUIRE would arrive, Bannister made cold approach (REDACTION) on morning 15 June. (REDACTION) convinced Bannister pilot who had come with special instructions from Consejo for fast action part of (REDACTION). Knows Bannister only by true first name. 2. (REDACTION) firmly told that time is come, that he get moving, take over army, and that time last opportunity for army to salvage its honor and even existence. 3. He agreed. Added he and SUMAC–2 fully working together and would draw up plan of action. Wanted STANDEL–1 eliminated by Consejo or Calligeris people. Was told that this his problem and he expected to handle. If impossible take care one man what percentage have army. 4. Second meeting with ESQUIRE and Bannister morning 16 June. Said he and SUMAC–2 sure they can take over army but will need show of strength on part of opposition. Requested that P–38 drop bomb directly in center hippodrome located just west of La Aurora airport. Also requested that planes buzz 15 June demonstration and if possible drop tear gas. He told the bomb could be dropped and possibly tear gas as well. 5. Vitally important this be done. Suggest at least one loud bomb on hippodrome. They plan seize control from Diaz and Dove. 6. (REDACTION) said all gear dropped Guatelon was turned over by campesinos to Guardia Civil who handed it to army. Army very frightened sight these weapons. Was told this was psychological drop for that purpose but that real drops also being made. Told he better move fast. He agreed. Said he would put guards around all Embassies as soon as they move so that foe cannot escape. Said Arbenz, Commies, and enemies will be executed. 7. After meeting he departed to meet SUMAC–2 and then proceed line up regimental commanders in capital..."

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Guatemala Current Section: 263. 6/30/54-Telegram From the CIA Station in Guatemala to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida

06/30/54: Telegram from Guatemala Station to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida: "1. This is to fill you in on nights developments. 2. Holland called JMBLUG (John S Peurifoy, U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala) approx 2230 about DTFROGS (El Salvador) mtg. 3. JMBLUG met at Jefatura Fuerzas Armadas with STANDEL–1 and SUMAC–2 approx 0100 June 29 to pass Holland’s message. 4. Approx 0400, ODUNIT (U.S. Air Force) attache called JMBLUG out of meeting. Jose Luis Cruz had been to see him, said pro-Calligeris officers had taken Base Militar 2000 June 29. Said new junta formed, would march on Jefatura building shortly to seize STANDEL–1, SUMAC–2. 5. JMBLUG decided stay so as not tip hand. 6. [name not declassified] phoned, asked JMBLUG come to palace. JMBLUG declined. [name not declassified] said he would be at Jefatura right away. 7. STANDEL–1, SUMAC–2 excused themselves, conferred briefly. Came back, said they planned resign. 8. New junta arrived, surrounded Jefatura, marched into conference room armed. Took over..."

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Gavin McDonald

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