Cryptonym: AMLEG-29
104-10308-10054: CABLE: AMLEG 29 MET BY WARMBOLD AND AMLEG 1 ON 20 APR
04/22/63: Cable from Hague to Director (Info: JMWAVE, FRAN, HAMB): "1. AMLEG-29 met in ROTT by Warmbold and AMLEG-1 on 20 April. He explained that he did not recruit IDEN A as planned because IDEN B told him IDEN A is now being watched closely due his recent attempts to resign from military. A-29 had no free time to see and make own assessment IDEN A situation due serious illness mother and his required presence aboard ship during repairs. 2. Info in ref obtained by AMLEG-29 from IDEN C. Request traces. She is former girl friend of AMLEG-29 and parents are neighbors. She very active in resistance group whose name sounds like 'Frente Liberacion Nacional - Frente Liberacion Escambray.' A-29 sees her in Havana each time home although she spends circa two of every three weeks with grandparent in Matanzas. 3. A-29 certain IDEN C would accept recruitment by him to work with U.S. Warmbold seeing him again evening 23 April. Request OPIM permission prior next meeting with A-29 to instruct him to recruit IDEN C, train and give her SW and accommodation address previously planned for IDEN A." - - - Page 2: "IDEN A: (REDACTION). IDEN B: (REDACTION) brother-in-law of (REDACTION) see previous info of (REDACTION) from AMLEG-29. IDEN C: (REDACTION) DOB circa 39, resides with mother and father (REDACTION) resigned from job as teacher in (REDACTION) had U.S. visa prior blockade nullified chance to leave. Father former sergeant in Batista army now gardener. Sister (REDACTION) DOB circa 36, is office clerk in La Isla De Cuba Department store, has applied for U.S. visa. Grandfather and uncle live in Matanzas."
104-10308-10053: CABLE: REF DISCUSSED BY STA WITH EDMENT AND WARMBOLD.
04/22/63: Cable from Hague to Director Slugline RYBAT KEYWAY PBRUMEN AMLEG: "1. Ref discussed by STA with Edment and Warmbold. Due instability and undesirability (REDACTION) and lack of independent assets with access to Cuban ships, only possibility implement ref at this time by use of AMLEGS...In general believe AMLEGS willing cooperate this effort only if they convinced it part of 'final effort' overthrow Castro. (AMLEGS-12 and 29 expressed general disillusionment over U.S. restrictions similar action by emigres in U.S. and found it difficult reconcile our request for their assistance this op with apparent U.S. policy stop others from carrying out similar activity). B...Also, Cuban G-2 likely attempt major effort break AMLEG complex (which will be suspected) and may take reprisals against CIA/U.S. State Department installations thereby identified...2. Re specific action against Havana (which arrived Rotterdam 19 Apr and departing direct to HAVA 26 Apr). Sabotage raised by Warmbold and Edment with AMLEGS-12 and 29 with following results:...B. AMLEG-29 appeared genuinely interested performing internal sabotage on ship but as chief engineer would require collaborator in engine room since he does not take regular engine room duty and his presence there always for specific inspection which observed by men who are on duty. His mother in Cuba on verge nervous breakdown and action his part now would require his immediate defection which he not willing do because of mother. If another engine room AMLEG transferred his ship prior next voyage he would be willing cause serious damage which could plausibly be explained as natural accident or breakdown." (CONTINUED BELOW)
104-10308-10053: CABLE: REF DISCUSSED BY STA WITH EDMENT AND WARMBOLD.
"3. Believe AMLEG-29 would possibly be willing to plant four hour delay explosive 'Clam' to one of 34 drums of 'Tetrahyrdofuran' which to be loaded on duty. Manifest lists substance as minus 20 degrees centigrade. Clam would be planted after ship arrives home port. Have not discussed this action with AMLEG-29 yet. Please advise OPIM prior next meeting with AMLEG-29..."
04/23/63: Cable from Hamburg to Director: Slugline RYBAT TYPIC AMLEG: "1. HAMB basically opposed using talented and well motivated agents such as AMLEG-29 capable performing inside recruitments as action agents in sabotage efforts. Prefer recruit low level assets with no family inside to undertake this type assignment. 2. Unless DIR considers sabotage effort this particular ship absolutely necessary request we postpone use AMLEG-29 pending more complete study effects sabotage effort on AMLEG (an FI - foreign intelligence - operation using Cuban merchant seamen) program, possibilities retaliation and clarification goals wish achieved. C/S Comment: *Re sabotage on Cuban ship."
04/23/63: Cable from Director to Hague (Info: Hamburg, Frankfurt): (Orig: Janet Nixon, V. Sherman, SAS/EOB - WE/5): REFS A. HAGU 3698 (IN 22804)* B. HAGU 3695 (IN 22657)** C. HAGU 3696 (IN 22624)*** D. HAMB 3278 (IN 23241)**** "1. Approve Ref A para 3 action if agent accepts chief of mission must be informed. Any comments he wishes make are to be sent ODACID (U.S. State Department) via Roger Channel. 2. If AMLEG-29 refuses proposal, approve recruitment, training in SW and assignment accommodation address to IDEN C Ref C. No traces, POA in progress. 3. Will comment soonest on other considerations raised Refs A and D. SAS/Comment: *Para 3 proposed that AMLEG-29 place a four-hour delay explosive 'CLAM' to one of 34 drums of 'TETRAHYDROFURAN' which to be loaded on the deck of the HAVANA. **AMLEG-29 wishes to recruit a Cuban woman active in resistance groups. ***Gives name and biographic data on above contact. ****Hamburg's views on sabotaging Havana."