Home/ Resources / Projects / CIA Cryptonyms / cryptonym: AMOT-106

Cryptonym: AMOT-106

Definition:
Jose Casas
Status:
Speculative
Sources:

104-10180-10164: CABLE: SW MESSAGE FROM AMOT-34 SAID HE TALKED TO ==== AND TOLD HIM RE HIS PLIGHT OF HAVING TO CACHE HIS W/T SET.

05/17/61, cable from JMWAVE to Director: Sluglines JMZIP AMOT COMMO: "1. SW message from AMOT-34 said he talked to 'Eugenio' (AMIRE-1) and told him re his plight of having to cache his W/T set (AJOLAS) on AMOT-106's farm which now guarded by militia. G-2 searched farm five times without locating set. Set cached in well. A-1 told A-34 he had extra set. In view Ref A instruction that A-1 leave PBRUMEN ASAP suggest A-1 be immediately notified turn over any surplus set to A-34. A-34 will remain PBRUMEN. 2. A-34 now providing excellent intel reports via SW. Base WAVE believes providing A-34 with another W/T set at this time would double his value to overall KUTUBE/KUDESK objectives PBRUMEN. C/S Comment: *Stated only WT sets cached HAVA were thru KUTUBE Staybehind assets." Handwritten note: 201-274049 (check), FI. 5/17/61

104-10180-10164: SW MESSAGE FROM AMOT-34 SAID HE TALKED TO ==== AND TOLD HIM RE HIS PLIGHT OF HAVING TO CACHE HIS W/T SET.

5/18/61 memo from Stanley R. Zamka/David Morales, Chief of Base, JMWAVE to Chief, WHD, Operational/JMZIP/AMOT, SW Message No. 11 from AMOT-34: "The following SW message was received from AMOT-34 on 12 May 1961. The message also contained intelligence information which is being reported separately. AMOT-106 and REDACTED are under surveillance and have not been able to retrieve equipment (W/T set) due to constant militia guard of AMOT-106's farm. On 8 May I talked to AMIRE-1 and brought him up to date regarding my equipment (W/T set), and also about still having my signal plan and pads intact."

104-10310-10020: FILE:DDCI DOCUMENTS

5/22/61 dispatch from Chief of Station, JMWAVE to Chief, WH: "Following is a brief summary of JMWAVE/KUDESK current assets in the Target Area (Cuba): AMOT-34: Subject is a source of operational intelligence in Cuba...AMOT-106, 107 and 108...provide AMOT-34 with operational intelligence in Habana.

104-10215-10256: CABLE: APPRECIATE REF BUT PREFER NOT

5/22/61 memo from Chief of Base, JMWAVE to Chief, WH: "A brief summary of JMWAVE/KUDESK current assets in the target area (Cuba). Analyze AMOT-34, AMOT-48, AMOT-106, 107 and 108, and various AMOT subsources."

104-10163-10019: WITHHELD

5/16/63 cable LX-320: Memorandum of Contact with Jose Antonio Casas Rodriguez, 201-327702. Was he AMOT-106? Casas said that Azcue was a very close friend of Manolo Castro, who was "reportedly murdered by a group of Communist left wing revolutionaries that included Fidel Castro." See Commission Document 1140, page 18 of 23: FBI officer O'Connor claims that Castro killed student leader Manolo Castro and other individuals before he took power in Cuba. See Ilan Ehrlich's book "Eduardo Chibas: The Incorruptible Man of Cuban Politics", p. 46, which names Dr. Gustavo Ortiz Faz as the killer of Manolo Castro.

104-10163-10450: DISPATCH: INTEL/TYPIC PROGRESS REPORT FOR JUNE 1963

7/2/63 dispatch from Chief of Station, JMWAVE to Chief, SAS: The Cuban intelligence production for June 1963 included UFG-2983 on "incidents in provoking friction between foreign persons and Cubans in Cuba". The source was described as AMAPACHE-1, and described as involving "Esperanza; Alfonso Montes Torrano; AMOT-106 via AMBLEAK courier)".

104-10163-10265: DISPATCH: OPERATIONAL/TYPIC/AMOT-106 VISIT TO CUBAN CONSULATE ON 9 AUGUST 1963

On August 9, 1963, AMOT-106 went to the Cuban consulate in Mexico City because he had a re-entry visa for Cuba - spent five hours with Azcue and concluded he was a "very kind and helpful person" who could be convinced to turn against the Communists. Azcue said he left Cuba because his friend Manuel aka Manolo Castro was killed in a revolutionary incident many years ago, and criticized both Carlos Prio and Fulgencio Batista. Azcue assured AMOT-106 that he would assist amy member of AMOT-106's family in the USA to obtain permission to return to Cuba. AMOT-106 reported what he had learned to Tony Sforza. AMOT-106 asked Azcue where he could buy auto spare parts at a discount, and Azcue took him to the spot. Bill Harvey was always interested in this kind of thing. (See 104-10185-10364 for Harvey's notes about Intercontinental S.A., and the excerpt below from State Secret, Chapter 4) "One key project was focused on the corporation Transcontinental S.A. in Mexico City, engaged in bringing black market vehicles from the United States into Cuba. The ability to track Transcontinental S.A., and its change of name, location and phone number was considered during 1963 as a "most noteworthy LIFEAT contribution” to station efforts on Cuba. It was considered a good way to learn about the Cuban Embassy’s contacts and commercial products sought by the Cuban government. Project LIFEAT, Project Review (Parts 1 and 2), 6/1/63, pp. 2 and 5, NARA Record Number: 104-10413-10052. The head of Transcontinental S.A. was Dallas import-export agent Ramon Cortez, also known as Ramon Cortes and Raymond Cortez. Cortez had a history of working both sides of the street with the Capri casino in Havana and as a friend of Che Guevara and a celebrant at May Day celebrations. A Dallas jury convicted Cortez for impersonating a Guatemalan diplomat, but Cortez never went to jail. His variety of names served him well.

104-10163-10265: DISPATCH: OPERATIONAL/TYPIC/AMOT-106 VISIT TO CUBAN CONSULATE ON 9 AUGUST 1963 (continued)

On September 3, 1963, JMWAVE chief Ted Shackley sent a report directed to Fitzgerald, with copies to Scott and J. C. King. This report incorporates a four page memo reported to AMOT case officer Tony Sforza by “AMOT-106”. When AMOT-106 met with Azcue, he noticed a funny interaction between an American man, his son, Azcue, and Silvia Duran – the Mexican secretary recently hired to replace Azcue’s recently deceased cousin Maria Ollivarri. Duran was at ease as she teased Azcue. “The American spoke to Azcue and the Mexican secretary stated to A-106 that the American was a stupid fool to want to take his son with him to the Cuban hell. Azcue was believed to have overheard that statement. A-106’s attention was directed to the very familiar manner in which the Mexican girl spoke to A-106 in Azcue’s presence.” Note that Shackley’s report may actually have been written by SAS/CI Guy Vitale: Id., p. 1 (“cross-reference to Vitale” on bottom of page). See Bill Simpich, State Secret, Chapter 3: "Ominously, the aforementioned memo also states that Azcue’s cousin who worked as a secretary at the Cuban consulate died in a car accident. Azcue told AMKNOB-1 on 8/14/63 “it is said she was killed intentionally” during the previous month. At the funeral, Azcue asked Silvia Duran to stay at the consulate as her replacement. Duran had been helping out at the consulate for about a month prior to the accident."

104-10163-10012: ABOUT 1500 HOURS, 10 SEPTEMBER 1963.

On 9/10/63, Casas was approached by Galen Peary with a request to ask him to go to Mexico City and try to persuade Azcue to defect. See State Secret, Chapter 3: A memo went out from FitzGerald’s office (on Sept 10), reminding Mexico City that the goal for Azcue is recruitment in place and not defection. The memo added that since Azcue was planning to leave for Cuba in ten days, either LITAMIL-3 or REDACTED should make the pitch to Azcue. It’s clear that REDACTED is Azcue’s friend, the defector Casas. On September 11, Casas’ boss made it clear to SAS that he did not want Casas leaving his job in Pennsylvania. Who would replace Casas? Was it Oswald? Or AMKNOB-1? On September 13, the Mexico City station reported that a female informant let them know that Azcue was leaving for a visit to Cuba. The memo says that HQ has made it clear that the goal is to convince Azcue to agree to “recruitment in place” rather than to defect. Most importantly, the memo also mentioned that since Azcue was willing to provide passports and other favors to anti-Castro Cubans, LITAMIL-3 and (redacted, but almost certainly) Casas should be used in a “compartmented one-two punch.” Since Casas was now out of the game, who would it be? Oswald or AMKNOB-1? On September 19, just a week before Oswald’s arrival to Mexico City, LITAMIL-3 made his pitch to recruit consul Eusebio Azcue. Azcue said, “You know my feelings on this. Have not changed mind, will not change mind.” The memo from Mexico City has handwritten notes on it, saying “Good try. Nothing lost”, and “…let’s wait for further developments.” It looks like Jack Whitten’s initials, “JHS”, used for his alias “John H. Scelso”. Harvey’s colleague Neill Prew is also copied on this important document."

See Also:
Contributors:
David Boylan • Bill Simpich

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