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Cryptonym: SUMAC-2

Definition:
SUMAC-2 was the cryptonym for Lieutenant Colonel Jose Angel Sanchez Barillas.
Status:
Documented
Discussion:
A memo in April of 1954 stated that the Minister of National Defense, Jose Angel Sanchez, was opposed to Communist control over Arbenz and was "considered inclined towards supporting any well-organized opposition movement." In addition, a dispatch from Graham L. Page (probably Henry D. Hecksher) on June 1, 1954, mentioned that a small group of officers controlled the Guatemalan Army, including SUMAC-2, STANDEL-1, SMILAX, and STANDEL-2. Page was not confident that SUMAC-2 and STANDEL-1 in particular would turn against Jacobo Arbenz Guzman (STANDEL). Furthermore, a telegram on June 30, 1954, stated that SUMAC-2 and STANDEL-1 had resigned.
Sources:

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Guatemala Current Section: Index

Page 460: Index..."SUMAC-2, See Sanchez Barillas, Lt. Col. Jose Angel..."

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Guatemala Current Section: 4. 1/25/52-Telegram From the CIA Station in [place not declassified] to the Central Intelligence Agency

01/25/52: Telegram from Withheld Station: "1. An army captain came Guatemala City 24 Jan from Jutiapa and stated Castillo Armas succeeded in delaying revolt, one of his reasons being few more days would make fall of Zacapa easier; also that Castillo Armas is on (REDACTION) farm located both sides Guatemalan-Salvadoran border near Jutiapa. 2. Present indications governing triumvirate will be (1) Castillo Armas (2) Juan Cordova Cerna, see TGG 1359 (3) Oscar Mendoza, Guatemalan Military Attaché in Costa Rica, presently in Guatemala for appendectomy, or Colonel Elfego Monzon, minister without portfolio, or Colonel Marciano Casado who was forced leave country 29 Nov 51 at Tapachula Mexico. 3. Major Carlos Paz Tejada, recently removed as Minister of Communications and assigned Atlantic Highway Works, and Colonel Carlos Enrique Diaz considered by students as pro-government. Latter but not former is liked by some army officers who support movement. 4. Colonel Monzon, although possible choice for triumvirate may be aware generally of planned revolt but not known to be taking part. Colonel Francisco Oliva, ex-chief of Coban (also RCVD, Toban) military establishment and ex-chief of staff for deceased Colonel Arana supporting movement. 5. Military Air Attaché report dated 22 Jan 52 and evaluated C 3 reports Carlos Enrique Diaz has created junta of self, Lt. Col. Jose Angel Sanchez Barillas and Col. Carlos Aldana Sandoval to take over government if president becomes too ill, or for other reason, to prevent occupation president’s office by Alvarado Fuentes. Comment: This appears logical move of pro-government officers and could be used to dissipate support to Castillo Armas if his revolt shows indication of success. Source: Same as source 1 of ref cable. Distr: chargé d’affairs only..."

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Guatemala Current Section: 133. 4/24/54-Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner) to Director of Central Intelligence Dulles

04/24/54: Memo from Deputy Director for Plans to the Director: Subject: Position Paper on PBSUCCESS: Pages 2-3: ..."c. Military and Paramilitary: As stated above the Board of National Estimates concludes that a revolutionary potential exists in the Guatemalan Army. Specific data may be adduced to confirm this estimate. Disaffection and dissatisfaction are evident throughout all echelons. The high command is particularly vulnerable to defection and in some instances defection in place is practically assured. The Minister of National Defense, Jose Angel Sanchez, is opposed to Communist control over Arbenz and is considered inclined towards supporting any well-organized opposition movement. The Chief of the Armed Forces Colonel Carlos Enrique Diaz, is probably discredited and considered no longer loyal to Arbenz. The Chief of Staff, Colonel Enrique Parinello de Leon, has repeatedly indicated his desire to see the end of the Communist-controlled regime. The Chief of the Air Force, Colonel Luis A. Giron, is believed disaffected. The Minister without Portfolio, Colonel Elfego Monzon, is actively, covertly organizing within the Army for a coup (REDACTION). Plans are under way to incorporate his assets with those of the Junta and a meeting is being planned to effect this union. Thus, within the high command a definite capability exists to defect in place sufficient numbers of influential military leaders to ensure control over the Armed Forces before any overt action is undertaken..."

https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000922848.pdf

06/01/54: Dispatch courier from COS, Guatemala, Withheld to LINCOLN: Subject: General - K-Program. Specific - Meeting with SWALLOW: "1. On 30 May, Graham L. Page, accompanied by ESQUIRE (who had made the necessary arrangements the day previous) called upon SWALLOW at his (REDACTION) residence in Guatemala City. It was pointed out to SWALLOW that Page, though in no official capacity, would be able to reflect some of the thinking prevalent in responsible American circles on the highest policy-making level of the Administration...4. Page told SWALLOW that the United States had come to the firm resolve to accomplish the removal of the Arbenz regime...Success and failure of this enterprise would hinge essentially upon the attitude of the Army in such an event. This in turn would largely be determined by a small group of officers in the Army High Command, in effective control of the armed forces, via SUMAC-2, STANDEL-1, SMILAX, and STANDEL-2. 6. Page's function in Guatemala was to impart to this Army group the knowledge of American determination to thwart the attempt of international communism to establish a Western Hemisphere beachhead in Guatemala...Neither SUMAC-2 nor STANDEL-1 could possibly be counted upon to hold in confidence a message of the type Page was contemplating to impart. More likely than not they would advise Arbenz...He (SWALLOW) therefore proposed to see SUMAC-2 and STANDEL-1 as soon as possible and to tell them that if this should came to pass, the full responsibility for the consequences would rest with the Guatemalan Army. This, he pointed out, would be a most appropriate occasion to convey to STANDEL-1 and SUMAC-2 the gist of Page's message. Page observed that it would probably be even more effective if this message could be impacted to SUMAC-2 alone as in as much as there was some faint indication that he is not as certain regarding the wisdom of Arbenz' course as he used to be heretofore..."

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Guatemala Current Section: 175. 6/8/54-Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the CIA Chief of Station in Guatemala

06/08/54: Telegram from Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to COS, Guatemala: "1. Despite compromise PBSUCCESS moving forward apace. Compromise cost only top echelon and plans that events have invalidated anyway. But mass of organization remains intact and in state of near-readiness. 2. RO’s, organizers, sab leaders presently being launched. They will contact unburned second, third echelon and proceed as planned. 3. Numerous 5-man harassment teams being readied for launching, with mission attack Commies and Commie property, but not attack army. 4. Capacity to air supply friendly internal forces should exist soon. 5. Shock troops moving to WSHOOFS (Honduras) staging sites. High degrees of readiness, both in proficiency and spirit. 6. More leaflet drops, intensified SHERWOOD programs contemplated. 7. It would therefore be regrettable if, by your departure, you would tend confirm apparent impression of setback to PBSUCCESS. On contrary, your mission now to counteract [name not declassified] depression and destroy whatever smugness/fatalism has arisen among army through Semantic compromise. 8. If SWALLOW your sole channel after ESQUIRE departure, make maximum use to convey 'You ain’t seen nothing yet' theme to SMILAX, SUMAC–2, etc. This might begin soonest. Events in next week may make you appear as prophet and man worth doing business with. 9. Would be unfortunate you leave on eve of authentication you have been requesting. 10. Request you weigh foregoing in light security and operational factors and advise your considered conclusions for LINC decision. 11. Also request you attempt retain ESQUIRE in place during forthcoming period..."

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Guatemala Current Section: 193. 6/17/54-Telegram From the CIA Station in Guatemala to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida

06/17/54: Telegram from Guatemala Station to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida: "In view critical situation, ripe psychological moment and in compliance requests made reference, and since did not know when ESQUIRE would arrive, Bannister made cold approach (REDACTION) on morning 15 June. (REDACTION) convinced Bannister pilot who had come with special instructions from Consejo for fast action part of (REDACTION). Knows Bannister only by true first name. 2. (REDACTION) firmly told that time is come, that he get moving, take over army, and that time last opportunity for army to salvage its honor and even existence. 3. He agreed. Added he and SUMAC–2 fully working together and would draw up plan of action. Wanted STANDEL–1 eliminated by Consejo or Calligeris people. Was told that this his problem and he expected to handle. If impossible take care one man what percentage have army. 4. Second meeting with ESQUIRE and Bannister morning 16 June. Said he and SUMAC–2 sure they can take over army but will need show of strength on part of opposition. Requested that P–38 drop bomb directly in center hippodrome located just west of La Aurora airport. Also requested that planes buzz 15 June demonstration and if possible drop tear gas. He told the bomb could be dropped and possibly tear gas as well. 5. Vitally important this be done. Suggest at least one loud bomb on hippodrome. They plan seize control from Diaz and Dove. 6. (REDACTION) said all gear dropped Guatelon was turned over by campesinos to Guardia Civil who handed it to army. Army very frightened sight these weapons. Was told this was psychological drop for that purpose but that real drops also being made. Told he better move fast. He agreed. Said he would put guards around all Embassies as soon as they move so that foe cannot escape. Said Arbenz, Commies, and enemies will be executed. 7. After meeting he departed to meet SUMAC–2 and then proceed line up regimental commanders in capital..."

https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000934438.pdf

06/24/54: Cable from Guatemala City to Director: Slugline RYBAT PBSUCCESS INTEL: REF: GUAT 945 (IN 21545): "1. (REDACTION) came to see me at 1015 this morning. He had the following statement: A. (REDACTION) held conversation with SUMAC-2 (REDACTION) which conversation lasted most of night. SUMAC-2 completely demoralized as is STANDEL-1. STANDEL-1 however still seems to exercise enough control over STANDEL-2 to prevent the latter from following SUMAC-2 at this moment. B. All mentioned are eager to move but all state they cannot do so without some feasible excuse for such action without being accused by the troops in the field of having betrayed them while they were fighting. 2. This may seem incomprehensible but the capital is completely quiet and it is imperative that a show of force be given to these individuals to trigger them off. 3. LINC 4262 (IN 21522) has just been received and in this it is noted that authorization is being requested to bomb Matamoros. JMBLUG fervently agrees with me that Metamoras should be bombed as soon as possible in a devastating manner. The Matamoras complement is concentrated along the Barranco near the fortress. It is strongly suggested that more than one plane comprise the attacking forces. Please try to arrange to have two P-38 accompany the P-47 and strafe other gasoline tanks with incendiaries. It would be wise to also have all available C-47's fly over the city without necessarily doing anything but it would be very good if leaflets demanding the resignation of STANDEL (Jacobo Arbenz Guzman) are dropped. 4. JMBLUG (John S Peurifoy) agrees with me that this is real opportunity to end this matter successfully...Cable Secretariat Comment: A run-off copy of the above message was issued to Mr. Wisner's office at 1740 hours, 24 Jun 54."

https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000921233.pdf

06/24/54: Cable from Guatemala to Director: Slugline PBSUCCESS RYBAT: RE: GUAT 946 (IN 21819): "1. (REDACTION) reports that Jorge Torriello and Jorge Garcia Granados approached SUMAC-2 (REDACTION) with suggestion that they all get together and turn against govt. 2. SUMAC-2 (REDACTION) said (REDACTION) wanted nothing to do with them since they known for their unscrupulous past. Cable Secretariat Comment: A run-off copy of the above message was issued to Mr. Wisner's office at 1840 hours, 24 Jun 54."

https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000920993.pdf

06/27/54: Cable from Guatemala to Director: Slugline RYBAT PBSUCCESS: "1. ESPARTO was with SUMAC-4 this AM, when SUMAC-4 was summoned to STANDEL (Jacobo Arbenz Guzman) office. SUMAC-4 said he being considered by STANDEL to replace SUMAC-2. 2. This afternoon ESPARTO briefly saw SUMAC-4 again. SUMAC-4 said he did not get job because unacceptable to army. STANDEL was white and nervous, but said he would prefer suicide to surrender. MTG was to discuss army command reorganization but ESPARTO got no details. After MTG ranking officers agreed to force STANDEL resignation within 24 hours. STANDEL-1 and SUMAC-2 not among plotters. EVAL: ESPARTO B2, SUMAC-4 F3. 3. SUMAC-4 now at brothers home. Wishes enter some embassy tonight as 'visitor.' JMBLUG (John S Peurifoy) arranging (REDACTION), through other embassy may be finally chosen. 4. We will pick up SUMAC-4 at 2030 and debrief him thoroughly before delivery to any embassy. Will advise as soon as possible..."

https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000921006.pdf

06/28/54: Cable from Guatemala to Director: Slugline PBSUCCESS RYBAT INTEL: RE: GUAT 983 (IN 22786): "1. JMBLUG (John S Peurifoy) invited early afternoon 27 June to meeting with general staff. Present were STANDEL-1, SMILAX, SUMAC-2, STANDEL-3, and Colonel Carlos Sarti. They stated they had agreed STANDEL-1 would be next president and wanted following: A. JMBLUG to agree arrange cease fire so they could bring back troops now engaged in battle to maintain order. B. Calligeris (Carlos Castillo Armas) to be left out in cold since he not acceptable to them. 2. Stated they would so advise STANDEL though had not decided who would do so nor whether he would agree. Finally stated STANDEL-1 would present this idea and if he did not appear after present (RCVD PRULENT) time, SUMAC-2 would bring up artillery. 3. JMBLUG stated he could not guarantee any thing since he did not control Calligeris forces. 4. STANDEL-1 stated only 500 regular army and 2500 badly trained 'reservists' guarding capital. Suspect by reservists he meant miltia which now being armed. 5. ODYOKE (U.S. Government) officials present at this meeting were JMBLUG, JMBLUG-1, and the ODIBEX (U.S. Army) and ODUNIT (U.S. Air Force) attaches. 6. Another meeting taking place now. 7. Above info obtained from telegram being prepared by ODACID (U.S. State Department) personnel."

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Guatemala Current Section: 263. 6/30/54-Telegram From the CIA Station in Guatemala to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida

06/30/54: Telegram from Guatemala Station to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida: "1. This is to fill you in on nights developments. 2. Holland called JMBLUG (John S Peurifoy, U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala) approx 2230 about DTFROGS (El Salvador) mtg. 3. JMBLUG met at Jefatura Fuerzas Armadas with STANDEL–1 and SUMAC–2 approx 0100 June 29 to pass Holland’s message. 4. Approx 0400, ODUNIT (U.S. Air Force) attache called JMBLUG out of meeting. Jose Luis Cruz had been to see him, said pro-Calligeris officers had taken Base Militar 2000 June 29. Said new junta formed, would march on Jefatura building shortly to seize STANDEL–1, SUMAC–2. 5. JMBLUG decided stay so as not tip hand. 6. [name not declassified] phoned, asked JMBLUG come to palace. JMBLUG declined. [name not declassified] said he would be at Jefatura right away. 7. STANDEL–1, SUMAC–2 excused themselves, conferred briefly. Came back, said they planned resign. 8. New junta arrived, surrounded Jefatura, marched into conference room armed. Took over..."

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Contributors:
Gavin McDonald

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