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Cryptonym: SKIMMER

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The "Group," CIA cover organization supporting Carlos Castillo Armas.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Guatemala Current Section: Abbreviations and Cryptonyms

Page xvii: ..."SKIMMER, The 'Group' CIA cover organization supporting Castillo Armas..."

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Guatemala Current Section: 110. 3/2/54-Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Central Intelligence Agency

03/02/54: Telegram from Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida: ..."E. KUHOOK (CIA Paramilitary Operations Staff): 1) Firming up SYNCARP/SKIMMER relationship to insure reliability of Calligeris. Ontrich will undertake this week. 2) Based on Ontrich preparations, Cadick is to examine staging sites, staging preparation, transport facilities, etc., to insure Calligeris capability implement logistics plans. Cadick trip to be completed approx 10 March. 3) SCRANTON trainees will graduate approx 25 May, according present plans. 4) Twenty-seven sabotage trainees will graduate 15 March. Leader trainees will graduate SARANAC approx 1 May allowing thirty days implement organization inside target area..."


03/25/54: Cable from Lincoln to Director: Slugline RYBAT PBSUCCESS: FOR CADICK: "1. (REDACTION) met with (REDACTION) 23 Mar and although not impressed by his enthusiasm he did secure an agreement to conduct the black flights. 2. (REDACTION) insisted upon maintenance utmost security and indicated willingness 'look other way' which interpreted mean would not lend any positive assistance. He is to appoint an officer to negotiate with SKIMMER and SYNCARP representatives. 3. Ontrich being authorized to represent himself as SKIMMER representative. Will keep you informed other developments. However perceive no objection to continuing with development as per para 1 your memo this subject dated 24 Mar. Ontrich en route (REDACTION) as scheduled. Will advise name of WSHOOFS (Honduras) REDACTION officer. 4. Inform LINC your alias for KMFLUSH (Nicaragua)." - - - This cable on the same day reported "that Ontrich had been appointed senior SKIMMER representative for Honduras." https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000916935.pdf

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Guatemala Current Section: 126. 4/11/54-Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Central Intelligence Agency

04/11/54: Telegram from Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida: "1. Following summation situation represents LINC’s views based upon debriefing Ontrich who arrived 0000 April 11: A. Galvez weakened and equivocated (REDACTION) to degree that required firm action to establish definite cooperation. Latter action taken by SKILLET (Whiting Willauer, U.S. Ambassador to Honduras) who, while keeping Skimmer version and stressing ODYOKE (U.S. Government) non-intervention, kept Galvez in line while using Iden A and Ontrich to press for firm operational details. B. SKILLET demonstrated exceptional political skill in keeping Vice Pres from resigning thus holding govt together for PBSUCCESS. This action endeared SKILLET to Galvez. Latter apparently now leaning on SKILLET as source of strength during current politically unstable period preceding elections. C. Excellent security appears present despite above maneuvering. Only Galvez, Vice Pres, ForMin and Chief Air Force cut in within WSHOOFS (Honduras). No documentary evidence nor witnesses to SKILLET talks. Plausible denial remains intact. D. Galvez has general understanding with Osorio (3) to act against WSBURNT (Guatemala) together. SAFFRON-1, firm Calligeris supporter, due see Osorio next few days. More Galvez becomes committed in interim, stronger will SAFFRON-1’s pressure on Osorio be. Osorio’s support also requires ODACID (U.S. State Department) approach in manner believed in progress at HQs level. E. Removal MinDefense is essential earliest but is not a prerequisite for running initial flights. Time factor important as security weakens with every day’s delay once flights initiated. Need HQs action. F. LINC withdraws objections to intermediate storage at [name not declassified] as recent reports indicate increased enemy activity both sides of border. Thus gear would be moved from (REDACTION) direct with minimum delay into target areas..."


04/12/54: Cable from Lincoln to Director: RYBAT PBSUCCESS: FOR CADICK: "1. FYI: Test flight had not been approved by HQs. LINC entirely responsible. High level discussions may be prejudiced by conduct this flight. Therefore imperative you handle matter most carefully reporting fully all pertinent factors. 2. HQs principal objection to flights based upon cables from (REDACTION) indicating overinvolvement ODYOKE (U.S. Government) therein. Therefore essential only SKIMMER concept prevail and there be no PBPRIME (U.S.) involvement. 3. Repeat (REDACTION) reaction; repeat all local reactions; how stored, how many people witting; security in general; etc. 4. No additional flights will be authorized until results this test are fully known."


04/14/54: Cable from Lincoln to Director: Slugline RYBAT PBSUCCESS: IMMEDIATE ACTION: PASS WHITING: RE: REDACTION 135 (IN 37021): "1. Cadick personal observation and opinion: A. WSHOOFS (Honduras) commitment was fact prior to flight. B. If flight had not arrived as committed, WSHOOFS-SKIMMER/SYNCARP relations would have been extensively damaged. C. Due to his own timidness, (REDACTION) would have commenced removal Calligeris from WSHOOFS next day. D. Calligeris confidence in SKIMMER would have been irreparably damaged. E. As is, flight a security success. Further delay blamed on SKIMMER desire await reaction. 2. SKILLET (Whiting Willauer, U.S. Ambassador to Honduras) reports future negotiations on this matter would become extremely difficult had we not proved sincerity and ability to comply with commitments."


05/26/54: Cable from Withheld to Director: Slugline RYBAT PBSUCCESS: FROM CADICK: "1. Osorio is stalling and it is probable he wants put off issue of choosing sides until winner decided. Do not believe he will move without pressure from SKIMMER. 2. Recent 2-week stall, friendly but purposeful, by (REDACTION) on aiding Calligeris with passes through WSHOOFS (Honduras) strike controls, is attributed to DTFROGS (El Salvador) indecision. 3. Request immediate steps of some sort be taken in SKIMMER name. Suggest Duke as solution. 4. Seriousness of situation accented by tightened border controls by WSBURNT (Guatemala) here. We need dispersion."

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Guatemala Current Section: 234. 6/24/54-Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida

06/24/54: Telegram from Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida: "1. We have been working with ODACID (U.S. State Department) on plans for consolidation phase to determine circumstances under which PBPRIME (U.S.) would recognize a rebel government or would offer military or economic aid to a new regime. No authoritative conclusions yet reached and none likely to be until there is firmer indication revolt sufficiently successful at least produce situation in which rebels control considerable territory and sufficient forces to give them at least an even chance of overthrowing regime. In view fluid and preliminary nature ODACID views believe no useful guidance can be given you and understand no present ODACID plans for communicating on this matter with JMBLUG (John S Peurifoy, U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala) or SKILLET (Whiting Willauer, U.S. Ambassador to Honduras)...4. Regardless action by Calligeris (Carlos Castillo Armas) believe desirable if contact re–established (REDACTION) by Page or Bannister to point out that if army moves decisively against Arbenz it rather than Calligeris will rule the country and to state that SKIMMER would support regime established by army even if it excluded Calligeris entirely. Well aware danger playing both groups simultaneously and naturally would greatly prefer outcome in which (REDACTION) and Calligeris combined forces. Nevertheless if sizable part of the army will really move it will be a stronger force than anything Calligeris has, except air power which we could control in a pinch. Line here proposed was suggested last sentence par 5 ref C. 5. If you agree para 4 above you may wish send appropriate instructions WSBURNT (Guatemala)..."

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Guatemala Current Section: 276. 7/9/54-Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Central Intelligence Agency

07/09/54: Telegram from Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida: "1. LINC strongly concurs with (REDACTION) desires for P–51’s and subsequent sale F–47’s to Calligeris and urges all possible KUBARK (CIA) effort to insure favorable decision on KMFLUSH (Nicaragua) request to ODACID (U.S. State Department) and expeditious delivery of aircraft. 2. As expansion of above views and to insure fullest utilization of experience and knowledge gained through PBSUCCESS the following points are submitted for your consideration. A. Personal (REDACTION) support PBSUCCESS both have emphatically pointed up (REDACTION) opposition to communism, his clear insight Latin American affairs and his realization of need for and desire to establish and continue ODYOKE (U.S. Government) support and collaboration. B. SKIMMER as authorized by Hqs has made definite commitments to (REDACTION) Calligeris re help on air support which while not officially ODYOKE commitments must be morally recognized as such and fulfilled if any future ODYOKE–Latin American dealings are to have proper foundation."

Gavin McDonald

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