05/06/54: Memorandum from J. C. King, CWH to Deputy Director (Plans): Subject: Approach to Colonel Carlos Enrique Diaz: "1. It is proposed that Colonel Carlos Enrique Diaz be approached for defection, utilizing initially the services of (REDACTION) and followed up by (REDACTION), a cleared American agent. Diaz is presently on a tour of South America and could be intercepted between 10-13 May in Caracas, Venezuela, where (REDACTION) would have both easier access than in Guatemala and the advantage of being on neutral ground..."
06/17/54: Telegram from Guatemala Station to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida: "566. Ref: LINC 3838. (2) In view critical situation, ripe psychological moment and in compliance requests made reference, and since did not know when ESQUIRE would arrive, Bannister made cold approach (REDACTION) on morning 15 June. (REDACTION) convinced Bannister pilot who had come with special instructions from Consejo for fast action part of (REDACTION). Knows Bannister only by true first name. 2. (REDACTION) firmly told that time is come, that he get moving, take over army, and that time last opportunity for army to salvage its honor and even existence. 3. He agreed. Added he and SUMAC–2 (Lt. Col. Jose Angel Sanchez Barillas) fully working together and would draw up plan of action. Wanted STANDEL–1 eliminated by Consejo or Calligeris (Carlos Castillo Armas) people. Was told that this his problem and he expected to handle. If impossible take care one man what percentage have army. 4. Second meeting with ESQUIRE and Bannister morning 16 June. Said he and SUMAC–2 sure they can take over army but will need show of strength on part of opposition. Requested that P–38 drop bomb directly in center hippodrome located just west of La Aurora airport. Also requested that planes buzz 15 June demonstration and if possible drop tear gas. He told the bomb could be dropped and possibly tear gas as well. 5. Vitally important this be done. Suggest at least one loud bomb on hippodrome. They plan seize control from Diaz and Dove. 6. (REDACTION) said all gear dropped Guatelon was turned over by campesinos to Guardia Civil who handed it to army. Army very frightened sight these weapons. Was told this was psychological drop for that purpose but that real drops also being made. Told he better move fast. He agreed. Said he would put guards around all Embassies as soon as they move so that foe cannot escape. Said Arbenz, Commies, and enemies will be executed..."
06/27/54: Telegram from Guatemala Station to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida: "981. 1. JMBLUG (John S Peurifoy) enroute at this moment 1245 hours local time for conference with STANDEL-1 and general staff following telephone call from STANDEL-1 and SUMAC who have intimated they wish to turn govt over to Junta. Obvious govt situation desperate despite communiqué to effect that govt will fight house by house until end. 2. Since army has shown no guts in past do not believe they can be expected to show courage now. 3. Believe govt on point of surrendering. 4. Have briefed JMBLUG that govt must agree to following points act or deny statements issued by Calligeris (Carlos Castillo Armas): A. Arrest Communist and other leaders responsible for situation. B. Declaration martial law. C. Cessation of hostilities."
06/28/54: Telegram from Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to Guatemala Station: "4458. 1. Urge you exercise every means to have (REDACTION) remove STANDEL–1 before noon 28 June failing this prevail upon STANDEL–1 to accept Calligeris (Carlos Castillo Armas) cease fire conditions. 2. FYI. There remains no choice but fight unless STANDEL–1 comes out immediately against communism accepting terms announced and call cease fire for forming new govt with Calligeris. (2) To do otherwise would be to surrender our present advantages and possibly fall victim of Arbenz Communist intrigue."
06/28/54: Telegram from Guatemala Station: "986. From JMBLUG to Ascham and Whiting. 1. As result all day meeting with STANDEL-1 and General Staff, it has been determined that STANDEL-1 will assume presidency tonight. Then have agreed to move immediately on seizing Commie leaders and sending them out of country. They have refused to deal with Calligeris (Carlos Castillo Armas) and sought good offices of PBPRIME (U.S.) to bring about cease fire on both sides. 2. It is my opinion that once STANDEL (Jacobo Arbenz Guzman) is out tonight, they should be forced to deal with Calligeris. I personally do not wish to become part of another Mihailovich-Tito deal. It seems to me that those who had the courage and guts to bring about this situation should not be sold down the river. While we might for temporary period attempt to stop bombing Adam (Guatemala City), I believe attacks should continue in north until such a meeting arranged. 3. I do not trust the army leaders either on anti-communism or on keeping faith with PBPRIME. They are collaborators with communism and must pay penalty in form Calligeris assumption of presidency. 4. Our first victory has been won but not the battle. Please consult Holland on this matter in conjunction with my formal reports to him. In other words, force negotiations. If necessary, have Holland send me such instructions."
06/28/54: Telegram from Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to Guatemala Station: "1. LINC recognizes possible conflict in your receiving orders from two places nevertheless believe action taken on ref A will not conflict too seriously with ref B. 2. Ref C was sent before receiving STANDEL–1’s speech which failed to mention his removal of Communists as reported in GUAT 986 (IN 22794). (5) Thinking here was based on your having a crack in the door to put foot in which could be exploited. Second thought is that SWALLOW should mediate but this not too good as he would have to follow Osorio who is not our man. 3. LINC believes (REDACTION) is better choice than SMILAX to replace STANDEL–1 as closer to being agreeable to recognition of Calligeris (Carlos Castillo Armas) which is important to our objectives. 4. On theory full advantage should be taken of first enemy weakness LINC has directed air strikes for Adam (Guatemala City) afternoon 28 June on TGW transmitter bldg, Matamoros and flak suppression. Anticipate this show of strength will provide substance to any consideration of Calligeris’s position."
06/29/54: Telegram from Guatemala Station to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida: "999. 1. (REDACTION) 2. (REDACTION) his only ambition is obtain cease fire and end of 'useless' slaughter. 3. He sending plane to Zacapa in attempt land there (REDACTION). I warned him that plane might be shot down and it would be advisable to waggle wings etc if approached. 4. He preparing (REDACTION) asking for cease fire and immediate start discussions with Calligeris (Carlos Castillo Armas). 5. My impression is that govt here so completely shaken they will make only half hearted attempt to establish any conditions. 6. ESSENCE has many men ready though they without arms at moment. However irregulars from Via Canales area may start moving in immediately. 7. Saw some of Salama prisoners. They horribly beaten. Several were assassinated by guards. 8. (REDACTION) stated that STANDEL-1 had forced him into deal with help certain army officers which had obliged him play cagey game and arrange for inside coup. (REDACTION) Believe nobody desirous of occupying hot seat at this moment."
06/30/54: Telegram from Guatemala Station to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida: "002. 1. This is to fill you in on nights developments. 2. Holland called JMBLUG (John S Peurifoy) approx 2230 about DTFROGS (El Salvador) mtg. 3. JMBLUG met at Jefatura Fuerzas Armadas with STANDEL–1 and SUMAC–2 (Lt. Col. Jose Angel Sanchez Barillas) approx 0100 June 29 to pass Holland’s message. 4. Approx 0400, ODUNIT (U.S. Air Force) attaché called JMBLUG out of meeting. Jose Luis Cruz had been to see him, said pro-Calligeris (Carlos Castillo Armas) officers had taken Base Militar 2000 June 29. Said new junta formed, would march on Jefatura building shortly to seize STANDEL–1, SUMAC–2. 5. JMBLUG decided stay so as not tip hand. 6. (REDACTION) phoned, asked JMBLUG come to palace. JMBLUG declined. (REDACTION) said he would be at Jefatura right away. 7. STANDEL–1, SUMAC–2 excused themselves, conferred briefly. Came back, said they planned resign. 8. New junta arrived, surrounded Jefatura, marched into conference room armed. Took over."
Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention (1982)
Page 4: ..."The regular army officers, fearing for their country and their lives, confronted Arbenz. His nerves shattered, the president addressed the nation by radio at 9:00 on the evening of June 27. He sadly told them that Guatemala was under attack by agents of the United States and the United Fruit Company and that he was turning over the government to his military chief, Colonel Carlos Enrique Diaz. A few short months before its tenth anniversary, the Guatemalan revolution was over..." - - - Pages 174-175: ..."Arbenz knew he could not continue without the army's support and that either alternative in the ultimatum amount to total defeat. On June 27 he met with Chief of Armed Forces Colonel Carlos Enrique Diaz. Visibly tired, he told Diaz that he would peacefully turn the government over to him if he received the guarantee that there would be no negotiations with Castillo Armas. Diaz, who had supported the revolution all along and opposed the invasion as much as Arbenz, readily consented"...
05/12/75: Memorandum Prepared in the CIA: Subject: CIA's Role in the Overthrow of Arbenz: ..."On 27 June Arbenz resigned and turned the government over to another Communist, Carlos Enrique Diaz, chief of the armed forces. Following the resignation the Chief of Station and another agency officer held a negotiating session with Guatemalan Army officers. The Agency representatives argued that Díaz was unacceptable (REDACTION). Following assurances from the U.S. Ambassador that Monzón was indeed the U.S. choice, those present agreed that Monzón would be the head of a junta. The agreement soon broke down when Díaz doublecrossed Monzón by appointing him as Minister of Government while Díaz retained his position. Díaz caved in following bombings by F–47’s. Negotiations took place between Castillo and Monzón, President of the Junta, who agreed to accept Castillo as a member. In early July Castillo became President of the Junta with Major Enrique Oliva and Monzón as the other two members..."