Cryptonym: SKILLET
Page xvii: ..."SKILLET, Whiting Willauer, U.S. Ambassador to Honduras..."
04/10/54: Telegram to Withheld Station: "45998. To: [place not declassified] (for SKILLET from Whiting)...1. Ref A: Double Uncle. 2. Both ODACID (U.S. State Department) and KUBARK (CIA) seriously concerned about extent of SKILLET’s (3) personal involvement as revealed by above references. We had never contemplated that SKILLET would be projected into firsthand discussion of details this operation with such persons as Pres. WSHOOFS (Honduras) and Chief of Air Staff. Unable to state at present time what effect this exposure will have on ODACID judgement re continuation operation in present form, but we already on notice very strong feelings of doubt re advisability trying maintain present timetable. At high level meeting scheduled for tomorrow we hope obtain some clarification ODACID position and will communicate results this discussion. 3. Will also raise at this meeting your question Ref C re what assurances, guarantees SKILLET authorized give Pres. WSHOOFS if this subject raised by him. However, should point out that SKILLET’s giving of special and additional official guarantees as quid pro quo for his cooperation this matter would be clear indication if not acknowledgement ODYOKE (U.S. Government) official responsibility. This would remove last vestiges of carefully erected and tediously maintained basis for denial official responsibility...6. SKILLET may rest assured all his messages being closely followed by Whiting personally and that Whiting fully aware of pressures under which everyone connected this matter laboring...(3) A handwritten marginal note reads: 'Amb to Honduras, Whiting Willauer,' and an arrow points to 'SKILLET.'"
04/11/54: Telegram from Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida: "1. Following summation situation represents LINC’s views based upon debriefing Ontrich who arrived 0000 April 11: A. Galvez weakened and equivocated [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to degree that required firm action to establish definite cooperation. Latter action taken by SKILLET who, while keeping Skimmer version and stressing ODYOKE (U.S. Government) non-intervention, kept Galvez in line while using Iden A and Ontrich to press for firm operational details. B. SKILLET demonstrated exceptional political skill in keeping Vice Pres from resigning thus holding govt together for PBSUCCESS. This action endeared SKILLET to Galvez. Latter apparently now leaning on SKILLET as source of strength during current politically unstable period preceding elections. C. Excellent security appears present despite above maneuvering. Only Galvez, Vice Pres, ForMin and Chief Air Force cut in within WSHOOFS (Honduras). No documentary evidence nor witnesses to SKILLET talks. Plausible denial remains intact...G. Objectives re evidence of ODYOKE participation withdrawn view above clarification as now evident WSHOOFS would be thoroughly implicated once permitting arms enter country. Re-affirmation SKILLET’s role would prove extremely important to sustain Galvez’s courage follow through. Believe Galvez’s position too unstable vis-à-vis Carias to double-cross Calligeris. Thus conclusion is that Galvez will be most anxious move gear into target country rapidly as possible..."
04/28/54: Contact Report: Place: War Room: Persons Present: Mr. Wisner, Mr. Bissell, Mr. Barnes, (9 names withheld): "Mr. Wisner spoke first, saying that 'we have the full green light and the go ahead.' This was in regard to policy and he indicated that he was not addressing himself to operational considerations. With regard to flights, approach, etc.—it is all in the affirmative. He mentioned there may be operational consideration requiring that the program be shifted forward from the present date or other changes and the staff should bear in mind constantly the importance of maintaining a sufficient degree of flexibility in their approach to this thing so that the program can be adjusted to fit the need..." Page 4: ..."RUFUS had three questions troubling him: 1. What would be the Group’s attitude if a group of anti-Arbenz and anti-Communist officers grab the ball and prematurely take over the government? What would the Group’s attitude be in such an event? (Mr. Wisner said we will stay on his side. 'He is our hero.') 2. RUFUS is worried about the approaching elections in Honduras since Galvez’ position weakens daily. (Mr. Wisner said that SKILLET had briefed them on this and he is worried about the local situation). 3. RUFUS is worried about his 80–100 trained men now in Tegucigalpa over whom he virtually has no control until he gives the battle cry. The town is full of Guatemalan agents. He is worried about getting them out of Tegucigalpa. (Mr. Wisner agreed that he had a problem there)..."
07/01/54: Telegram from Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Mission Broadcasting Station: "4575. For Cadick. 1. Word received mtg broken off due unacceptable demands both sides. Calligeris apparently insists on right entering Adam leading his army liberation. Monzon demanding remain number one for 30 days. 2. Both demands are unreasonable. Calligeris insistence on triumphal march would antagonize army upon which he must lean for support. Monzon’s position strengthens with each hour that passes. 3. Hqs expects Calligeris might return soon to SOMERSET or Tegu and desires Cadick or Ontrich (with SKILLET) make immediate effort to turn him around and go back to DTFROGS (El Salvador) soonest for resumption of discussions. Further Calligeris must be told unless he becomes reasonable he will lose his friends quickly. 4. Although everyone PBSUCCESS very anxious have Calligeris succeed in final step same time cannot support hostilities between anti-Communists. Request you impress upon him high moral principles involved which must not become sacrificed for vanity or personal interests..."