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Cryptonym: AMRUNG-1

Definition:
Rogelio Gonzalez y Corso, code name "Francisco". Name also referred to as Corzo and Corcho. Head of the internal resistance in Cuba until his capture in March 1961.
Status:
Documented
Sources:

104-10061-10115: List of Names re Kennedy Assassination Investigation

HSCA asks for true name of AMRUNG-1. CIA response is Rogelio Gonzalez y Corso. Name provided to CIA officers Chris Hopkins and Bill Sturbitts by the CI staff. http://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=26341#relPageId=19&tab=page

John Prados, Safe for Democracy, pp. 218, 256.

Rogelio Gonzalez y Corso was the internal resistance chief in Cuba of the MRR. Hr established it with Nino Diaz in Nov. 1959. By April 1960 the MRR network extended to all the provinces. In July, the FRD voted him To be the national chief in Cuba. He was arrested on 3/18/61 and executed shortly before the Bay of Pigs.

104-10162-10452: GIVEN TO MORALES BY BERNIE ON/A 29 APRIL 1960

A note "given to (David) Morales by Bernie (Reichardt)" 4/29/60: Artime writes that he needs to meet with Rogelio Gonzalez, he thinks Angel Fernandez Varela (AMPALM-4) might be able to set it up - and that he needs to speak with Gonzalez about military matters that he does not want Fernandez Varela to know about. Artime describes Gonzalez as an agricultural engineer and a member of the First Directorate of the MRR, and "my man of confidence" in Cuba. Artime also complains that because "I had to buy food for the boys who are in Miami and to rent a home in Fort Lauderdale for those who are going to arrive. THUS I NEED MONEY".

104-10162-10450: SENT TO MORALES TO HAVANA O/ABOUT 30 APRIL, TO ROGELIO

A note "sent to Morales to Havana...to Rogelio", 4/30/60: Ignacio asks Rogelio for information. He also provides some updates.

104-10167-10019: AMRUNG-1 informed Zamka he has been informed by AMHAWK that he and his group will not Cooperate with the Frente in Cuba

9/27/60 Havana to Director, for Twicker (Howard Hunt): "AMRUNG-1 informed Zamka he has been informed by AMHAWK'S representative known as 'Eladio' that he and his group will not cooperate with the Frente in Cuba. Eladio who reportedly is known as ""Maximiliano" to AMHAWK is believed to have been so instructed by AMHAWK."

104-10226-10139: UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA

Feb.-March 1961: After Lino Fernandez/AMYUM-1's arrest at MRR chief in Feb. 1961, the new chief Rogelio Gonzalez Corso (AMRUNG-1) "did not want to work with the UR (since this faction of the MRR was an internal member of the exile FRD). By mid-March 1961, the UR consisted of at least 22 different organizations and, in addition, guerrilla leaders of the Escambray (DUQUE, RAMIREZ, BEMBIBRE, and LIMA) had also signed the UR declaration. This led to a meeting in Havana on 18 March to finalize a working agreement between the MRR and the UR. Unfortunately, due to the indiscretion of another individual, G-2 members discovered the meeting, arresting GONZALEZ Corso, DIAZ Hanscom, and Humberto SORI Marin (the military coordinator of the UR) and the indiscreet individual. The four were shot during the invasion triage?, although Headquarters made attempts to get them released through bribes."

1994.04.25.13:51:29:440005 Reel 5, Folder I - UNIDAD REVOLUCIONIA (UR).

"By mid-March of 1961 the potential of the UR as an effective opposition movement...had grown considerably...It was reported that ROBERT GEDDES had penetrations in 27 police stations with the object of gaining control over them if revolt or invasion materialized...he (had) plans to seize the G-2 and PSP offices in every city and town in northern Las Villas prior to an invasion...the UR action included uprisings in Pinar del Rio, Matanzas, and Pinar del Rio; sabotage operations throughout the island; and rebellion in...the navy...an unfortunate breach occurred at a meeting in the Biltmore section of Habana on 18 March 1961. Leading members of UR and MRR (and of other groups) met to discuss unification of resistance strategy...it included over 30 leading resistance figures. REDACTED security forces learned of this meeting and its location, ordered a surprise raid...included among those arrested: National Coordinators Rafael Diaz Hanscomb (NOTE: Actually Rafael Diaz Hanscom) and Rogelio Gonzalez Corzo of UR and MRR: Maj. Humberto SORI Marin, military coordinator of UR."

Joan Mellen, The Great Game in Cuba: How the CIA Sabotaged its Own Plot to Unseat Fidel Castro (Skyhorse, )

3/11/61-4/20/61: "Confident that he had persuaded CIA of the folly of a precipitate invasion, with the Underground not yet ready and at so unpropitious a location, believing CIA’s assurances that it would heed his advice, Sorí decided to return to Cuba. (On 3/11/61, CIA) requested that Alberto Fernandez/AMDENIM-1 carry one of its radio operators, Manuel Puig Miyar (nickname: ñongo), into Cuba with Sorí to serve as Unidad’s radioman. Believing that CIA had accepted his 'Plan', Sorí agreed. 'In Cuba, you can overrule the Company at Sorí’s orders!' Alberto told the uninvited CIA passenger. (After dropping him off in Cuba, Alberto had second thoughts.) 'Tie him up and bring him back hog-tied' was what Alberto wanted to say. But he could not. Sorí was stubborn, determined to take CIA at its word. He allowed himself to believe that CIA was planning to adopt the Unidad 'Plan', which meant a postponement of the invasion, and a change in the landing site. Sorí then set about rounding up the missing leaders of the Underground, including the MRR’s 'Francisco.' High on Sorí’s list of tasks was to inform Artime’s MRR members of what he had agreed upon with CIA, that they would be under the discipline of Unidad. 'I’ll be all right. Don’t worry,' Sorí said. 'Pick me up on Friday!' Only later would Sorí realize that CIA had “pumped him for information” while committing itself to nothing, including changing the landing site (for the Bay of Pigs)...Geddes got a message to Alberto. $300,000 was needed to rescue Sorí. The money was for bribes to high officers in the rebel army, who would also have to be brought out of Cuba with their families. There would be fifty in all. Alberto appealed to his very rich father, who contributed most of the $300,000. (note: CIA contributed about $5000)..."

Joan Mellen, The Great Game in Cuba: How the CIA Sabotaged its Own Plot to Unseat Fidel Castro (Skyhorse, )

"CIA brought Geddes out of Cuba to Florida where he conferred with Alberto. Geddes collected the money. Then he returned to Cuba. For safekeeping, he deposited the $300,000 in the safe of the Hotel Capri. The treasonous radio operator (Pedro Sergio) Cuellar Alonso (note: aka Sergio Alonso, who turned in members of Unidad) was not yet done. He remained close enough to Unidad to learn about the plan to spring Sorí from the hospital. Then he slipped away, headed for a telephone, and turned Geddes in. Two days after he returned from Florida, Geddes was arrested and tossed into La Cabaña prison. The semi-gangster owner of the Hotel Capri immediately helped himself to the $300,000. "Executed on 4/20/60 after their 3/19/61 capture was Humberto Sorí Marín, as well as Rafael Díaz Hanscomb/AMGLAD-1, Manuel Puig Miyar, and Rogelio González Corso/AMRUNG-1, also known as 'Francisco,' chief of the MRR. (Alberto Fernandez/AMDENIM-1 told author Joan Mellen) that the execution of Sorí represented 'the collapse of everything,' all real hope of regaining Cuba." The self-defeating invasion at Cochinos had not been about overthrowing Castro. That had not been CIA’s agenda. Rather, the elaborate, expensive charade had been an exercise in CIA’s flexing its muscles, justifying its bloated budget and embarrassing an unreliable president with whom the Agency was at war. Alternatively, the Agency had sought to blackmail Kennedy into authorizing a full invasion of Cuba, absolving CIA of responsibility. That a successful invasion at the right time and place might have inspired a popular uprising, one that the Agency would not be able to control, was itself motive enough for CIA to sabotage the effort. (Mellen's book is based on interviews with AMDENIM-1 and others, as well as CIA documents, see her book and documents such as 104-10166-10226, pp. 7-8. (on Robert Geddes, Sori, and more.)

104-10193-10131: DISPATCH: AMOT-83 REPORTED THAT HE TALKED WITH SUBJECT WHO ARRIVED IN MIAMI FROM CUBA

5/25/61: Memo from Chief, JMWAVE to Chief, WH: Brunschwig reported to AMOT-83 that he was closely associated with the MRR in Dec. 1960 when it began to organize under a young man trained in the US "for the purpose of organizing that service in Cuba...after the capture of AMRUNG-1, chief of the underground in Cuba, Brunschwig became the secretary of the new chief" until the Bay of Pigs, when he had to go into hiding.

104-10226-10048: DISPATCH-THE FOLLOWING REPORT WAS RECEIVED AMOT SUB-SOURCE IN HAVANA

6/9/61, memo from Chief of Base, JMWAVE to Chief, WH: Zamka (David Morales) relays a memo he received from an AMOT subsource regarding the arrival of AMRUNG-1, Rafael Diaz Hanscom and Humberto Sori Marin.

104-10193-10168: MEMO: AMBRONC-5 AND AMJAVA-4 CONTACT REPORTS

August 1961, memo for the record by Clarence Pantleone: "Following AMRUNG-1's apprehension, AMBIDDY was asked who should coordinate internal action. AMJAVA-4 took his place beside the national coordinator who after the invasion took asylum. When this happened AMJAVA-4 assumed the position of national coordinator." Pantleone did not have much confidence in AMJAVA-4.

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