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Cryptonym: AMOZON

AMOZON was probably a JMWAVE infiltration team of anti-Castro Cubans from 1963 until around 1966.
Operation AMOZON was mentioned in cables on December 6 and December 9, 1963. In addition, a cable on December 14, 1963, stated that the AMOZON team had completed clandestine maritime reception and small boat training on December 13th. Moreover, a cable in February of 1966, on Operation SALLY XIV, mentioned the AMOZON team, which included AMOZON-1, AMHAM-1 (Juan Felaifel Canahan), AMSORREL-5 (Jose Nicolas Salado Mata), AMWOO-1, and AMYUM-18. Furthermore, a cable on March 9, 1966, mentioned that AMHAM-1 started working for JMWAVE in August 1963. He was initially recruited as a radio operator trainee, and was later placed with the newly formed AMOZON team. The cable also mentioned that AMHAM-1 was aware of the names of the Crown and Jade vessels, which were used by the AMOZON team on operations, and a number of facilities used by the team. AMOZON and AMLASH (Rolando Cubela Secades) were used as slugs in a number of cables in March, 1966. A cable on March 11, 1966, stated that if AMHAM-1 was a long-time Cuban Intelligence agent reporting regularly, then the Cuban security forces missed several chances to apprehend not only the AMOZON team and their inside assets, but also two very valuable JMWAVE assets, namely AMKHAN-2 (Carlos Martin Ahrens Temple) and AMKHAN-3, as well as AMISLE-2. The cable also mentioned that on Operation AMOZON VI, in December 1964, the team, which included AMHAM-1, emplaced a peso cache intended for the ATHENA project but was never used. Also, a cable in March 14, 1966, stated that AMHAM-1's chief was an American Lieutenant Colonel, who called himself Smith, and who was the AMOZON case officer, Leifeshe, who used Smith as an alias. A cable on March 18, 1966, mentioned that a few days previously the wife of AMOZON-5, in Isabela de Sagua, had phoned the home of AMSPAN-5 (brother of AMOZON-5) in Miami.


12/05/63: Cable from Director to JMWAVE (Orig: Withheld, Unit: SAS/IOS): Slugline RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE COMMO: "1. Re Ref A, POA granted AMOZON-1, subject Ref B, 5 Dec 63. Commo training authorized. Assigned 201-739650. 2. OA AMSORREL-5, subject Ref C amended 29 Nov 63 for commo training. SAS/Comment: *RYBAT. **(Unintelligible) PRQ Part I. ***Granted OA AMSORREL-5." 201 numbers at top of cable: 201-739650 and 201-311334.

1993.08.04.16:38:02:870028: JMWAVE CABLES, WAVE 8600 - 8699.

12/06/63: Cable from JMWAVE to Director: Slugline TYPIC LOGS COMMO: ..."2. Material required for Operations AMHICK, AMTRUNK, AMCRUEL, AMSAKI, and AMOZON. Six receivers required NLT 11 Dec for Ops AMHICK and AMSAKI."

1993.08.04.16:41:08:870028: JMWAVE CABLES, WAVE 8700 - 8797.

12/09/63: Cable from JMWAVE to Director: Slugline TYPIC LOGS COMMO: ..."4. Material requested by 1 Jan for Ops DAEDALUS, LEMNOS, AMCRUEL, AMSPARK, AMSAKI, AMOZON, and 4 EA for AMBANTY."


12/14/63: Cable from JMWAVE to Director: Page 3: ..."IV. Admin and Support: A. Training: 1. AMOZON team completed clandestine maritime reception and small boat training 13 Dec..."


02/24/66: Cable from JMWAVE: Slugline RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE AMOZON: AFTER ACTION REPORT OP SALLY XIV: "1. Following details supplement ref. A. AMOZON team departed OV Jade in IC at 22155 Feb local approx 2.5 miles from outer keys and proceeded towards Dromedarios Key...C. At 222230 on reaching initial bend in narrow channel 132395 AMOZON-1 heard sound of weapon bolt going into battery. He opened fire with BAR at boat located on right in mangroves only 10-12 feet from team craft. Firing from enemy on right almost simultaneous with that by AMOZON-1. Fire came from another boat on left at 132393 was returned by AMYUM-18 with LMG. Initial enemy burst apparently hit AMHAM-1 (Juan Felaifel Canahan) who fell from boat into water without uttering sound. Starboard engine hit and stopped running. AMWOO-1, P/A, ordered AMSORREL-5 to turn craft about, AMSORRER-5 pulled ahead to wider portion of channel where turn accomplished. Firing was reduced during turn. On return course AMYUM-18 and AMOZON-1 resumed firing at both enemy boats. Boat which fired initial burst fired briefly but soon ceased. Team believes it silenced by team fire. Other boat continued firing. Team estimated fire fight lasted total approx ten minutes..."


03/09/66: Cable from JMWAVE: Slugline RYBAT TYPIC AMOZON AMLASH: REF WAVE 9552 (IN 71501): "1. AMHAM-1 (Juan Felaifel Canahan) began work for WAVE in August 63. Initially recruited as radio operator trainee. Later placed with newly formed AMOZON team and since May 64 has served with team as radio op. Including SALLY XIV AMHAM-1 made 17 trips into Cuba. Was assessed as highly skilled radio operator and courageous agent...B. During training and ops he became acquainted with some 21 Cuban agents of WAVE affiliated with special ops or training elements. Some known only under alias, some under true name. Most were fellow agents on ops, fellow trainees, or principal agents for AMOZON team. C. He aware of name of ops vessel Crown which used for number AMOZON team ops...D. Aware of name of ops vessel Jade which used for number AMOZON ops...F. Aware of following WAVE training sites, in some instances exact location, in others general location. Param training house. Flamingo maritime training site. Everglades firing range. Plantation Key survival site. Commo training site Ocala. 6. Knows following safe areas: No. 231, AMOZON team area, terminated. No. 293, tempo AMOZON team area. No. 341, Big Pine Key special ops area. No. 335, current AMOZON team area. No. 239 training site...I. During 29 October - 2 December 63 he trained at (REDACTION) and (REDACTION). Since black flights involved, believe he not aware location either area..."


03/11/66: Cable from JMWAVE to Director: Slugline RYBAT TYPIC AMOZON AMLASH: Page 3: ..."B. If AMHAM-1 (Juan Felaifel Canahan) longtime CUIS agent reporting regularly then CUIS missed several chances to apprehend not only AMOZON team and their inside assets but also two very valuable WAVE assets, namely AMKHAN-2 (Carlos Martin Ahrens Temple) and AMKHAN-3, plus AMISLE-2. On Op AMOZON VI December 64 team incl AMHAM-1 emplaced peso cache intended for ATHENA project but never used; cache successfully retrieved by AMKHAN-2 in May 65. Op SALLY III July 65 emplaced large peso cache for AMKHAN op; cache retrieved by AMKHAN-2 July 65. Fact that AMKHAN-2, AMKHAN-3 and families were successfully exfiltrated by WAVE in Dec 65 and that interrogation and LCFLUTTERS indicated they not under CUIS control would seem indicate AMHAM-1 not under CUIS control as of Dec 63. Would appear chance to apprehend AMKHAN group and several KUBARK (CIA) ops craft and crews would have presented to CUIS an opportunity against which continued monitoring of AMOZON activity would be unimportant. *Portion missing - being (unintelligible)."


03/12/66: Cable from Director to JMWAVE: Slugline RYBAT TYPIC AMOZON AMLASH: "1. While arguments can be made supporting either position, HQs tends to agree with WAVE that AMHAM/1 (Juan Felaifel Canahan) was not DA. In this connection, HQs has taken following steps: A. LCFLUTTER operator Paul L. Napolilli was queried on AMHAM/1 test of 10 August 1963 which was described as routine and there no reason at time or now after reexamination to question results. Review of questions asked AMHAM/1, however, shows no specific reference to allegations in ODENVY (FBI) report dated 22 Aug 63. B. Horace D. Bickelhaupt, AMHAM/1 C/O from Dec 63 to July 64 remembered AMHAM/1 as hard working, conscientious and added that only misgivings he had were ODENVY allegations which resolved to C/O's satisfaction following talks with and assessment by AMWOO/1 in spring 64. 2. HQs recommends early interrogation and LCFLUTTER of AMBASS/1 (Anis Felaifel, chief of intelligence for the MRR) to determine: A. Bona fides AMBASS/1 himself. B. All he knows AMHAM/1 and particularly allegations made by ODENVY, i.e. informing against PBRUMENERS (Cubans), Estella Menendez, activities at Miami H.S. C. How much he revealed to AMHAM/1 re his work with AMBIDDY/1 (Manuel Artime Buesa) and the latter's connections with elements PBRUMEN (Cuba), particularly those in AMLASH (Rolando Cubela Secades) trial." Releasing Officer: William V. Broe, C/WHD. Coordinating Officer: B. Ortman, C/WH/C/MO. Authenticating Officer: John T. Flynn, A/DCWHD/C.


03/14/66: Cable from JMWAVE: Slugline RYBAT TYPIC AMLASH OMOZON: Cable states that the Carlos Martinez article is the most important article about the Cubela trial. "Article claim(s) AMHAM-1 (Juan Felaifel Canahan) took eight LCFLUTTER tests and had passed them all. Names of three alleged (CIA) agents in Miami (two of them correct). Fact his chief was American Lt. Col. who called self Smith (this is AMOZON case officer Leifeshe who used alias Smith). AMHAM-1 work as double agent made easier because his brother, AMBASS-1 (Anis Felaifel), was intel chief for MRR.


03/15/66: Cable from JMWAVE: Slugline RYBAT TYPIC AMOZON AMLASH: "1. FOLL summary developments SUBJ affair 11-14 March. Unless otherwise indicated phone calls were made with approval of station. 2. Morning 11 March AMBASS-1 (Anis Felaifel, chief of intelligence for the MRR) phoned cousin (IDEN A) in Havana. Latter seemed very frightened, said knew nothing about AMHAM-1 (Juan Felaifel Canahan) except what had heard on radio...4. Afternoon (unintelligible) March AMBASS-1 phoned cousin (IDEN A) again. Cousin very nervous and seemed very worried, said had seen AMBASS-1 sister (IDEN B) but that she knew nothing about AMHAM-1 fate...5. Afternoon 14 March AMBASS-1 phoned to IDEN C, his mother-in-law. IDEN C said she had seen IDEN B, that latter nervous and frightened, and that altho said she had not seen AMHAM-1, IDEN C thought she lying...B. AMBASS-1 noted various inaccuracies in AMHAM-1 statements. Example AMHAM-1 said knew of assassination plot against Castro for two and one half months: Actually AMBASS-1 mentioned matter to AMHAM-1 in January 1965. AMHAM-1 stated AMSEED-3 involved in KUBARK (CIA) op in Baracoa area of Oriente: AMBASS-1 stated AMHAM-1 knew target area of this op was Sagua de Tanamo area not Baracoa. C. AMBASS-1 does not believe AMHAM-1 was double agent. AMHAM-1 loved wife deeply and worried for her during his absences from Miami. AMHAM-1 basically not interested in political and social problems which disturbed most PBRUMEN (Cuban) exiles, was more interested in leisure activities than trying to pick up info re exile doings..." - - - 03/15/66: According to WAVE 9638: REF: WAVE 9637 (IN 75595): IDEN A was Orlando Damien. IDEN B was Josefina Felaifel. IDEN C was Clorinda (or Florinda) Aguirre. https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=47927&relPageId=6&search=WAVE_9638


03/18/66: Cable from JMWAVE: Slugline RYBAT TYPIC AMOZON: "1. Night 15 March wife of AMOZON-5 in Isabela de Sagua phoned to home of AMSPAN-5 (brother of AMOZON-5) in Miami. Mrs. AMOZON-5 stated that what initially happened to AMOZON-5 looked very bad but now things are better for him. No further details given. 2. Afternoon 16 March AMBASS-1 (Anis Felaifel, chief of intelligence for the MRR) phoned his cousin, IDEN A of WAVE 9638 (IN 75589), in Havana. IDEN A stated that none of family friends or relatives in Havana had seen AMHAM-1 (Juan Felaifel Canahan) and were apprehensive re his fate, promised phone AMBASS-1 as soon as any word received. 3. Night 16 March AMHAM-1's wife received phone call from his sister, IDEN B of WAVE 9638, in Havana. IDEN B stated that 'she had seen AMHAM-1 and that he was very sick' (Comment: Mrs. AMHAM-1 and AMBASS-1 interpret this as meaning AMHAM-1 is in jail facing a long prison sentence or worse). IDEN B added that AMHAM-1 'did not have cancer' (Mrs. AMHAM-1 and AMBASS-1 interpret this as meaning that AMHAM-1 is not a Communist agent, nor is he collaborating with the Communists). IDEN B stated that AMHAM-1 told her to contact AMBASS-1 to see if latter could get her out of Cuba since she soon would be in danger. IDEN B added that she doubted whether she would ever see AMHAM-1 again." - - - According to WAVE 9638 (03/15/66): IDEN A was Orlando Damien and IDEN B was Josefina Felaifel: https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=47927&relPageId=6&search=WAVE_9638


03/21/66: Cable from JMWAVE (Handwritten on right hand side: Grace): REF: WAVE 9564 (IN 72322): "1. After further study have decided postpone THOR III until April cycle. Following primary factors in decision. A. Not urgent to run up this cycle and possible higher state of coastal alert will be maintained as result of SALLY XIV, AMLASH trial and Ameijeiras affair (however to date no evidence indicating this is the case). B. Altho team willing carry out op this cycle if so directed, it clear they not enthusiastic about doing so, primarily because of publicity re AMLASH-AMOZON affair. Station considers situation not such that team should be pressed to run op this cycle. C. Better weather conditions likely next cycle. D. Can schedule op so as to obtain better moon conditions (view rugged terrain in op area it preferable not conduct in dark of moon conditions). 2. Plan run CIRRUS I and VEGA XVII as scheduled."

Gavin McDonald

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