10/15/52: Air dispatch from Vincent B. Ogden, COS, Guatemala to Chief, WHD: Subject: Operational ESQUIRE: "1. ESCONSON has advised that ESQUIRE was in contact with him on 7 and 8 October 1952, and during the course of their conversations he learned that ESQUIRE had recently arrived from QKCIGAR (since 1 October) and that his principal interest in contacting him was to determine if ESCONSON had, in fact, a means of communicating with Bob Jackson. ESQUIRE furnished ESCONSON the telephone number of Jackson. 2. ESQUIRE advised ESCONSON that a 'timetable for action' was to be sent to him by Bob Jackson some time between 16-25 October. ESCONSON ascertained that ESQUIRE's principal preoccupation has been the fusing of the opposition groups which he identified by code names which are apparently those used within the groups but are herein referred to by cryptonyms used in DYCLAIM (CIA) communications. We have recorded in our files the referred to code names...4. ESQUIRE mentioned that RNDINDLE's recent trip to KMPAJAMA (Mexico) and QKCIGAR was the result of an arrangement made by ESQUIRE and his brother in BGTOWN to discuss plans for the movement; that his brother had previously been in contact with the Dominican Consul in BGTOWN although he, ESQUIRE, had never met the Consul...ESQUIRE mentioned visiting the consul's office in BGTOWN which he says is a few floors above the WSBURNT (Guatemala) Consulate...5...ESQUIRE indicated he was considerably concerned for his personal security as a result of his personally have been in contact with the Dominican Consul and because of an article appearing in the Diario de Centro America, pro-government Guatemala City newspaper, on 7 October, relating to an interview with Enrique C. Henriquez, brother-in-law of ex-President Prio Socarras of Cuba..." - - - Mention of ESQUIRE going to his farm at bottom of page 2.
12/30/53: Cable from Guatemala City to Director: Slugline RYBAT PBSUCCESS: "1. ESQUIRE recently gave embassy officer info in general term: Salama uprising, lack of coordination among anti-commie groups, arms, funds etc, without mentioning support from U.S. Government or any person by name. Indicated he favors Calligeris (Carlos Castillo Armas). Said if he could see indication of outside support which would eliminate problem of collecting funds locally and particularly give members of organization feeling were not alone he would be willing to attempt rebuild an anti-government movement. 2. ESQUIRE is of the wealthy class in which he has many contacts. Our needs for local exchange require use every possible secure medium. 3. We propose use him through ESOTERIC for that purpose with understanding he not engage any specific conspiratorial activity. Advise."
05/12/54: Memorandum from C. Tracy Barnes to Jake Esterline: Subject: Notes in Response to Questions in DIR 49887: "1. At the Wisner meeting on Tuesday, May 11, I gave some information in response to the questions set forth in the above reference. Most of this information was drawn from notes and I was asked to provide copies of these notes. Enclosed are three such copies. You will know who to give them to although I would recommend that one copy go to Dick Bissell who was particularly anxious to have it. 2. Let me reemphasize that the enclosures are only notes and should not be otherwise interpreted." - - - Page 3: ..."H. Now that SEMANTIC (probably Domingo Goicolea Villacorta) and SECANT (Major Enrique Trinidad Oliva) are in WSBURNT (Guatemala) capital and secure communication lines are set up with station and with Calligeris (Carlos Castillo Armas) believed LINCOLN (note: CIA's Guatemalan covert operations headquarters, a forward base in Florida) will be promptly informed of all significant moves of government. SEMANTIC has net of agents with good high level contacts in army and government. WSBURNT station agents who have high level connections and who are in position to provide info of value are ESSENCE, ESQUIRE, ESPERANCE and ESCROW. Believed that (REDACTION) also will furnish valuable info once he is lined up. Capabilities government to meet PBSUCCESS moves difficult to determine as not known exactly how many officers will elect to actively back regime. However, plans include actions to disrupt communications and transport, cut off or sabotage arms and ammo, and put pressure on officers to join opposition on D-Day..."
05/16/54: Air Dispatch from LINCOLN to COS, Guatemala: Subject: Operational Notes for Graham L. Page: "1. Attached please find sterile notes for Graham L. Page (probably Henry Hecksher)...2. Please inform Page that his field cryptos are being used in the attached notes. For convenience, ESQUIRE is designated 'Roland.' 3. For the information of Guatemala Station and Page, Headquarters was informed by cable on 14 May of the agreements reached on the K-Program (note: operations aimed at intelligence and defection of Guatemalan military; after May 11, 1954, redirected at military defections) at the 11 May meeting between Bannister (probably John Doherty), Clower (Joseph G. Sancho), Page and Nutting. it was pointed out in the cable that the K-Program originally comprised intelligence, defection, 'priming' and labor defection, but that it would now, for purposes of security and concentration on key issues, be restricted to intelligence and military defection. Page's assumption of control over ESQUIRE and his high regard for ESQUIRE's ability were noted. (REDACTION)'s threefold duties - intelligence, KUGOWN (Psychological and Paramilitary Staff) appeals to the Army and recruitment in Guatemala City garrisons - were listed. It was explained that Burnette would handle the backstopping and commo for Page, and that Burnette's diplomatic status provided Page more protection than Clower, as a bodyguard, could provide. A separate cable was sent on the use of Clower as the case officer on ESCOBILLA, SEMANTIC (probably Domingo Goicolea Villacorta) and SECANT (Major Enrique Trinidad Oliva)...Jerome C. Dunbar."
05/20/54: Telegram from Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to Guatemala Station: "2890. Ref: GUAT 602. (2) 1. Inadvisable disclose our relationship with ESQUIRE to Calligeris (Carlos Castillo Armas), especially in view (REDACTION)–Calligeris hostility. Basic compartmentation between Calligeris and K–Program (note: operations aimed at intelligence and defection of Guatemalan military; after May 11, 1954, redirected at military defections) must be kept. 2. Assure ESQUIRE we will keep him out of Calligeris black book at proper time. 3. LINC not contacting Calligeris on this matter. Will inform you if Calligeris volunteers anything. 4. ESQUIRE not to disclose any operational details to (REDACTION). 5. Keep ESQUIRE in WSBURNT (Guatemala) as long as operationally necessary and feasible."
05/21/54: Dispatch from COS, Guatemala to LINCOLN: Subject: General - Operational: Specific - Material from Graham L. Page: "There are being transmitted herewith various documents which have just been received from Graham L. Page (probably Henry Hecksher) for relaying to LINCOLN (CIA's Guatemalan covert operations headquarters, a forward base in Florida). Due to the time element we are unable to retype these documents and they are being forwarded as received. (REDACTION) Cyrus E. Burnette." - - - Page 5: "K-Program: ESQUIRE and Calligeris (Carlos Castillo Armas): 1. As reported to you, Subject was contacted on the evening of May 18th, by one (REDACTION), a brother-in-law of (REDACTION). Both are known to ESQUIRE as engaged in conspiratorial activities although - it is Page's impression - that until the last contact ESQUIRE was not aware of their affiliation with Calligeris. About four months ago ESQUIRE and the aforementioned debated the advisability of liquidating Manuel Pellecer. The project was referred to 'higher authority' and word came back that nothing should be done unless a triggerman could be found with a personal grievance against Pellecer..."
06/09/54: Telegram from Guatemala Station to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida: "791. Re: LINC 3631. (2) 1. King Program (note: operations aimed at intelligence and defection of Guatemalan military; after May 11, 1954, redirected at military defections). (3) Following from Page (probably Henry Hecksher) ETD Guat City 10 June 1200 hours on PAA flight 444. ETA Miami same day. 2. Ref LINC 3631 (IN 15716). Your message very heartening, but developments make imperative Page proceed LINC at least for consultation. No reason why can not return WSBURNT (Guatemala) soonest if operational and security considerations warrant. Recent correspondence re (REDACTION) suggests LINCOLN/King Program gears no longer mesh. (4) Either Page at fault in not clearly conveying substance (REDACTION) plans or LINCOLN (note: CIA's Guatemalan covert operations headquarters, a forward base in Florida) unwilling consider any suggestions not strictly in line original PBSUCCESS concept. Due lack specific instructions (REDACTION) operation has deteriorated into academic exercise. 3. ESQUIRE ETD 9 June. ETD New Orleans for WSBURNT 15 June. Visiting dying father in Chicago. Suggest ESQUIRE, Nutting and Page have joint discussion o/a 15 June."
06/17/54: Telegram from Guatemala Station to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida: "566. Ref: LINC 3838. (2) In view critical situation, ripe psychological moment and in compliance requests made reference, and since did not know when ESQUIRE would arrive, Bannister (probably John Doherty) made cold approach (REDACTION) on morning 15 June. (REDACTION) convinced Bannister pilot who had come with special instructions from Consejo for fast action part of (REDACTION). Knows Bannister only by true first name. 2. (REDACTION) firmly told that time is come, that he get moving, take over army, and that time last opportunity for army to salvage its honor and even existence. 3. He agreed. Added he and SUMAC–2 (Lt. Colonel Jose Angel Sanchez Barillas) fully working together and would draw up plan of action. Wanted STANDEL–1 (Colonel Carlos Enrique Diaz) eliminated by Consejo or Calligeris people. Was told that this his problem and he expected to handle. If impossible take care one man what percentage have army. 4. Second meeting with ESQUIRE and Bannister morning 16 June. Said he and SUMAC–2 sure they can take over army but will need show of strength on part of opposition. Requested that P–38 drop bomb directly in center hippodrome located just west of La Aurora airport. Also requested that planes buzz 15 June demonstration and if possible drop tear gas. He told the bomb could be dropped and possibly tear gas as well. 5. Vitally important this be done. Suggest at least one loud bomb on hippodrome. They plan seize control from Diaz and Dove. 6. (REDACTION) said all gear dropped Guatelon was turned over by campesinos to Guardia Civil who handed it to army. Army very frightened sight these weapons. Was told this was psychological drop for that purpose but that real drops also being made. Told he better move fast. He agreed. Said he would put guards around all Embassies as soon as they move so that foe cannot escape. Said Arbenz, Commies, and enemies will be executed..."
06/28/54: Telegram from Guatemala Station to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida: "992. Re: GUAT 990. (2) 1. We have been double-crossed. 2. [3 names not declassified] formed junta and announced it over TGW at 1145. (REDACTION) renounced presidency, kept chief armed forces. (REDACTION) Min Defense. (REDACTION) Minister of Gobernacion. (REDACTION) asked (REDACTION) remain. This complete violation agreement 7 hours earlier. 3. With (REDACTION) failure, issue became readiness of junta negotiate with Calligeris (Carlos Castillo Armas). JMBLUG (John S. Peurifoy), JMBLUG 1, ESQUIRE, Bannister (probably John Doherty), Nutting spent from 1200 to 1415 with junta. (REDACTION) spoke for junta. They refused give yes or no to JMBLUG question whether they would meet Calligeris. Evaded all issues, praised their own anti-communism, slandered Calligeris, cried have beaten army retain power in nation. 4. Urgently recommend bombing Adam (Guatemala City) this afternoon. 5. Next mtg 1730, same participants. Bombs would persuade them fast."
07/05/54: Cable from LINCOLN to Director: Slugline RYBAT PBSUCCESS PBCABOOSE: "1. It is necessary to establish SKIMMER (note: The "Group," CIA cover organization supporting Carlos Castillo Armas) contact with Calligeris (Carlos Castillo Armas) soonest to resolve a plausible and palatable explanation of his air support for liberation movement. Suggest either ESQUIRE or Clower (Joseph G. Sancho) be used as local SKIMMER representative for this and possibly other SKIMMER matters in future..."