Cryptonym: AMBRONC-1
This FBI memo on January 25, 1961, described Colonel Martin Elena as a "former Cuban Military Attaché, Washington, D. C." https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=125264#relPageId=14
AMBRONC-5 was Juan Manuel Guillot Castellanos, alias "Monty".
104-10061-10115: LIST OF NAMES RE KENNEDY ASSASSINATION INVESTIGATION
#10 on this list provided to HSCA by CIA identifies AMBRONC-1 as "Eduardo Martin y Elina".
"The civilian head of the (FRD) is "Tony" de Varona. His military counterpart is said to be Col. Eduardo Martin Elena, a respected career Cuban army officer, reportedly untainted by connections with the Batista government.
104-10274-10003: MEETING WITH AMBRONC-1 AT CRABANAC'S COCONUT GROVE APARTMENT, 21 DECEMBER 1960
12/29/60 memo by Wallace A. Parlett/Gerald Droller about meeting with AMBRONC-1/Colonel Eduardo Martin y Elena at Crabanac's (Howard Hunt's) apartment in Coconut Grove. Parlett was accompanied by Eustace C. Keator aka "Colonel Roderick". Parlett described AMBRONC-1 as "an outstanding, non-political Cuban who was respected by one and all".
104-10073-10121: FORMER BAY OF PIGS PRISONER INTERVIEWED
"On 30 January 1961, Manuel Villafana/LITAINT-1, head of the Cuban Air Force in exile attached to the Brigade 2506, visited Trax Base. Villafana read a copy of the letter he had sent to the (FRD) demanding, in the name of members of the Brigade 2506, to remove the general staff of the Directorate, FRD, and reinstate Jaime Varela Canosa as Navy Chief. Varela had been released as Navy Chief by Eduardo Martin Elena then Chief of Joint Staff with headquarters in Miami. Villafana had the approval of Brigade headquarters, but the opposition of the majority of the Brigade members. We considered this an act of insubordination to the Chief of the Joint Staff and to the civil authorities of the FRD...Some men refused to continue training until an acceptable solution was reached. About 14 of these men were sent under arrest to Peten plains where they were fed by airdrops. The rest continued training under the direct command of the American instructors."
104-10168-10072: CABLE: AS ANTICIPATED AMDIP-1 RAISED AMBRONC-1 AFFAIR DURING 9 FEB 61 MEETING
2/10/61 from Gerry Droller at JMBELL to Guatemala City: "As anticipated AMDIP-1 (Tony Varona) raised AMBRONC-1 affair during 9 Feb 61 meeting with Crabanac (Howard Hunt) and Parlett...AMDIP-1 maintains that AMBRONC dismissal should have been handled via AMPORT/FRD Executive Committee...AMDIP warns that if troops become aware (of) unilateral AMBRONC dismissal wholesale exodus from camps of more than half of troops will occur. AMDIP-1 cites Mr. William Carpenter as having told pilots that AMPORT useless instrumentally. AMDIP-1 repeatedly alleged not only AMIRON but also majority (of) Miami Cubans solidly behind AMBRONC-1 (on) this issue. AMDIP-1 stated that some formula needed soonest (to) smooth ruffled feelings. Further said Villafana (LITAINT-1) and San Roman not acceptable to him and AMPORT in any leadership capacity."
2/18/61 memo from JMWAVE to BELL: In discussions regarding AMPORT/FRD Executive Committee, "apparent reason for AMJAG-1/Justo Carrillo non-acceptance of trav trip is fact AMBRONC-1 was AMJAG-1 nominee."
104-10143-10048: DRAFT DOCUMENT: COMMENTS ON BOOK V, SSC FINAL REPORT,
6/4/61: Another agent message dated 4 June 1961 asked about a man who had identified himself as Moratori, who claimed to work with US intelligence and to be in touch with one Martin Elena and others (not identifiable), who 'have plans for an invasion within 30 days, after the death of Fidel'. A reply, dated 6 June, stated that the information was not true and that Moratori was not known and should not be trusted. Insofar as CIA records show, there was an Italian diplomat of that name in Cuba at that time. Little is known about him.) The orginator of the agent message cannot be identified from present records." Note that Martin Elena's name was redacted in 1994.11.18.11:04:22:470006 at p. 86 - his name was revealed in 2017.
ELC was in formation in April 1962. Col. Ramon Barquin wanted Martin Elena to be its leader. Martin Elena was not yet willing to commit - he wanted clarity "of the acceptance of the ideas of the organization by Cubans in general".
Carlos Prio was trying to spark an invasion of Cuba in late 1963. Francisco Fesser was the source of this story. Prio brought together three former commanders of high rank, including Martin Elena "known more for his capability than his valor". Prio claimed to have bases in eight countries and spoke disparagingly of the CIA. Was seeking money from wealthy donors.