A March 1963 CIA cable stated that INDEVOUT-3 was a Cuban "with excellent contacts in Cuban Government circles." Probably based in Geneva at least part of the time. Moreover, in a March 1964 CIA cable, INDEVOUT-3 reported that Fidel Castro genuinely desired to negotiate détente with the United States Government, and Castro was concerned President Johnson would not follow the "Kennedy course." In addition, in a June 1964 Contact Report, AMWHIP-1 (Carlos Tepedino Gonzalez) described INDEVOUT-3 as "a sour type". Tepedino also referred to INDEVOUT-3 as "Camejo." Furthermore, in a November 1966 cable INDEVOUT-3 was referred to as a "high level source." INDEVOUT-3 also had the cryptonyms SLSTEEL-1, AMCLOCK-1 and AMANVIL-1: https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2021/docid-32373697.pdf
See 104-10308-10193: In a ZRWAHOO memo, he is described as having a "responsible position in Havana during the first year after the Castro revolution" and as of Nov. 1962 living in Mexico.
09/02/60: Dispatch from Chief, EE to Chief of Base, Geneva, COS, Bern: "1. Following are general requirements on Cuba which may be put to INDEVOUT: a. Extent and nature of Soviet and Bloc military aid to Cuba. b. CHICOM technical support to Cuba. c. Cuban reaction to large sales of sugar to Bloc countries and to the trade agreements signed with the USSR, Poland and East Germany. d. Type projects CHICOMS and Soviets are working on in Cuba. e. Evidence of shipment and transshipment of strategic materials to the Bloc by indirect routes...k. Indications of a power struggle or split among top Cuban leaders. l. Actual control over the Cuban regime. m. Stature of Raul Roa in the inner circle. n. Precautions taken to prevent possible assassination attempts of top Cuban officials..." Handwritten note at bottom of page: "filed AMCLOCK Prod. Requirements, September 1960.." "2. The above requirements are of a general nature and are the same as those served on Cuban sources world-wide. It is anticipated that INDEVOUT's response to these general requirements will generate more specific requirements tailored to his indicated capabilities..."
10/25/62: CIA originated telegram: Priority: 1-SIG. 1-BOARD. 1-INDEVOUT/3/OPS. 1-INDEVOUT/3/PROD. 1-REPORT CHRON. 1-3082. Slugline: PP DIR INFO PP BERN CITE GNVA 4357: RYBAT INDEVOUT-3 PBRUMEN INTEL: REF: GNVA 4353: "1. Soviet minister and resident delegate in GNVA Nikolay Molyakov, former department chief in MFA and recently sometime acting head of Sov Laos Cong del, visited SUBJ for two hours at latter's office on noon 23 Oct. Molyakov's call appeared be combination of repaying curtesy call he owed SUBJ and learning from him about his views on Cuban developments. 2. Molyakov commented that the USSR would not let the American move go without retaliation. He said he thought the American move was 'an election affair'...3. SUBJ replied that he felt that the domestic election was important but that he felt Pres Kennedy was also trying to apply pressure, through the Cuban step, to allies whose enthusiasm for various American proposed positions had been flagging, like the UK and the Latin American nations...4. Molyakov agreed with this, but added that more important externally was American fear of Latin American peoples, like those of Brazil and Venezuela 'where revolution is before the door.' He insisted however that domestic considerations had been the paramount ones. SUBJ replied that the risk seemed disproportionately great since for a domestic goal Pres Kennedy was risking war. Molyakov replied ironically that he had read that a Swedish detection station had reported a twenty six megaton blast and that although 'I didn't originate that report, it is probable that the blast took place.' (SUBJ Comment: Molyakov was implying that there would be use made of such bombs if the American move resulted in war. SUBJ added that he had no reason to believe that Molyakov had rcvd any instructions from Moscow at the time that the conversation took place, and that his comments on the reasons for the American move on Cuba were likely to be based on his own analysis)."
03/28/63: Cable: Slugline INTEL PBRUMEN INK: "SUPDATA: ZRWAHOO. INDEVOUT 3. See GNVA...SUBJ: Background to October 1962 Cuban Destruction of a U.S. U-2...SOURCE: Cuban with excellent contacts in Cuban Government circles (B) from an official of the Cuban Government (F). 1. (Field Comment: The Cuban Government official has been an intimate acquaintance of source for many years. He has excellent high level contacts throughout the Cuban leadership structure and is (unintelligible) in a position to have acquired the information reported below)..." - - - 7/11/63: Cable: Domark from Middaugh: Slugline RYBAT INDEVOUT 3: "1. As part of (REDACTION) Subject must provide books on espionage. He has sent such as he and we have access to in local shops and has urgent need to send more very soon. We planning ask London make exhaustive purchase but in meantime have need pass him circa ten for immediate posting (REDACTION). 2. Can you at early point ransack (REDACTION) bookstores for any type of work on espionage or counter espionage of literally any country. Works can include historic items like World War I Black Room, World War II like breaking of Japanese code, operation North Pole in Holland, and what have you, as well as works by communist defectors and the newer crop of espionage studies. They must be in English or French. 3. Books he has already sent include: Reseau de Spions, L'Histoire de Gestapo, CIA, MI 5, Secret War, Manuel de Espions, Her Majesty's Secret Service, treason in twentieth century, and several unidentified books on fascism. 4. Would appreciate phone call as soon as you know how many books you can get. Mail books commercially to Middaugh private address. Orig: Middaugh. Released: Elmard." https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=162258&search=104-10322-10262#relPageId=
03/02/64: Cable from Geneva to Director: Slugline RYBAT INDEVOUT 3 PBRUMEN: "1. Had circa two and half hour meet with SUBJ late evening 29 Feb. This followed by double brush meet late evening 1 March at which SUBJ passed us and received back document which photographed (see below). 2. General Comment: SUBJ characterizes present trip as 'most interesting to date' from point of intel. We believe continued debriefing will bear this out. SUBJ great fatigue and inevitable side discussions after return from homeland. Limited both length of meeting and breadth and depth of initial debriefing. Nevertheless we able cover substantial range of highly significant topics..." - - - Pages 2-3: ..."Believe also continued debriefing will confirm initial impression that SUBJ has secured particularly valuable insight into top level thinking several important areas. Will make continued debriefing top priority concern, but unfortunately SUBJ movement highly limited by presence GNVA of group of Cubans for who and other matters and another top level group will commence arriving Geneva circa March for UNCAST conf. We hope be able break back of problem with circa six - eight hour debriefing SUBJ projected for 7 March in ZURI. 4. Personal and op highlights of meeting and debriefing follows: A. Personal report personal: SUBJ is elated by fact of successful round trip, and of treatment accorded him HAVA...B. Operational report operational: SUBJ encountered grave risk during HAVA stay. Circa ten days after arrival, he suddenly denounced as 'counter revolutionary' by former aide Pedro Gonzales Pineiro (see GNVA 5462). Denunciation, which made to Min Forn Affairs Collegium, apparently result Pineiro bitterness towards SUBJ, aggravated by Raul Roa refusal grant Pineiro desirable post for which he requested by name. Everyone from Roa on down rallied to SUBJ, and Pineiro has not yet come up with specific charges..." (CONTINUED BELOW).
03/02/64: Cable from Geneva to Director: Slugline RYBAT INDEVOUT 3 PBRUMEN: Page 4: ..."Cuban/US relations and Guantanamo: Castro sincerely desires negotiate detente with U.S. Concerned President Johnson will not follow Kennedy course which 'might have led to negotiations.' Khrushchev in Moscow convinced Castro 'Carribean peace' works to Cuban advantage and must be strengthened. In addition, Castro convinced Cuban prosperity not achievable with Soviet aid alone. He infuriated because 'fishing boat' incident constituted obstacle to betterment U.S. Cuban relations, but prestige forced him take some action. In cutting Guantanamo water, apparently chose action least likely to escalate. One alternative considered and abandoned was firing at 'U-2' flights, which Cubans apparently able track." - - - For the unredacted version see: https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2021/docid-32373793.pdf
06/05/64: Contact Report: Page 13: ..."22. Geneva: AMWHIP/1 (Carlos Tepedino Gonzalez) stated he felt the trip to Geneva was totally unsuccessful and, even though he made every effort, could see no possibilities of establishing contact with Cubans who were there. He stated that Camejo (INDEVOUT/3) was a sour type and felt he would have been wasting his time trying to get close to him." - - 09/30/64: Cable from Paris to Director: Slugline TYPIC PBRUMEN MHAPRON: "1. UNSNAFU/9 (Luis Enrique Trasancos) said 29 Sept Foreign Minister Raul Roa will precede Dorticos to Cairo non aligned nations conference. AMWHIP/1 reported 29 Sep Ambassador Carrillo saw Roa in London weekend 26-27 Sep while latter en route Cairo. 2. UNSNAFU/9 says ambassador to Algeria Jorge Serguera also to attend conference. Returned ALGI from PARI 28 Sep. Had stayed at local embassy. 3. AMWHIP/1 says UN rep Jose Enrique Camejo Argudin went Paris Cairo for conference probably 28 Sep. 4. Ambassador to Morocco Enrique Rodriguez Loeches now PARI staying with Carrillo." https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=108194&search=#relPageId=2&tab=page
12/31/64: CIA document: "SLSTEEL-1 (formerly INDEVOUT-3 & AMANVIL-1), 201-009239, 14 files (June 1947 - 31 December 1964). Reports description of Subject - Very sensitive high-level, on-island reporting source. VOL. 13: Memo to EE/SA/Switzerland, WH/SA-64-590, 30 Jul 64: '...AMWHIP/1 (TEPEDINO) further stated that he himself was not particularly friendly with INDEVOUT-3, probably because he is known to I-3 as business partner of AMWHIP-2's (Juan Ventura Valner)...' (Handwritten note: N.B. pointing to above). There is no info in Subject's file re assassination nor any mention of operations directed against Castro or GOC. Attached are documents re Kennedy or reporting on events/ideas which may pertain to this search."
03/07/66: Cable from Geneva to Director: Slugline RYBAT INDEVOUT-3 PBRUMEN: "1. Had short meet with SUBJ late evening 5 March. In addition discussion AMSNAKE-1 matter, which follows separately, SUBJ stated he very worried at press reports Rolando Cubela arrested in connection plot against Castro. Per GNVA 7668, SUBJ present in Paris at Christmas 64 when Cubela also visiting there. In conversations with SUBJ and Carrillo, Cubela showed some bitterness at regime for present sideline position. On at least one of several occasions when SUBJ, Cubela, Carrillo together, student president Jose Revellon also there. 2. What worries SUBJ more than Paris contact, which after all in effect under Carrillo aegis, is fact that when he went HAVA from N.Y. fall 65, at request Cubela long time friend Marta Jimenez, SUBJ took package which allegedly contained medical books, probably to Cubela. SUBJ states that given closeness of Jimenez to Cubela, might well be mixed up in any anti-regime activity Cubela has undertaken, if press reports true. 3. Given necessarily brief period 5 March meet and need get AMSNAKE-1 matter straightened out first, unable debrief SUBJ in detail on extent his past contacts Cubela on Cuba Govt. in anticipation debrief near future, and for out info, would appreciate on continuing basis any info amplifying press reports and throwing light on nature Cubela involvement."
03/11/66: Cable from Director to Geneva: Slugline RYBAT TYPIC INDEVOUT/3: "Re para 2 ref, America Cisneros de Fissolo is person with whom Cubela stayed while PARI during Dec 64 - Jan 65. Not identical with Jacinto Cisneros which is alias of Felipe Llaudy Hernandez." - - 03/16/66: Cable from Geneva: Slugline RYBAT TYPIC INDEVOUT 3 AMWEST: "1. In parenthetical elaboration on para 1 C Ref A statement, INDEVOUT-3 wrote 'In fact, AMWEST-1 is very nervous re subject of Cubela.' 2. Will explore I-3 knowledge A-1 present frame mind at upcoming debriefing." https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=161266&relPageId=#relPageId=
03/19/66: Cable from Director to Bern, Geneva: Slugline RYBAT TYPIC INDEVOUT/3: "1. Appreciate rapid and clear handling refs. 2. HQs has transcript of recording of Cubela trial, allegedly released in toto by GOC. However would be interested Carrillo/Subject insight into following: A. Timing of discovery of Cubela plot, and why did Castro decide to try Cubela when he did? B. Request I-3 continue attempt get Carrillo evaluation Castro aims recent purge and ultimate extent."
03/29/66: Cable from Beirut to Director (Sprange Acting): Slugline TYPIC AMBRAY ZRPERUSAL MHAPRON: "1. In three-hour meeting at Sprange home 29 Mar AMBRAY/1 reluctant come to formal agreement but very willing cooperate. A/1 anxious make press conference to denounce Cuba in general and AMTHUG/1 (Fidel Castro) in particular. Has been persuaded do nothing until we form definite plan of action. 2. In own handwriting A/1 listed following friends he could contact and who anti-commie: A. Antonio Carrillo (France) who scheduled return Cuban capital city early April to become Deputy Foreign Minister. B. Rafael Hernandez (France). C. Amado Palenque (Austria). D. Jose Luis Galbe (Greece) who now sick in Cuba but will most likely return to Greece...F. Severino Mansur (Italy)...H. Carlos Maristany (Holland) still in Cuba but believes he will return. I. Armando Entralgo (Ghana). J. Camejo Argudin (Geneva U.N.). K. (Unintelligible) Mora (India). L. Raul Amado Blanco (Lisbon). M. Miguel Alonso (U.N.). N. Arturo Barber Orozco (Handwritten note: Now in Havana as Deputy Director of Politica II (Soviet & Bloc countries). O. Name forgotten Amb to Canada who a playboy (Handwritten: Unintelligible Fernandez Unintelligible). 3. A/1 described Argudin as most important along with Entralgo and Amado Blanco. All very anti-commie. Blanco's brother Heigan is Deputy Minister of Trade and father is Luis Amado Blanco Amb to Vatican..."
11/22/66: Cable from Director to Mexico City (Orig: Withheld, Unit: WH/COG/FI/TC): Slugline RYBAT TYPIC MHAPRON SAWELL SYPINGPONG: "1. LITAMIL/9 (Luis Alberu Souto) is close friend of AMADAGE/1 (identity for Mexico City only). Request, therefore, obtain complete LITAMIL/9 assessment of AMADAGE/1 including identification friends or relatives in West who could be used for recruitment approach. FYI only: sensitive reliable (REDACTION) source indicates AMADAGE/1 convinced will be reassigned Cuba late 66 or early 67. Also INDEVOUT/3 who high level source reported November 66 that AMADAGE/1 soon to be recalled Cuba. On 15 Oct 66, sensitive (REDACTION) source indicated AMADAGE/1 had recently suffered very bad heart attack and was hospitalized. 2. FYI: JMWAVE in contact with AMADAGE/1's brother Leon who sent short letter to AMADAGE/1 on 14 Oct 66 but as yet has reported no response." - - 08/09/1968: CIA document: ..."65A01 U INDEVOUT/3 NYDO-1275 IN-77071 21 OCT 65..." https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=192431&search=#relPageId=2&tab=page