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Cryptonym: ESCONSON

Unknown identity. ESCONSON was both an Guatemalan agent, and a KUFIRE (Intelligence) agent coverage project in Guatemala in 1953-54.


10/15/52: Air dispatch from COS, Guatemala to Chief, WHD: Subject: Operational ESQUIRE: "1. ESCONSON has advised that ESQUIRE was in contact with him on 7 and 8 October 1952, and during the course of their conversations he learned that ESQUIRE had recently arrived from QKCIGAR (since 1 October) and that his principal interest in contacting him was to determine if ESCONSON had, in fact, a means of communicating with Bob Jackson. ESQUIRE furnished ESCONSON the telephone number of Jackson. 2. ESQUIRE advised ESCONSON that a 'timetable for action' was to be sent to him by Bob Jackson some time between 16-25 October. ESCONSON ascertained that ESQUIRE's principal preoccupation has been the fusing of the opposition groups which he identified by code names which are apparently those used within the groups but are herein referred to by cryptonyms used in DYCLAIM (CIA) communications. We have recorded in our files the referred to code names. One is the KMEGGCUP group headed by RNDINDLE and the other the group lead by (REDACTION) and John H. Calligeris (Carlos Castillo Armas), the latter stated by ESQUIRE to be presently in WSHOOFS (Honduras). ESQUIRE explained to ESCONSON that the (REDACTION) Calligeris group claims considerably more men and arms than the RNDINDLE group, but all or almost all of their support is outside the country, whereas the RNDINDLE group has its men and materials inside the country. He said the principal difference between the two groups is that the RNDINDLE group cannot accept Calligeris as the future president and the (REDACTION) Calligeris group is insisting that Calligeris should have sole power after the revolution takes place. He said that both recognize the advantages of working together, but the RNDINDLE group want a junta of 5-7 men...Vincent B. Ogden." DYCLAIM can be found on page 26 here: https://www.archives.gov/files/iwg/declassified-records/rg-263-cia-records/second-release-lexicon.pdf


02/09/53: Cable from Sr. Rep. Guatemala City to Director: Slugline PBFORTUNE: "1. Following from Oliver G. Galbond (J. C. King) from ESQUIRE via ESCONSON 9 Feb: 'Crisis here now at hand gravest events maybe touched off 6 p.m. today with public symbolic burning of constitution. Arbenz has stated those participants will leave their corpses in central plaza. His paranoid Hitler type speech to marching CTG groups Saturday evening with leaders of official parties including Communist and announced real revolution now begun will not be stopped by scraps of paper such as constitution. Further stated would use opportunity to liquidate reactionaries entirely, stated he intends to survive in order to write their death certificates in their own blood. His figure of individuals thus to be dispatched 800. Your embassy here apparently still passive and unresponsive to elements actively and subversively in opposition, does not reflect attitude of your government now formulated and announced by Eisenhower and Dulles...3. ESCONSON-2 states he doubts demonstration will be held since it is common gossip in national palace martial law will be declared..."


12/15/53: CIA document: Stage One Report: Annex B: Friendly Assets and Potential: Page 12: "A. GUATEMALA. 1. (REDACTION). a. The KUFIRE (Intelligence) agent coverage, Guatemala, is currently being handled through two projects, these being the ESCONSON and ESCROW projects. 1). ESCONSON Project. Principal Agent, ESCONSON-2, is a Guatemalan national (REDACTION) he served for several years as a member of the Guatemalan secret police. He is also known to have engaged in intelligence activities for the Guardia Judicial or plainclothes police of the Guatemalan government and also for the Guatemalan military intelligence service. ESCONSON-2 (formerly ESCALATOR) is believed to have identification documents of these various intelligence organizations and it is assumed that he uses them when necessary to obtain information. He is known to have at least four sub-agents. a. ESCONSON-3 is a Guatemalan, salesman-peddler, who previously worked for the secret police and was developed by ESCONSON-2 (REDACTION) for use by our organization. ESCONSON-2 and ESCONSON-3 are close friends...b. ESCONSON-4. Was developed by ESCONSON-2 (REDACTION) and had worked previously in the information section of the Guatemalan Guardia Judicial. He is a (REDACTION) by profession..."


01/28/54: Air dispatch from Chief of Project, PBSUCCESS to COS, Guatemala City: Subject: General - Operational Matters. Specific - KUFIRE Tasks, PBSUCCESS: Page 3: "A. Based in Guatemala: FT/1: Identity - ESCONSON Project. Responsible Officer - C/S, Guatemala City. Mission - To exploit capabilities of this project to provide psych/intelligence coverage of targets; (a) government officials; (b) high level military officials; (c) pro-government political groups and (d) to develop contacts within Communist circles: To probe all contacts for potential resistance cadre leaders. Estimated cost: $800.00..."


Undated: Memorandum to J. D. Esterline from Withheld: Subject: Material on Guatemalan Committee for Holland: "1. Attached is the memo from DD/P to WH re Holland's planned speech on Guatemala which requested that we furnish material suitable for use by him. 2. (REDACTION) and I checked the dispatches and cables from Guatemala to see if any such information as desired could be gleaned for Holland's use, but it was apparent that the meat of CIA information on the subject is contained in the study of Communism in Guatemala prepared by RQM/OIS in conjunction with Staff C and the State Department's ARA for use by the State Delegation to the Caracas Conference. Incidentally, that report contained information from dispatches gotten by RQM/OIS from RI which were based on reports by such GUAT sources as ESCROW and the ESCONSON group. The bulk of CIA information on the subject which may not have been contained in the OAS report is already in State's hands in the form of regular CS and CSDB's put out regularly by the desks..."


04/16/54: Air dispatch from COS, Guatemala, to Chief, LINCOLN: Subject: General - Operational. Specific - ESQUIRE. Reference - GUAT 305, 334; LINC 1649, 1753: "1. In accordance with LINC 1649 an effort was made to enter into contact with ESQUIRE through JMBLUG-2 as had been suggested by HUL-A-90. Unfortunately, our efforts through the intermediary JMBLUG-2 proved fruitless since ESQUIRE had departed the capital. 2. In view of the apparent gravity of the situation with respect (REDACTION) and his plans, Adrian B. Kidwell and I traveled on 8 April to ESQUIRE's finca where I held a short but interesting conversation with him. During this conversation, ESQUIRE stated that following the Salama incident he had become convinced that it would be better for him to avoid all further contact with ESCONSON, through whom he had previously reported, and as a result, he had also refrained from contact with any ODYOKE (U.S. Government) representatives until he began having some labor difficulties, he approached the predecessor of JMBLUG (John S. Peurifoy) and asked to be placed in contact with someone knowing something about agrarian matters. JMBLUG's predecessor introduced him to JMBLUG-2. In subsequent meetings with JMBLUG-2 ESQUIRE gave JMBLUG-2 whatever political information he had but insists that he did not reveal his previous contact with ESCONSON or with (REDACTION)...Earle N. Bannister." - - - 04/26/54: (Page 1) Routing and Record Sheet: Esterline number 3 in the "TO" column. Handwritten notes on RNDINDLE in "COMMENTS" section. At bottom of this section redactions before ESQUIRE, RNDINDLE, ESCONSON and JMBLUG-2.


05/23/54: Dispatch from LINCOLN to ACOS, Guatemala City (Info: Washington): Subject: General - Operational Matters. Specific - Intelligence Requirements: "1. In view of the events of the past few days it is believed that a review of our most important intelligence requirements as of this time is in order. Basically, there is no change from the directions which have gone out to you during the past few weeks. Your primary intelligence task continues to be the procurement of information on (1) the extent of the knowledge which the Guatemalan government and Army have regarding PBSUCCESS and (2) exactly what they propose to do with respect to this knowledge...5. Other assets of the station which might possibly be of some assistance from an intelligence standpoint would appear to be (REDACTION), ESPERANCE, ESQUIRE, and ESCONSON, (REDACTION), in particular, should be informed of the importance placed on the procurement of information of this type. He probably has access, or the means to obtain access, to the information we need, and all possible pressure should be placed on him to get this material. ESPERANCE, ESQUIRE and ESCONSON have government and military contacts which should be used to the limit of their possibilities. (REDACTION) Jerome C. Dunbar. (REDACTION) G. S. Vincent."

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Guatemala: Current Section: 222. 6/22/54-Telegram From the CIA Station in Guatemala to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida

06/22/54: Telegram from Guatemala Station to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida: "929. Ref LINC 4165. (2) 1. No indication ref true at this moment. 2. Reports from ESCONSON 2 and 7 indicated Commies and Commie dominated workers claim they intend attack embassies of unfriendly govts and especially PBPRIME (U.S.) embassy where expect seize documentation proving ODYOKE (U.S. Government)–Calligeris (Carlos Castillo Armas) collaboration. 3. Strafing attack morning 22 June described by competent PBPRIME observer as pathetic. One small oil tank on outskirts of city hit but fire out in 20 minutes. Flak not suppressed. Plane apparently did not come lower than thousand feet at anytime. ESAGE, ESPERANCE. 4. Public impression is that attacks show incredible weakness, lack of decision, and fainthearted effort. Calligeris efforts widely described as farce. Anti Commie anti govt morale near vanishing point. ESPERANCE, ESQUIRE, ESTIMATOR, ESCONSON. 5. One lone plane attacking half heartedly at this stage of game gives impression weakness. If Adam (Guatemala City) targets to be attacked, suggest some show real strength. Display this morning far more damaging our cause than to govt and Commies. Govt widely accusing ODYOKE of being involved in this insurrection and the people believe this to be so. Weakness and lack of decision is attributed to ODYOKE and will be reflected in attitude of people and especially of Commies and pro govt irregulars toward lives and property of PBPRIME residents in WSBURNT (Guatemala). Only force and decision will be respected. Words are useless."


05/06/69: Dispatch from Chief, Western Hemisphere Division to COS, Withheld; COS, JMWAVE: Subject: JMTEAK - Jose Alberto Cardoza Aguilar: - - - Page 112: ..."(3) ESCONSON..." Number 3 mentioned on page 95 (in ADDRESS-ES) section; page 97 (in POLITICAL AFFILIATION) section; and the first half of page 104.

Gavin McDonald

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