Inside the Company, by Philip Agee, p. 62
from the book: Psychological and paramilitary, known as PP or KUCAGE, operations differ from those of differ from those of PI or CI because they are action rather than collection activities. Collection operations should be invisible so that the target will be unaware of them. Action operations, on the other hand, always produce a visible effect. This, however, should never be attributable to the CIA or to the US government, but rather to some other person or organization. These operations, which received their Congressional charter in the National Security Act of 1947 under 'additional services of common concern', are in some ways more sensitive than collection operations."
In this "name trace" CIA conducted for the HSCA, see this page listing KUCAGE as the first crypt in a set, and the previous page identifying it as "Psychological and Paramilitary Ops Staff (PP)."
This is a 1958 request that Michael M. Choaden, believed to be a pseudonym for David Phillips, be granted Operational Approval as a contract agent for "general developmental KUCAGE activities in Cuba."
10/8/59 handwritten notes on Political Organizer - Edward G. Tichborn: "The senior KUCAGE staff has recruited a number of individuals who have had extensive experience in politics, particularly as campaign managers and political organizers...Tichborn could perform a very useful service through consultation with the Station, Tony Varona and Sanchez Arango..."
This 1962 memo concerning the possible defection of AMLASH/1 (Rolando Cubela) notes the "KUCAGE value," a reference to the psychological/propaganda aspects of the KUCAGE crypt.
5/1/62 dispatch from Ted Shackley, Chief of JMWAVE to William Harvey, Chief of Task Force W: A crucial document. As requested by Daniel W. Presland (Harvey's pseudonym) on his recent visit, attached herewith is a paper prepared within the Station on the subject of the restructurization and revitalization of the CRC. The basic paper was prepared in the KUCAGE branch but it has also been passed for appropriate comment to other senior officers within the Station. It provides "estimates" of Miro Cardona/AMBUD-1 and other leading personalities, an estimate of internal capabilities and possible courses of action. At p. 10: "A number of reports from various Station sources indicate that support for positive action may at least be contemplated by sources other than (CIA) and (State Department)." The report cites President Ydigoras of Guatemala, and that "General Anastasio Somoza, Chief of the Armed Forces of Nicaragua, has had conversations 'with the Pentagon' on undertaking action against Cuba."
5/11/62 dispatch from Ted Shackley, Chief of JMWAVE to William Harvey, Chief of Task Force W: This memo was written in the wake of the resignation of Jose Ignacio Lasaga, the Director of Doctrine and Propaganda for the CRC. Shackley believed that "LASAGA's resignation was occasioned by his long-brewing fear of a possibility of 'peaceful co-existence' on the part of ODYOKE (the White House) and Miro vis-a-vis the Cuban problem. The Station has forwarded several on LASAGA's rather violent discussions with MIRO on this matter." This is one of several dozen "Operational/GYROSE/KUCAGE" memos between Shackley and Harvey during 1962.