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Cryptonym: GPPHOTO

Definition:
General Maxwell Taylor, chair of the Cuba study group after the Bay of Pigs and later the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Status:
Documented
Sources:

104-10228-10389: DISPATCH: OPERATIONAL/ REPORT NO. 369: MEMORANDUM FROM PASSAVOY TO GPPHOTO RE RECRUITING PROGRAM

This 10/15/62 Shackley-Harvey dispatch states as the subject: "Passavoy Report No. 369: "Memorandum from PASSAVOY to GPPHOTO re Recruiting Program." The next page is No. 369, PASSAVOY's "memorandum to General Taylor".

104-10231-10290: CABLE: CAPONONG MET WITH AMBUD-1 AT LATTER'S SUGGESTION ON 4 SEPT

9/4/62: PW/Caponong "met with GPPHOTO and other ODEARL/DOD personnel...most important conversation...was one with GPPHOTO at which Al Rodriguez present as interpreter...GPPHOTO told AMBUD-1 (that intel collection)..had concluded that PBRUMEN/Cuba government could not be overthrown through internal uprising. GPPHOTO continued by saying that next six months would be devoted to additional collection intell and extensive sabotage against PBRUMEN economy."

157-10005-10256: TESTIMONY OF GENERAL MAXWELL TAYLOR, 9 JUL 1975

1975 testimony of Maxwell Taylor: "(The President) wanted me to underake a review of the Bay of Pigs for that purpose, namely to tell him what had gone wrong and why."

202-10002-10093: SOUTH VIETNAM ACTIONS

October 1963, JCS Chairman Maxwell Taylor writes to the rest of the chiefs, "On Oct 2 the President approved recommendations relating to military matters contained in the trip report...," including a phase-out of US forces so that military functions "can be assumed properly by the Vietnamese by the end of calendar year 1965." The memo also notifies the Joint Chiefs to "Execute the plan to withdraw 1,000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963..."

104-10171-10351: CABLE: AT REQUEST GPFOCUS 24 SEPTEMBER, IDEN MET ERNESTO

Charley Ford memo about RFK interest in matter and JFK interest in ELC and GPPHOTO-plus involvment (Perez) Alamo with Alwin (Odio) Tamayo who subject considerable recent traffic REF A is meeting between Letuce and Amdenim-11, REF B is a summary of contacts of Dunney Perez; REF C is the 9/11/62 traces on Dunney Perez, no traces on Odio (above, DIR 35924) Note that Odio is AMLUNT-1 and Dunney Perez is AMLUNT-2.

104-10228-10389: DISPATCH: OPERATIONAL/ REPORT NO. 369: MEMORANDUM FROM PASSAVOY TO GPPHOTO RE RECRUITING PROGRAM

10/9/62, memo from PASSAVOY/Col. Wendell C. Johnson (WCJ) to General Taylor on the recruiting program for Cuban exiles: "The principal student groups, (DRE) and Frente Juventudes Cristianas had not yet decided to back the program and send in their young men to sign up...Dr. Miro is very gratified with the way the program is progressing..."

202-10002-10043: COURSES OF ACTION RELATED TO A REVOLT IN CUBA

2/20/63 memo from Maxwell Taylor, Chairman of the JCS to Director, JCS: "...it is timely for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to make a comprehensive study of the courses of action that might be taken if...a revolt occurred...if the revolt was widespread and apparently successful, might we decide on a curtailed, rapidly executed version of CINCLANT OPLAN 316 in order to exploit in time the effect of the revolt on the Castro forces?...in support of the foregoing study, there are two specific and more detailed tasks that I would like to have carried out separately as a matter of priority. a. Analysis of the training of selected Cuban nationals to form teams of Cubans with specialized training. The primary mission of these forces would be to land in Cuba...b. A message to CINCLANT requesting his views on (the paragraph above on exploiting a revolt inside Cuba) as a matter of priority."

202-10002-10018: COURSES OF ACTION RELATED TO CUBA (CASE II)

5/1/63 memo from J-5 to Joint Chiefs of Staff: "The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff...dated 25 March 1963, requested that a study be made of the requirements to plan and incite a revolt in Cuba. He stated, in part therein, 'In view of past difficulties in infiltrating agents into Cuba and of obtaining reliable information out of Cuba, it will always be extremely difficult to contrive a timed uprising in proper relations to US preparations to exploit it.' Hence, 'consideration should be given to the advantages of engineering an incident as a cause for invasion rather than trying to generate and coordinate action from the inside involving many Cubans of doubtful reliability..."

Contributors:
Bill Simpich

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