Cryptonym: SOMERSET
https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000922731.pdf
06/04/54: Cable from LINCOLN to Director: Slugline RYBAT PBSUCCESS: ATTN: COWDEN: ..."5. Request you investigate above report soonest through your established ODUNIT (U.S. Air Force) channels. Although all cargo now in SOMERSET. Few flights needed hereafter are vital and we believe seriousness above report must be clarified soonest as planes will be based at SOMERSET where LINCOLN (Note: CIA's Guatemalan covert operations headquarters, a forward base in Florida) assured of KMFLUSH (Nicaragua) backstopping."
06/14/54: Telegram from Withheld to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida: "583. 1. SECANT and all others adamant that 1 bomb, placed on presidential palace would be convincer to army on-the-fencers and cause mass hiding of key opposition. 2. Pilots convinced palace can be hit on 1 shot. SECANT convinced people would understand 1 bomb only not meant for them and would be convinced we holding back on bombing to prevent harming them. Field convinced. 3. Request SOMERSET be advised in accord with LINCOLN (Note: CIA's Guatemalan covert operations headquarters, a forward base in Florida) decision. If used, should be timed hours after clandestine broadcast announces go."
06/17/54: Telegram from Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to Withheld Station: "3966. Command msg for Cadick (William Robertson): 1. You hereby assigned full field command all KUBARK (CIA) controlled PBSUCCESS assets less GUAT Station. 2. Your mission is to create maximum impact on enemy govt with forces at your disposal. With objective of persuading army to join friendly cause. 3. You will be guided by existing directives and/or policies. 4. You will be directly responsible to LINCOLN (Note: CIA's Guatemalan covert operations headquarters, a forward base in Florida) for requesting further guidance. LINCOLN will provide command directives as required which must be strictly adhered to in every instance. 5. You will hereafter direct all air operational support activities through SOMERSET less fire. Fighter aircraft will be armed for defense only. Air fire support authority must be obtained from LINCOLN regardless of urgency existing. 6. You will utilize and employ SHERWOOD (Note: CIA radio broadcasting program based in Nicaragua begun on May 1, 1954) broadcast and KUGOWN (Psychological and Paramilitary Staff) teams as required. 7. You will direct tactical intelligence activities keeping LINC informed at all times. 8. You will submit operational situation report by OPIM cable every 12 hours until further notice."
06/19/54: Telegram from Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida: "1. No authority to bomb at present, also army may swing our side soon. 2. Avoid attack and bypass Hank (Zacapa - Guatemalan base) while having air show by fighters for benefit garrison. 3. If fear or dislike regime does not bring army over in day more forceful air support will have to be provided. 4. Try one day guerrilla tactics with air show. Meanwhile we are requesting authority for real air support to be ready if necessary. In meantime can assure you have realistic hope that army may turn against regime. Cannot afford risk this opportunity by bomb or other attack until make effort find out. 5. SHERWOOD (Note: CIA radio broadcasting program based in Nicaragua begun on May 1, 1954): Order supply bombs moved to SOMERSET to be ready by dawn 20 June."
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Guatemala
06/26/54: Telegram to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida: "06731. Ascham (Allen Dulles) sends congratulations all hands PBSUCCESS with regard to heartening gains and improvement in situation of last forty–eight hours. He particularly wishes that SHERWOOD (Note: CIA radio broadcasting program based in Nicaragua begun on May 1, 1954) team be commended and also that SOMERSET take action commend in the name of Calligeris (Carlos Castillo Armas) the pilots whose professional performance and careful attention to requirements have been outstanding."
06/28/54: Telegram from Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters: "1. Urge favorable reply soonest JMBLUG’s (John S Peurifoy) acceptance offer of good offices to mediate situation as it affords such obvious advantage it should not be passed up particularly with possibility OAS team appearing on scene 28 June. 2. LINC also believes every effort should be made to follow up this maneuver as rapidly as possible with show of strength and does not concur with JMBLUG’s suggestion we let up on bombing Adam (Guatemala City). June 28 could be decisive date therefore both SHERWOOD (Note: CIA radio broadcasting program based in Nicaragua begun on May 1, 1954) and SOMERSET have been directed to increase not let up the pressure. 3. Conditions of cease-fire established in LINC 4362 (IN 22435) (4) are reasonable and minimal. Removal of Arbenz already partial step and others should be undertaken soonest. If JMBLUG mediates he could say he has heard Calligeris (Carlos Castillo Armas) terms on radio and would like to receive STANDEL–1’s (Colonel Carlos Enrique Diaz) terms if a cease fire is to be arranged. 4. Transmittal of messages to Calligeris could be accomplished overtly as public knows he maintains residence in Tegu. 5. Needless to say LINCOLN (Note: CIA's Guatemalan covert operations headquarters, a forward base in Florida) fully concurs with JMBLUG’s unwillingness to see Calligeris discarded at this time."
07/01/54: Telegram from Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Mission Broadcasting Station: "4575. For Cadick (William Robertson). 1. Word received meeting broken off due unacceptable demands both sides. Calligeris (Carlos Castillo Armas) apparently insists on right entering Adam (Guatemala City) leading his army liberation. Monzon demanding remain number one for 30 days. 2. Both demands are unreasonable. Calligeris insistence on triumphal march would antagonize army upon which he must lean for support. Monzon’s position strengthens with each hour that passes. 3. Hqs expects Calligeris might return soon to SOMERSET or Tegu and desires Cadick or Ontrich (with SKILLET) make immediate effort to turn him around and go back to DTFROGS (El Salvador) soonest for resumption of discussions. Further Calligeris must be told unless he becomes reasonable he will lose his friends quickly. 4. Although everyone PBSUCCESS very anxious have Calligeris succeed in final step same time cannot support hostilities between anti-Communists. Request you impress upon him high moral principles involved which must not become sacrificed for vanity or personal interests."
https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000920855.pdf
07/02/54: Cable from Sherwood to Director: Slugline RYBAT PBSUCCESS: FROM CADICK: "1. (REDACTION) intercepted news story filed DTFROGS (El Salvador) new papers in LCPANGS (Costa Rica). Contained info that PBPRIME (U.S.) pilots operating out of SOMERSET giving many details. No IDENs or photos. Give hotel of pilots. 2. (REDACTION) firm, wishes all effort squelch story. Cannot get names news man or papers. 3. Suggest effort get (REDACTION) say story ridiculous as Calligeris (Carlos Castillo Armas) already informed him where planes based and that pilots were WSBURNTS (Guatemalans). Cable Secretariat Comment: Col. King, WH, notified of receipt of this message at 0600 2 July 54."
https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000935207.pdf
09/01/54: CIA document: Index of De-Briefing Reports: Pages 31-32: ..."On 2 June orders came through to move to SOMERSET, the advance base, for the purpose of dispatching bundles and supplies to the troops...On approximately 16 June the first flight took off from SOMERSET with 9 bundles..." - - - Pages 46-53: Numerous references to SOMERSET in these pages. Title on page 46: "SOMERSET Air Operations. Pages 46-47: ..."B. The sterile air crews under the direction of Bob Stewart (REDACTION) moved out from Miami on 4 June by devious routes. All air crews were in place at SOMERSET by 7 June. On or about 11 June air operations at SOMERSET were established and in readiness for phase three operations..." - - - Page 48: ..."E. Bad weather was a major problem for fighter aircraft. No radio facilities were available for homing. Every mission departing SOMERSET was a calculated risk. At this time of the year the weather is very bad in Nicaragua and at no time could we get a forecast for 4 hours later...SUMMARY: The success of the air operations section at SOMERSET is credited to the outstanding performance of all personnel assigned to this project..."