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Cryptonym: SHERWOOD

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Definition:
CIA radio broadcasting program based in Nicaragua begun on May 1, 1954.
Status:
Documented
Sources:

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Guatemala Current Section: Abbreviations and Cryptonyms

Page xvii: ..."SHERWOOD, CIA radio broadcasting program based in Nicaragua begun on May 1, 1954..."

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Guatemala Current Section: 95. 2/9/54-Memorandum From the Assistant Director for Communications, Central Intelligence Agency ([name not declassified]) to the Chief of the Wester

02/09/54: Memo from the Assistant Director for Communications to Chief, WHD: Subject: Establishment of Radio Station to Handle Tactical Communications for PBSUCCESS: ..."4. The SHERWOOD installation and the base radio station could be combined into one installation thus making the most economical use of communications personnel available. The strong possibility that SHERWOOD could be compromised and lost before the para-military is entered into must be considered, thus making it unwise to combine the two installations. 5. Therefore, it is recommended that the Chief, WHD approve the establishment of the radio base station in KMFLUSH (Nicaragua). The equipment necessary for the installation is not great and could be installed in an isolated safehouse anywhere in KMFLUSH, preferably north of the capitol city. The installation would be made by KUCLUB (Office of Communications) radio operators who would remain with the equipment until the station was activated. 6. The station could be operated on a limited basis handling PBSUCCESS (Project to overthrow Arbenz government in Guatemala in 1954) communications with the Calligeris group without attracting any attention or being in any danger of location through DFing. 7. The station would become fully operational only for a few days during the para-military phase of the operation. At that time it would probably be necessary to assign two additional KUCLUB radio operators to handle the rapidly expanding communications. If desirable this station could also serve as an advanced operations base for the PBSUCCESS case officer during this phase. 8. At the completion of PBSUCCESS, the radio station would be deactivated at the earliest possible date, thus making the risks of operating the station relatively small..."

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Guatemala Current Section: 115. 3/12/54-Contact Report

03/12/54: Contact Report: 9:40 a.m. - 12.10 p.m.: Place: War Room. Staff Present: (10 names in total not declassified), W. Robertson: Page 2: ..."Jake Esterline had prepared a paper pointing out the maximum danger for SHERWOOD. Tracey Barnes now has the paper and is going to try to get State Dept.’s concurrence on this establishment. SHERWOOD represents the maximum danger, the closest that they can come to proof of U.S. participation. We must push for a Nicaraguan site for SHERWOOD. It must be tested, ready to go, so it can be used for black broadcasts. A Nicaraguan site for SHERWOOD is vital..."

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Guatemala Current Section: 135. 4/28/54-Contact Report

04/28/54: Contact Report: Place: War Room. Persons Present: Wisner, Bissell, Barnes (9 names not declassified): ..."Mr. Wisner asked for information about SCRANTON–SHERWOOD. The question of being sure about communications between (REDACTION), the Calligeris’ Command Post and station was raised and discussed at length. Statement was made that two lines of communications will be available—through the CP (indigenous) and through the station...Mr. Wisner questioned what should be told the Chargé in Guatemala about reporting on SHERWOOD when it goes on the air. It is felt that we have the capability of reaching operational readiness during the month of June. Lots of factors have bearing on that and certain operations may not develop as planned but we are aware of that. Though we have a plan laid out, we know there can be changes and are prepared to be flexible...(REDACTION) was asked to explain the PP operations. He stated that their main asset is SHERWOOD and that 6 days programs are already taped. Issue was raised about possibility of substituting tapes in order to provide current coverage of any developments of interest. Mr. (REDACTION) mentioned that RUFUS (Carlos Castillo Armas) had a man with a good radio voice whom they proposed to bring up and train and then send back for use in just such instances. (REDACTION) disapproved this plan because it is planned that no indigenous personnel from the Calligeris group will be used at the site. Mr. Wisner felt that the use of the radio was a very important point and its effectiveness and impact is proportionate to the speed with which it acts. He cited as an example Radio Free Europe. A discussion on this subject between Mr. Wisner, Mr. Bissell and Mr. Barnes and (REDACTION) followed...SHERWOOD is to be on the air two hours a day as of 1 May and this will be lengthened to 4 hours a day. There is a possibility of plugging this station’s program in on a government-sponsored program eventually..."

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Guatemala Current Section: 175. 6/8/54-Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the CIA Chief of Station in Guatemala

06/08/54: Telegram from Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to COS, Guatemala: "3631. Re: GUAT 773.2 1. Despite compromise PBSUCCESS moving forward apace. Compromise cost only top echelon and plans that events have invalidated anyway. But mass of organization remains intact and in state of near-readiness...6. More leaflet drops, intensified SHERWOOD programs contemplated..."

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Guatemala Current Section: 247. 6/28/54-Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Mission Broadcasting Station

06/28/54: Telegram from Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Mission Broadcasting Station: "4459. For Langevin (David Phillips) and Cadick (Rip Robertson). 1. Arbenz is out but Diaz (2) refuses to accept Calligeris’s terms. Only 500 regular army and 2500 untrained reserves in Adam. 2. Immediately inform public what has happened and that if cease and terms LINC 4362 (IN 22435) (3) not complied with immediately SYNCARP (The "Junta", Castillo Armas' political organization headed by Cordova Cerna) will launch all out bombing attack and assault and destroy all those not joining anti-Communist forces. Communism must go and Diaz must agree to terms or army of liberation will continue its victorious march to Adam and fight Communists to last one. 3. Appeal to people that Communist Arbenz has resigned, first victory won and everyone should now join side of liberation movement for a greater WSBURNT (Guatemala). The government is obviously crumbling and further bloodshed futile. Prepare leaflets for troops in field. 4. Tell Diaz bombings to start noon 28 June and will not stop until liberation army occupies palace or Diaz agrees to terms announced. 5. Target but don’t announce for noon 28 June is Matamoros again and knock out brief pilots from Langevin’s staff or (REDACTION). Put on maximum air show. Strafe all AA batteries. 6. SHERWOOD to keep steady strong appeal that anti-Communists are victorious and Diaz must agree cease fire before hundreds of innocent army men die in lost cause. Only way to stop bloodshed is to drive communism out. No other solution acceptable..."

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Contributors:
Gavin McDonald

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